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FOREWORD
In May of 1982, the Industrial Union Department's (IUD) Labor 
Policy Institute initiated a project to assess the impact on trade unions 
and collective bargaining of worker participation or quality of worklife 
plans.
Individual unions have had different experiences with, and reactions 
to, such programs. In some cases unions have rejected such plans, citing 
their negative impact on collective bargaining. In other situations, 
typically those involving unions that have been integrally involved in for 
mulating and operating worker participation programs, the reaction has 
been much more positive. Given this diversity, we thought that it would 
be useful to sponsor research that could document the variety of positive 
and negative experiences unions have encountered.
Professor Tom Kochan from MIT, who undertook the research with 
his colleagues Harry Katz and Nancy Mower, has had wide experience in 
the field of industrial relations. In addition, a number of IUD affiliates 
assisted the MIT researchers in defining the questions and helped assess 
the results of the study. We owe special thanks to those unions which 
made special efforts to facilitate access to members and officials for Pro 
fessor Kochan and his associates.
We feel that this study is a useful tool for workers considering par 
ticipation in QWL and QWL-related schemes. Those contemplating such 
approaches will, as a result of this research, be better able to identify pit 
falls as well as a variety of means for enhancing the potential success of 
their efforts.
Howard D. Samuel, President 
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO
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Chapter 1________________
What's the Problem?
The growth of quality of working life (QWL) programs, 
related forms of worker participation processes, and ex 
periments with new forms of work organization in the past 
decade have posed both new challenges and potential oppor 
tunities to the American labor movement. On the one hand, 
these informal mechanisms require union leaders and 
managers to modify their traditional roles and relationships 
in significant ways. On the other hand, they open new chan 
nels for direct worker involvement and, possibly, for greater 
worker and union influence. These developments have 
generated a vigorous debate among union leaders concerning 
whether QWL and related participation processes will, in the 
long run, be good or bad for labor unions and for the 
workers they represent. Yet, the debate has, to date, largely 
taken place in a vacuum. While strong rhetorical arguments 
have been presented by both the supporters and the critics of 
worker participation processes, little direct examination of 
union experiences with these processes has informed the 
discussions.
In early 1982, however, a group of labor leaders meeting 
under the auspices of the Industrial Union Department of 
the AFL-CIO agreed to commission an independent study of 
the experiences of unions with worker participation pro 
cesses. The processes studied operate under a variety of
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labels in addition to QWL, such as Quality Circles (QC), 
Employee Involvement (El), Labor-Management Participa 
tion Teams (LMPT), socio-technical work systems, etc. The 
purpose of this book is to report the results of that study. 
The common characteristics of the QWL and related forms 
of worker participation studied are that all these programs 
involve small groups of union members and/or officers in in 
formal workplace participation processes which supplement 
the formal collective bargaining procedures. Some of these 
programs also go on to modify the way jobs and work are 
structured and organized at the workplace. These shop floor 
or office level forms of direct worker participation stand in 
contrast to the more long-standing form of indirect par 
ticipation commonly found in U.S. industrial relations: the 
joint labor-management committee. Indeed, a comparison 
of these two forms of participation can be instructive since 
they are likely to focus on different issues and have different 
effects on workers, unions, and the larger bargaining rela 
tionship. For this reason, one of the cases reported in this 
study is a labor-management committee. We will use that 
case to highlight the differences in these two forms of par 
ticipation.
Worker Participation 
and American Industrial Relations
One might ask, why should representatives of the labor 
movement even question the benefits to be gained from ef 
forts to increase worker participation in decisionmaking at 
the workplace? Shouldn't any process that serves to increase 
the voice workers have in issues that affect them be consis 
tent with the goals of labor unions? An answer to these ques 
tions requires a grounding in the history and basic features 
of the American industrial relations system and the role and 
status of labor unions in American society.
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Since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 
1935, the American industrial relations system has been 
designed around the premise that collective bargaining is the 
preferred channel for worker representation and participa 
tion at the workplace. The American system of collective 
bargaining is based on the concept that a duly certified union 
is to serve as the exclusive representative of workers. As the 
exclusive representative, a union has the right to negotiate 
with management over a clearly defined, but limited, scope 
of issues pertaining to wages, hours, and working condi 
tions.
This legislation emerged out of a political and social en 
vironment that had previously been quite hostile toward the 
rights of workers to organize to protect their collective in 
terests and to participate in decisions at the workplace. Sup 
port for the rights of workers to organize and be represented 
by national unions (i.e., unions whose membership base ex 
tends beyond the boundary and control of the employer) 
arose only after the collapse of the American Plan in the 
1920s. The American Plan consisted of a mix of strategies 
providing limited participation rights to employees through 
informal committees or company unions dominated by the 
employer. 1 The plan and employer resistance to unions were 
weakened by successful organizing drives by industrial 
unions in the 1930s. Thus, the power and stability offered by 
a legally enforceable collective bargaining contract and an 
independent collective bargaining agent were achievements 
that American workers and their labor unions fought hard to 
achieve in the 1930s and have valued ever since.
Since the 1930s, collective bargaining has served as the 
basic institution by which American workers have enhanced 
their economic security and expanded their sphere of in 
fluence at the workplace. This incremental expansion of col 
lective bargaining contracts was achieved through hard
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bargaining supported by the bargaining power achieved 
largely through the threat of the strike.
Although collective barganing has expanded in scope since 
the 1930s, American unions have never been genuinely ac 
cepted by American management as valued partners in in 
dustrial relations. The prevailing American managerial 
strategy continues to be, on the one hand, to avoid unions 
wherever possible, and on the other hand, to deal construc 
tively with unions wherever they exist or cannot successfully 
be avoided. 2 This management strategy, along with a deeply 
ingrained belief that social and economic gains can only be 
achieved through struggle and hard bargaining, has produc 
ed a sense of insecurity and distrust of employer motivations 
among many American labor union leaders. While the above 
statements may overdramatize the conditions under which 
the American industrial relations system and U.S. labor 
unions have evolved, they set the context for the reception 
received by early efforts to introduce QWL concepts to 
American unions.
Early Responses to QWL
QWL theory in its simplest form is based on the proposi 
tion that through collaboration and cooperation of workers 
and employers the quality of working life experiences of in 
dividual workers and the goals of employers can be 
simultaneously enhanced. 3 While this is a laudable objective 
that would be difficult for anyone to oppose, more careful 
examination of the way it was introduced to American 
unions helps us to understand why it was viewed with con 
siderable skepticism by the majority of labor leaders.
In order to understand the initial response of the 
American labor movement to early proponents of QWL 
theories and strategies, we need to look at the origins of 
those theories and their mode of introduction to American
What's the Problem? 5
unions. While the theoretical underpinnings for QWL 
strategies can be traced back to early human relations 
theory, 4 for our purposes we need only look back to the late 
1960s and early 1970s when the term QWL first became part 
of the American vocabulary.
Furthermore, early proponents of QWL largely ignored 
the history of industrial relations and collective bargaining 
outlined above. While industrial relations recognizes the 
need for both hard bargaining and mutual cooperation, 5 the 
behavioral science theories upon which the QWL advocates 
derived their strategies ignored the conflict side of the 
employment relationship and stressed only the need for and 
value of cooperation. In their crudest form, the behavioral 
science theories were really theories of management 
developed for managers rather than theories of the employ 
ment relationship from which policies and practices could be 
derived for balancing the diversity and maximizing the com 
monality of interests at the workplace.
Labor union representatives were quick to point out that 
these behavioral science theories left no significant role for 
labor unions as representatives of workers. Indeed, most 
behavioral science and QWL applications found their homes 
in nonunion companies and were used as part of the union 
avoidance strategies of these firms. 6 Thus, many observers 
within the labor movement saw the QWL strategies as simply 
another in the long list of efforts of American employers to 
weaken the labor movement. 7 In essence, QWL was perceiv 
ed as simply the American Plan revisited. The values of 
openness, high trust, extensive communications and par 
ticipation of individuals which the behavioral scientists em 
phasized were seen as simply another way of avoiding the 
need to deal with collective bargaining.
Consequently, QWL started off in the U.S. with a poor 
image among labor unions. It did not help that the early pro-
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ponents of QWL experiments also tended to oversell the con 
cept as a solution to the "Lordstown" syndrome. That is, in 
the minds of the QWL advocates, the problems facing 
American workers in the late 1960s and the early 1970s were 
that workers were alienated from their work because they 
were closed off from meaningful opportunities to influence 
their working environment. This alienation allegedly was the 
cause of excessive levels of absenteeism, wildcat strikes, and 
the blue-collar blues. In addition to diagnosing the problem 
in this way, the QWL advocates also had a ready-made solu 
tion, namely, to experiment with a predesigned QWL pro 
gram and thereby begin to address the "real" needs of 
American workers. 8 Little thought was given to how these 
new strategies for participation would relate to existing col 
lective bargaining and industrial relations systems. Nor were 
systematic efforts made to assess the extent to which unions, 
through collective bargaining, were in fact effectively 
responding to the priorities of their members. Correspond 
ingly, the reception given to the early QWL efforts was quite 
cool from union, and even from many management, 
representatives.
But despite this rocky start, some highly visible experimen 
tation did take place in the early 1970s under the auspices of 
the National Commission on Productivity and Quality of 
Working Life with the support of research and consulting ex 
penses provided by the Ford Foundation. These government- 
and foundation-sponsored experiments were complemented 
by a variety of private initiatives in both nonunion and union 
plants. The early experimental sites have now become 
household names within quality of working life circles. The 
most frequently discussed experiments occurred in the 
Rushton Mining Company, General Motors Tarrytown 
plant (and subsequently many other plants of General 
Motors), the Bolivar, Tennessee plant of Harmon Manufac-
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turing Company, the Topeka General Foods pet food plant, 
and several others. 9
While many of these highly visible programs faded away 
by the latter part of the 1970s (especially those sponsored by 
the government), they were succeeded by a much broader ar 
ray of private experiments that emerged near the end of the 
decade and in the early 1980s. This second generation of ex 
perimentation was fueled by the deepening economic crisis 
affecting American industry, the growing awareness of the 
stagnant productivity trends experienced in the American 
economy in the 1970s, and the increasing attention given to 
Japanese management practices by the American mass 
media. Indeed, according to one set of estimates, in early 
1982 approximately 1,000 companies had Quality Circles 
under way, 100 companies had more advanced forms of 
work reorganization experiments involving autonomous 
work groups and another 500 or so companies were engaged 
in Scanlon Plan type (productivity gains sharing) projects. 10 
In recent years, interest in various forms of participation has 
clearly diffused to a wider spectrum of firms and unions. 
Perhaps most significantly, a number of international unions 
have negotiated clauses into their agreements that launched 
joint union-management participation experiments. The 
most notable examples are found in the contracts between 
the United Automobile Workers and the major auto firms, 
the United Steelworkers of America (USW) and eight major 
steel producers, and the Communication Workers of 
America (CWA) and AT&T.
The Current Context For Worker Participation
This brings us to the current debate within labor union 
circles. Clearly, there is now a much wider diversity of views 
within the American labor movement concerning the viabili-
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ty of quality of working life processes than was the case in 
the previous decade.
At the same time, fear and suspicion still exist among 
many unions and workers regarding QWL programs. The 
basic fear expressed by opponents or critics of worker par 
ticipation programs is that their ultimate effect will be to 
undermine the strength and effectiveness of the local union 
and the collective bargaining process. Specifically, critics 
have argued that: (1) workers and/or employers may see 
these processes as substitutes for, rather than as supplements 
to, the collective bargaining process and established 
grievance procedures; (2) workers may begin to question the 
need for a union if they see employers listening to and solv 
ing their problems through QWL or other direct worker par 
ticipation processes; (3) union leaders may become too close 
ly identified with management or get co-opted into 
managerial decisions, lose touch with their members, or ex 
perience heightened internal political instability or conflict; 
and (4) informal participation processes may turn out to be 
simply another short-lived strategy for employers to gain 
greater control over and effort from workers without pro 
viding them with any real power to influence important deci 
sions within the firm. Finally, since these efforts are often 
used by nonunion employers as part of their union avoidance 
strategy, some labor leaders see these processes as inherently 
antiunion in design.
Supporters of worker participation processes generally 
argue that the negative consequences outlined above can be 
avoided by proper union involvement in the design and im 
plementation of participation programs. Supporters also 
stress that many employers will be experimenting with these 
processes regardless of whether or not the union is involved. 
Remaining outside of the process or being involved in only a 
minimal way will further erode the status of the union at the 
workplace. Others argue that support for worker participa-
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tion should be more than a defensive reaction to employer 
initiatives. They believe unions should embrace worker par 
ticipation processes as strategies for extending industrial 
democracy to individual workers. Finally, some union ad 
vocates believe that, by making worker participation pro 
cesses an important part of the broad agenda of the labor 
movement, unions will enhance their attractiveness to new 
workers in future organizing campaigns.
Theoretical and Analytical Issues
The central theoretical argument running through our 
analysis of these issues is that worker participation processes 
move through several stages of evolution as they unfold. It is 
only by understanding the dynamics of these processes 
through time that we can hope to understand their effects on 
local unions and on the larger collective bargaining relation 
ship and assess the arguments of the QWL advocates and 
critics.
It is particularly important to follow workplace ex 
periments through at least one complete contract cycle, i.e., 
from the initiation of the experiment to at least one follow- 
up negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement. This 
allows us to observe how the participation process affects 
and is integrated into the larger collective bargaining rela 
tionship. In addition, to test the stability or survival power 
of these experiments, it is necessary to watch what happens 
to them over time as business conditions change, key 
management and/or union supporters turn over or hand 
over responsibility for the project to others, union leaders 
who support the process stand for reelection, and other 
problems or conflicts in the bargaining relationship arise. 
Then, exploring how union member and officer views and 
experiences change over the cycle of collective bargaining, 
we can better understand whether these experiments are tem 
porary fads which have a natural but rather limited "half-
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life," or represent changes in the workplace industrial rela 
tions system that have lasting effects. The organization of 
the chapters follows this approach. We first present case 
study descriptions of the evolution of worker participation 
processes over the course of at least one contract cycle and 
often through changes in the economic circumstances of the 
parties. In chapter 3 we explore the especially complex issues 
that arise in sustaining worker participation processes 
operating under centralized collective bargaining structures. 
In centralized structures, many more interests and decision- 
makers within both management and union can influence the 
course of a participation process thus taking the control over 
the process partly out of the hands of local officials. We are 
fortunate to have two well known cases to draw on for this 
analysis, the United Auto Workers and General Motors and 
Ford, and the United Steel Workers and the major steel pro 
ducers. Then, we examine through survey and interview data 
the views that rank and file members, and local labor leaders 
hold toward worker participation.
Models of the dynamics of a joint union-management 
change process have been presented elsewhere and need not 
be repeated in detail here. 11 It may be useful, however, to 
summarize the general points of consensus found in these 
models since we use them to structure the analysis that 
follows. As noted above, the common argument in models 
of organizational change, and particularly in models of joint 
union-management change, is that once a change is started, 
the process takes on a dynamic character. Thus, it is impor 
tant to trace the effects of worker participation processes 
from the initial stimulus to change, through the early stages 
of implementation, and on to the stage at which the informal 
participation experiments are "institutionalized" or once 
again integrated into the larger collective bargaining rela 
tionship. The basic propositions in these models are as 
follows.
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(1) Introducing a worker participation process generally 
involves considerable political and economic risks to both 
management and union officials. Normally, therefore, both 
parties will only begin to explore the idea of starting a 
worker participation process if they feel intense pressures to 
do so. These pressures may come from external markets, 
legal, social, or political sources, or from internal sources 
such as from the expectations and preferences of workers or 
top managers. Furthermore, the parties can expect to en 
counter considerable skepticism and some resistance to these 
changes from workers and managers alike.
(2) To generate a joint initial commitment to proceed, 
both parties must perceive the process as being useful for 
achieving goals that are important to their respective 
organizations or constituencies. That is, management must 
see the process as having the potential to improve organiza 
tional effectiveness and union leaders must see the process as 
enhancing economic or psychological goals or needs to 
which workers assign high priorities. Broad appeals to the 
general, long-run or mutual welfare of the parties will not 
provide sufficient incentive to diffuse the process to large 
numbers of workers.
(3) Maintaining commitment to the process over time will 
be difficult. It will require overcoming the internal political 
opposition which is likely to arise from some workers, union 
leaders, and/or managers. It will require successful attain 
ment of the initial goals of the process, and will require con 
tinuation of the pressures that initially stimulated the 
change. In short, like all forms of labor-management 
cooperation, worker participation processes are fragile in 
struments.
(4) Ultimately, continuation of the process over time will 
require: (a) attainment of tangible goals valued by the 
workers and the employer, and (b) "institutionalizing" the 
changes into the ongoing collective bargaining relationship.
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Chapter 2
Dynamics of Worker 
Participation Processes
Single Cases
This chapter will present five case studies which illustrate 
the dynamics of worker participation processes. Particular 
attention will be given to how experiments which may begin 
as relatively narrow efforts focused on involving individuals 
and small groups of workers in decisions affecting their jobs 
can expand and influence the larger collective bargaining 
relationship. By drawing on a number of different cases we 
will also demonstrate that there is no one single outcome or 
path that participation processes follow. Rather, a wide 
range of positive and negative outcomes has been experi 
enced by different unions at different points in time.
Local 14B and Xerox
The first case discussed in this chapter is that of Local 14B 
of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union 
(ACTWU) and the Xerox Corporation. We will report the 
experiences of these parties in some detail since this case 
nicely illustrates many of the central themes developed in this 
book. Specifically, the case illustrates the fit between a QWL 
process and the larger economic, organizational, and collec 
tive bargaining context in which the process is embedded.
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This case involves a large, highly skilled, blue-collar 
bargaining unit located in the Rochester manufacturing 
facility of Xerox. The union and the company began a joint 
ly administered QWL program in late 1980 after a clause 
authorizing experimentation with such a program was in 
cluded in their 1980 bargaining agreement. Data for this 
study were gathered through interviews with the parties over 
a three-year period starting just after the initiation of the 
QWL process and ending after the settlement of the parties' 
1983 labor agreement. Survey data were collected from a 
sample of 387 workers out of a bargaining unit of approx 
imately 4,000 workers. The case data were collected during 
the summer of 1982, approximately 20 months after the 
start-up of the QWL project. In this case, the union involved 
in the QWL project acts as a full joint sponsor and sits with 
representatives of management on all of the various steering 
and oversight committees. The actual participation process 
resembles a Quality Circle (QC) program.
Background and Environment 
for the Experiment
Local 14B and Xerox have had a long-standing, 
cooperative collective bargaining relationship. The company 
voluntarily recognized the union in the late 1940s when the 
firm was a small manufacturer of a single product line. From 
the outset, the relationship was influenced by the strongly 
held philosophy of the founder of the firm. He believed in 
the desirability of maintaining cooperative and highly pro 
fessional relationships between the union and the company. 
His commitment has carried through the relationship up to 
the present time and his philosophy was passed on to his 
various successors in later years, largely through the con 
tinued leadership of the director of industrial relations for 
the Corporation.
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In the 1950s, Xerox began to capitalize on a series of 
technological breakthroughs that transformed the firm from 
a small and largely unknown business to one of the leading 
Fortune 500 corporations. The company continued to enjoy 
rapid rates of growth and high profits through the 1960s 
since its technological advances had continued to provide a 
near monopoly in the major product line. As the company 
expanded, new plants were opened and the union was volun 
tarily recognized on the basis of card checks or uncontested 
representation elections in each new facility. The major 
manufacturing facilities of the Corporation are located in 
one medium-sized city in the Northeast. Smaller facilities are 
located in other cities in various regions of the country. The 
company also acquired several smaller firms within the last 
decade as it sought to diversify into related product lines seen 
as having higher growth potential than the products on 
which the company's previous growth was built.
The competitive environment for this company changed 
dramatically during the last decade. Both domestic and 
foreign competition intensified at the same time that the 
growth in the overall market for its products began to slow 
down and decline toward the end of the 1970s. The market 
decline continued at an even more rapid rate during the 
recession of the early 1980s. By 1982, the company announc 
ed that it would be necessary to reduce its blue- and white- 
collar labor force by at least 30 percent as it struggled to 
regain its competitive position in its basic product line and to 
slowly but surely shift its new product development 
resources to the newer, more promising lines of business it 
had developed through acquisitions in recent years. Thus, 
the QWL process in this case exists in a bargaining relation 
ship that historically was characterized by higher levels of 
cooperation and an economic environment that had turned 
from one that had been expanding for a long period of time 
to one that was rapidly deteriorating.
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Origin and Structure of the QWL Process
The QWL process was launched with a provision included 
in the parties' 1980 collective bargaining agreement. That 
provision reads as follows:
Employee Involvement
A Joint Company-Union Employee Involvement Com 
mittee shall be established to investigate and pursue op 
portunities for enhancing employees' work satisfaction 
and productivity. To this end, the Joint Committee shall 
meet regularly to undertake the following respon 
sibilities:
A. Review and evaluate ongoing programs, pro 
jects, and experiments, both within and out 
side the Company, designed to encourage 
employee involvement.
B. Develop programs, projects, and experiments 
that might ultimately be broadly applied.
C. Establish subcommittees to develop suggested 
programs for specific areas. Hear and review 
reports from these subcommittees.
D. Submit reports and recommendations to the 
Company and Union regarding the implemen 
tation and subsequent progress of specific pro 
grams.
The original idea for this provision came from the chair 
man of the board of the company. He indicated an interest in 
developing some type of employee involvement program. 
Both the industrial relations staff of the Corporation and the 
international union representatives were prepared to discuss 
this issue in negotiations since both groups had been examin 
ing the experiences of other companies and unions with
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various worker participation experiments during the year 
prior to the beginning of formal negotiations.
Program Structure and Content
The structure used to implement the QWL process consists 
of several different joint committees and groups. At the top 
of the structure is the Planning and Policy Committee which 
consists of four union officers and four management 
representatives including the vice-president of manufactur 
ing, the manager of personnel, the manager of industrial 
relations, and the manager of QWL services. This committee 
meets approximately every four to six weeks and is responsi 
ble for establishing broad guidelines and policies for the 
QWL process. Each of the four central plants in the com 
pany's major manufacturing complex has an Advisory Com 
mittee consisting of 10 union and 10 management represen 
tatives. The job of these advisory committees is to develop 
plans for implementing the QWL process and monitoring its 
progress and coordinating its activities with other 
developments in the plant. Within each plant the various 
business centers also have a steering committee consisting of 
the manager of the center, two foremen, two technical per 
sonnel, and four union representatives. The task of this com 
mittee is to provide support for the QWL teams that undergo 
training in problemsolving techniques.
The basic unit of the QWL process is the QWL team. Each 
team consists of six to eight employees from the same work 
area. Participation in a team is voluntary; however, both 
bargaining unit and other employees are encouraged to par 
ticipate. Each team elects its own leader who may or may not 
be the supervisor for that work group. Approximately 50 
percent of the leaders in these groups are not supervisors.
Each team undergoes an initial 40-hour training program 
of which 28 hours are paid for by the employer and 12 hours
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are contributed by the employee. The training program is 
spread over approximately a 10-week period and emphasizes 
problemsolving skills and team building. Figure 2.1 il 
lustrates some of the material typically covered in a training 
program. At the end of the training program, a graduation 
ceremony is held in which each team presents its analysis of 
workplace problems and suggested solutions to the manage 
ment of that plant. Union representatives normally are pre 
sent and speak at these graduation ceremonies.
Figure 2.1
Putting QWL into Practice 
Problem Solving Team - Education & Training
QWL/EI Concepts 
Problem Solving Skills
• Data gathering techniques
• Cause and effect analysis
• Pareto analysis and histogram
• Check sheets and control charts
• Using statistics
Team Building and Functioning
• Interpersonal communications
• Effective team meetings
• Team records and reports
• Work on real problems
• Using technical staff support
• Presentation skills
Program = 40 hours (28 paid, 12 voluntary) 
: 4 hours over 10 weeks
Graduation - team presentations on real problems 
Presented to: steering committee and management
After graduating, each QWL team meets once a week for 
approximately one hour to discuss problems and to review 
the status of suggestions for improvements made at previous
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meetings. The groups cannot make changes that would con 
flict with the provisions of the collective bargaining agree 
ment. The parties refer to items which are "on line," i.e., 
those issues which fall within the legitimate scope of discus 
sion of a QWL team, and "off line" issues which are 
covered by the collective bargaining agreement and therefore 
cannot be altered by a specific suggestion from a team.
The efforts of these teams are supported by eight full-time 
union and eight full-time management QWL coordinators. 
The coordinators provide technical advice and help train the 
teams. Each coordinator has agreed to remain in this posi 
tion for at least two years. In addition, a full-time manager 
of QWL services monitors the overall program for the Cor 
poration. He is assisted by an outside consultant who initial 
ly worked approximately four days a week with the union 
and the company and now has scaled his involvement down 
to approximately one to two days a week. The hiring of the 
consultant was also a joint activity of the local union 
representatives and the company. In fact, the first individual 
to be considered was replaced by the present consultant 
because both the union and the management representatives 
felt that the present person was more successful in develop 
ing a rapport with union officers and committee members.
The teams can be accurately described as Quality Circle 
groups. The focus is on problemsolving around job-related 
issues. No changes had been made in the organization of the 
work, the roles of supervisors, the compensation structure, 
or other structural aspects of the plant level work organiza 
tion as of June 1982. The manager of QWL services, 
however, saw this as only the first phase of a more 
amibitious organizational change process. In addition to in 
creasing the number of workers trained for the QWL process 
(his goal is to train and involve 80 percent of the workforce 
by the end of 1985), this manager sees the process moving on 
to the point where workers and QWL teams would address a
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wider array of issues related to work organization, job 
design and work layout, and work group management. This 
would move the QWL process closer to an autonomous work 
group type of organization. As of the summer of 1982, 
however, none of the teams had moved to this stage nor had 
the company and the union agreed to this objective.
By the summer of 1982, approximately 25 percent of the 
members of the bargaining unit had been trained and were 
participating in a QWL team. Because the company has been 
experiencing layoffs since mid-1981, a number of people 
who have completed training are not participating in teams 
because the teams have been disrupted by movements of peo 
ple through the seniority bumping process.
Initial Union Response to QWL
According to the international representative of this 
union, the officers and members of the local were not sure 
how the QWL process would affect them. He stated:
We weren't making a quality product and we 
knew if we could produce a better product it would 
enhance job security. But the stewards were skep 
tical, the shop chairmen didn't want to get involv 
ed. They didn't know what QWL meant and it was 
a gimmick to them. The company has had so many 
programs each beginning and ending at various 
points in time. At the same time, the union's 
perception of the company's goals at the outset of 
the program was that this was an honest approach 
to get workers involved in improving efficiency and 
quality. We thought that the top executives of the 
corporation (the Chairman of the Board and the 
President and Chief Executive) were sincere.
Thus, despite some initial apprehension, the union decided 
to go ahead, include the language in the agreement reported 
above, and actively participate in the development and im-
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plementation of the program. A year after the initiation of 
the QWL process, the key union representatives reviewed 
their own views of the process to date. The international 
union representative stated that:
This has been a real eye opener to me. Manage 
ment wanted to make certain changes and produce 
more to meet their schedules. The workers agreed 
to cooperate. They understand the competitive 
threat better now. They see the relationship be 
tween their work and the success of the product 
they make.
The business agent for Local 14B has been with the com 
pany for more than 15 years and was also quite skeptical of 
the program at the beginning. He assessed the status of the 
program one year into its life as follows.
Management is really sharing information with 
us. This would not have been possible three or four 
years ago and I see this as a result of the QWL pro 
gram. At a meeting yesterday, for example, the vice 
president of manufacturing shared all the numbers 
on costs and future orders that he has so we could 
really get behind this layoff problem. [The union 
representatives and the company had met to try to 
avoid the layoffs of approximately thirty people 
and had been successful in doing so.]
Another long-time company employee and union official 
is the general shop chairman. He is currently a full-time 
employee paid by the company. In addition to being respon 
sible for coordinating the work of the shop stewards, he is 
the key union representative who oversees the QWL process. 
He started out as a strong skeptic of the QWL program but 
later became a strong supporter. He stated, for example,
At first I saw little point in all of this. We wor 
ried that this sort of program would make the shop 
stewards superfluous. But we have had no regrets.
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The program is running very efficiently. The 
management director of the QWL program is very 
fair in his dealings with the union. We have had 
great confidence in the consultant that the com 
pany hired to work with us and we trust him. The 
key is that we are considered to be equals by 
management. It's not like a short-lived program 
run by management where we will be left to pick up 
the crumbs.
The support of the shop stewards was a bit slower in 
developing in this case, as in most cases. Still, however, when 
we interviewed them at two years into the process, none of 
the shop stewards voiced opposition to the program, none 
saw serious overlaps or jurisdictional conflicts between the 
QWL process and the handling of grievances or with provi 
sions of the collective bargaining agreement, and all of them 
agreed that the union should continue to support the QWL 
process and be actively involved in it. Consequently, the first 
two and one-half years of the QWL process was a time of 
growing support and commitment on the part of top union 
leaders and union stewards. In addition, the union represen 
tatives serving as QWL facilitators were emerging as another 
important group of union activists supporting the process.
Evolution of Management Support
As noted earlier, the initial impetus to the QWL process 
came from the chairman of the board of Xerox. Within one 
year of the negotiations over the 1980 agreement, this chair 
man was scheduled to step down and be replaced by the cur 
rent president of the Corporation. This president and future 
chief executive officer also shared a strong commitment to 
develop the QWL process. Thus, the commitment from the 
top levels of the Corporation was very strong at the begin 
ning of the program and remained strong through its initial 
implementation phase.
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While support at the top had been strong from the start, 
support at the plant level and among middle managers was 
reported by both company and union representatives to be 
more variable and problematic. The first real test of the con 
tinuity of the program came near the end of the first year of 
the program. At that time a new vice-president of manufac 
turing had just taken over, and the budget for the second 
year of the program was under discussion. At the same time, 
the company was experiencing increasing competitive 
pressures and it was clear that layoffs would be coming in the 
second year.
The issue of funding and cost of the second year of the 
program came to a head in a meeting that involved the 
managers of the four plants in the manufacturing complex, 
the vice-president of manufacturing, the QWL consultant, 
the director of QWL services for the Corporation, and the 
three key union officials discussed above. The meeting began 
with the vice-president indicating that the estimated $6 
million price tag for the second year of the program was too 
high, that the money was just not available for the program. 
The outside consultant reported the dynamics of this meeting 
from that point on as follows:
The dynamics of this meeting were interesting in 
two respects. First the General Shop Chairman 
(who is the union representative on the QWL pro 
gram) took on the new Vice President of Manufac 
turing and challenged him directly by asking him if 
the company was "decommitting" to the program. 
Second, the plant managers took a much more ac 
tive role in challenging the new vice president as 
well and in trying to look for alternative solutions. 
The General Shop Chairman initially brought up 
issues that the plant managers should have raised 
themselves such as, what's the consequence of 
backing off the program the first time money 
becomes an issue?
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These discussions ultimately produced an agreement that 
the plant managers agreed would absorb some of the costs of 
the second year of the program within their own line budgets 
and would look for ways to bring the cost of the program 
down without slowing its progress. Eventually the cost of the 
second year was pared down to $3 million as opposed to the 
original estimate of $6 million. Consequently, with the joint 
support of the local union representatives and the line 
managers, the QWL process survived its first initial test, the 
turnover of a key management decisionmaker.
The lack of support for the program from middle 
managers and first-line supervisors was recognized by all of 
the parties. Indeed, after two years of experience with the 
program, the QWL manager was asked by the vice-president 
of manufacturing to develop a strategy for dealing directly 
with the lack of support from middle managers. They titled 
the new strategy "Changing the Management Culture."
Local union representatives estimated that perhaps 80 to 
85 percent of the line managers above the first-line super 
visors and below the plant managers were opposed to the 
QWL process. Opposition of these managers was attributed 
to their fear of losing power and having their roles changed 
while they failed to see the leadership styles and decision- 
making processes of managers above them changing in ways 
that were consistent with the QWL process. Opposition also 
appeared from some support groups such as the manufactur 
ing engineering personnel who felt threatened by the idea of 
having hourly workers suggesting changes in work practices 
or layouts that had heretofore been within the jurisdiction 
and discretion of engineering.
Evolving Views of the Rank and File
Rank and file employees explicitly agreed to initiate the 
QWL process when they voted to ratify the 1980 collective 
bargaining agreement. Although that agreement was ratified 
by an overwhelming margin, the QWL provision included in
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the agreement did not play a significant role in the discussion 
of the contract or in the vote itself. Thus, the first real 
evidence available concerning rank and file reactions to the 
QWL process came from the response to initial requests for 
volunteer participants. According to both the manager of 
QWL services and union representatives, there was some in 
itial reluctance on the part of most employees to be the "first 
to get involved." Just as the union representatives indicated 
in their statements, rank and file members had already seen a 
number of management initiatives to improve productivity 
or try out a new communications program or enhance at 
titudes and were fearful that this was another "gimmick." 
However, a number of groups were convinced to consider 
the process. After the first several groups responded very 
positively to the QWL training, interest in the concept spread 
more easily and rapidly. The manager of QWL services 
reported that after the program was initiated and several 
teams had completed training, most requests for volunteers 
resulted in a positive response from 50 to 70 percent of the 
employees in a work group.
There were clear signs, however, that rank and file interest 
in participating began to decline during the second year of 
the program. The general shop chairman reported that by 
the midpoint of the second year of the process, it was getting 
more difficult to get volunteers to participate. Indeed, when 
we conducted our survey two and one-half years into the 
process, only 25 percent of those not yet participating in 
dicated a willingness to join the QWL process. Moreover, 
analysis of the perceptions of those involved showed that 
those who had gotten involved early in the process were 
beginning to express more negative attitudes toward the 
union's handling of QWL issues. (More detailed analysis of 
the survey data is found in chapter 4.) These quantitative 
data were reinforced by the statements of the general shop 
chairman. In discussing our survey data he stated:
Those numbers seem to coincide with what I 
thought was going on. Those who got involved ear-
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ly are saying to us "We took some big risks in get 
ting involved early. Then we see that we are im 
proving productivity and quality in our shops. At 
the same time layoffs are occurring all around us 
and the workforce continues to shrink. We are now 
asking what are we getting out of this process."
Links to the Larger Collective 
Bargaining Relationship
The experiences surrounding two events illustrate the rela 
tionship which emerged between the QWL process and 
broader collective bargaining issues. The first event concerns 
a high labor cost operation that the firm was threatening to 
subcontract to outside vendors. The second event is the pro 
cess and results of the negotiation of the 1983 labor agree 
ment, the first agreement to be negotiated after the QWL 
process had been in effect.
The High Cost Operation. One of the most difficult and 
controversial issues to arise between the company and Local 
14B in the last several years has been the question of what to 
do with approximately 200 workers involved in the manufac 
turing of wiring harnesses, an electronic component that 
goes into the overall product. When Xerox first developed 
the technology for its copying machines, no other firms had 
the capability of manufacturing the necessary types of 
harnesses. Therefore, the company developed this capability 
in-house and has always produced its own wiring harnesses. 
Yet, as this technology became more routine and the market 
for these parts grew, many new small firms entered the 
market and sold these components to larger firms for use in 
their final products. Almost all of these newer and smaller 
firms are nonunion and pay wages considerably below the 
rate paid for unionized employees covered under the Local 
14B agreement. Indeed, the average total wage and fringe 
benefit cost for Local 14B employees in this particular opera 
tion in 1982 was approximately $19 per hour, compared to
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estimates from one vendor of $8 and another of $12 per 
hour. Productivity comparisons also failed to show any 
significant offsetting advantage to the Local 14B employees. 
Consequently, many managers within Xerox had been argu 
ing for several years that wiring harness operations should be 
subcontracted to an outside vendor. The pressure to do so 
was intensified by the fact that all of the firm's domestic 
competitors that had entered this market considerably later 
than Xerox were currently subcontracting this component to 
outside vendors. Thus, the cost of this particular part of the 
manufacturing process was considerably higher for Xerox 
than for its competitors.
This problem had been recognized by both the industrial 
relations staff of the Corporation and the local union leader 
ship for a number of years. Indeed, an agreement had been 
worked out prior to 1980 to slowly phase out the manufac 
ture of wiring harnesses but to do so without laying anyone 
off. This agreement became unworkable, however, as the 
market for the firm's products began to deteriorate in 1980. 
Therefore, the union and the company recognized they need 
ed to return to this issue in search of an alternative arrange 
ment. While there was strong pressure within management to 
simply contract out the work, there was strong opposition to 
this proposal from the local union. The vice-president of 
manufacturing described the discussions that ensued around 
this issue in 1981 as follows:
Management three levels above me made a deci 
sion to close down this operation. The international 
representative of the union responded to that deci 
sion by pointing out that his shop stewards were 
just livid about this decision because it contradicted 
an earlier negotiated effort to reach an accom 
modation on this problem. As a result several of us 
within management said "Let's not just put these 
people out on the street but let's give the problem 
to them to see if something can be worked out. Let
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the people themselves select a team to decide what 
is needed in this area." So this is what we did.
A group of workers and supervisors organized a task force 
to examine alternatives for reducing the costs of operations 
in this area. After one year of study and research the group 
came back with a number of, as the vice-president of 
manufacturing described them, "astonishing recommenda 
tions." Below is his description of what the task force 
recommended.
The group found that management was doing a 
number of things wrong. The layout of the plant 
was wrong and they showed how it could be 
redesigned. The amount of overhead allocated to 
this area of the plant was also found to be wrong. 
They found lots of things that could be done dif 
ferently. For example, they want to alter the con 
tract language governing transfers and promotions 
to slow down the movement of people across jobs. 
They would like to have a separate seniority unit 
for people working in this area to also cut down on 
the number of moves in and out of the operation. 
They would like to fix the jobs so that people don't 
desire to rotate out of them but make them more 
flexible and interesting. They would like to use 
more part-time workers at peak periods of produc 
tion to smooth out the workforce and to allow the 
payment of lower wages and fringe benefits. They 
propose eliminating a number of supervisors and 
working as a semi-autonomous work group. 
Overall, they have come up with a twenty-nine per 
cent cost reduction proposal. Companies can't get 
twenty-nine percent cost reductions these days 
through management studies alone.
Obviously the changes proposed by this group strike 
directly at the heart of the collective bargaining agreement. 
The union and company representatives studied these recom-
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mendations, accepted those that did not significantly alter 
the bargaining agreement, modified several in ways that did 
not cause significant problems for the agreement, and agreed 
to put those that required major changes in the bargaining 
agreement on the table for negotiations during the next 
round of contract talks.
This example illustrates a point that comes out in all the 
cases we examined in this research, namely, that it is difficult 
to draw a hard and fast line of demarcation between the 
QWL or worker participation process and the collective 
bargaining agreement. While the contract language govern 
ing the QWL process clearly provided the boilerplate 
"shelter agreement" provision stating that nothing in the 
QWL process would alter the provisions of the agreement, it 
is clear that as groups such as the one described above begin 
to explore alternative arrangements for organizing work, 
reducing costs, or increasing productivity, their explorations 
are very likely to lead them directly into contractual provi 
sions. As long as the participation process is limited to 
specific Quality Circle types of activities, it may be possible 
to limit discussions to topics described as "on line" and to 
avoid those "off line" topics that are the province of the 
bargaining agreement. Over time, however, it is likely that 
this distinction will become more difficult to enforce, as was 
the case in this example. At the same time, it does not 
necessarily mean that solutions cannot be identified that 
both preserve the integrity of the bargaining agreement and 
do not frustrate the change process. As we will see, the key to 
the parties' successful handling of this issue at Xerox was 
that they clearly recognized the need for union and manage 
ment representatives to negotiate those issues that did in 
volve contractual language.
The 1983 Contract Negotiations. Contract negotiations 
for the first agreement after start-up of the QWL experiment 
began in late 1982 in anticipation of a contract expiration 
date of March 31, 1983. Both parties knew that this was go-
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ing to be the most difficult negotiations they had faced in 
more than 30 years. Since the 1980 contract was signed, the 
market for the firm's products had shrunk drastically, the 
recession of 1981-83 had depressed sales across the industry, 
and the firm had embraced a new business strategy of at 
tempting to compete on the basis of price for the first time in 
its history. These changes in competitive conditions and 
strategy necessitated deep price discounts which in turn put 
intense pressure on manufacturing costs. The firm also made 
a decision to permanently reduce its blue- and white-collar 
labor force by over 30 percent, with the heaviest concentra 
tions in workforce reductions coming in the manufacturing 
facilities where the QWL process was in place. Furthermore, 
the concession bargaining that had dominated negotiations 
in many other industries in 1981 and 1982 meant that many 
of the industries and unions traditionally used as bases of 
comparison had already implemented contract concessions 
and wage deferrals. Finally, accompanying the transition to 
the new business strategy and the increased pressure on 
manufacturing and labor costs, came a shift in the distribu 
tion of power within top managerial circles. The power of 
the financial cost-conscious managers had increased at the 
expense of industrial relations. As a result, the industrial 
relations staff lost much of the autonomy it had previously 
enjoyed over the planning and strategy formulation for labor 
negotiations. Thus, the union representatives recognized that 
other management officials were in direct control or "calling 
the shots" for these negotiations and that the industrial rela 
tions staff would be under intense pressure to negotiate labor 
cost reductions and tighter contractual language.
Just where concern for the QWL process stood within 
management as negotiations opened was in serious question. 
The union representatives believed that the hard-line posi 
tion advocated by management negotiators signaled that the 
company really did not care about whether the QWL process 
survived these negotiations or not. They felt that the com-
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pany was being hypocritical in the approach it was taking to 
negotiations. On the one hand, all during the term of the 
agreement the company was preaching the values of QWL 
with its stress on openness, problemsolving, high trust, and 
information sharing. On the other hand, when it came time 
for negotiations, the company's initial proposals called for 
major concessions in the areas of subcontracting language, 
job transfers and promotions, and other sensitive areas. In 
addition, the employer representatives appeared, in the eyes 
of the union negotiating team, to take a rather closed- 
minded approach to negotiations rather than indicate a will 
ingness to consider alternatives in a problemsolving fashion.
The union, for its part, opened negotiations by making 
two basic points. First, it stressed that it had cooperated with 
the company throughout the term of the agreement to 
develop and sustain the QWL process and that it wanted to 
maintain and strengthen that process. Second, it stressed 
that in order for the process to be sustained through a second 
term of the contract, some provision for job security and for 
sharing the gains of the QWL process needed to be included 
in the new agreement.
The parties eventually reached an agreement after extend 
ing the old contract two weeks beyond its scheduled expira 
tion date. Four provisions included in the new contract are 
relevant to the QWL process:
1. The parties agreed to continue the QWL process with no 
significant changes in the language governing this pro 
cess.
2. The parties agreed to extend the wiring harness experi 
ment to all subcontracting situations. That is, if the 
company proposes to subcontract out work that it 
believes is not currently being done at a competitive 
level, the issue will first be given to the QWL team in 
that area to see if it can propose a strategy for making 
the operations competitive. If the work is contracted
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out, the company agrees to bring in other work that can 
be performed at competitive costs. Any worker assigned 
to this new work will retain his current rate of pay.
3. The company agreed to a guarantee of no layoffs for the 
three years of the new agreement.
4. All remaining issues involving the wiring harness area 
were resolved.
This agreement represented a major step toward the in 
tegration of the QWL process with collective bargaining. 
Essentially, the process of experimentation with new work 
organization (the wiring harness proposals) was generalized 
to all similar situations and made a part of standard 
operating practice. In addition, the union achieved the job 
security guarantee (at least for the term of this agreement) 
believed needed to maintain rank and file and leadership 
support for the QWL process. Finally, those issues which the 
parties were not able to settle through the QWL process 
because they were too central to the overall bargaining agree 
ment were appropriately referred to the bargaining table and 
resolved there as part of the overall renegotiation of the 
agreement. Thus, without judging the merits of the specific 
terms agreed to by the union and the company, this case 
serves as a model for linking the QWL and collective 
bargaining processes.
Summary and Conclusions
This case illustrates how a narrowly focused agreement to 
experiment with a QWL process evolved over time in the face 
of changing economic circumstances. It grew from an effort 
to improve the QWL experiences of individual workers into 
an integral part of the parties' strategies for addressing the 
basic economic problems of the firm and the job security 
concerns of the union membership. Innovations first sug 
gested by participants in the QWL process have since been 
transformed into standard operating procedures. The QWL 
process survived its first set of severe tests because the parties
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successfully responded to the job security concerns that had 
caused worker support for the QWL process to plateau and 
decline.
While the parties were successful in this case in negotiating 
an agreement that reinforced the QWL process in the face of 
an extremely harsh economic environment, these negotia 
tions could just as easily have led to the demise of QWL and 
a return to a lower trust, arms-length union-management 
relationship. The high level of trust built up over the years 
between industrial relations professionals and union leaders 
in this company were clearly instrumental in seeing the par 
ties through these difficult times.
Local 717 and Packard Electric
The QWL process between Local 717 of the International 
Union of Electrical Workers (IUE) and Packard Electric is 
the longest running worker participation project in our sam 
ple. Since Packard Electric is a division of General Motors, 
the development of a QWL program at this company is not 
independent of the origins and history of QWL in the auto 
industry. As will be outlined below, however, the content of 
the program has gone considerably farther than most of the 
QWL activities described elsewhere in this book. Indeed, this 
case provides the best example of a local union that saw the 
QWL process right from the beginning as a strategy for pro 
tecting job security. Thus, there has always been a close link 
between the QWL process and this union's broader strategies 
for representing the basic economic interests of its members.
Background to the Q WL Process
The beginning of the QWL process can be traced to an an 
nouncement made in 1973 by the general manager of 
Packard that there would be no more hiring or major capital 
investment in Warren, Ohio due to the high cost of produc 
tion. As a result, job security became a major concern to the 
Packard employees during the mid-1970s. The current union
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administration, although not in office at that time, ran in 
1977 on a platform to save the workforce through closer 
cooperation with management.
Evidence that the joint efforts were viewed as a means of 
addressing concerns over job security can be seen in the 
following statement by the chairman of the shop committee 
who was elected in 1977.
Between 1956 and 1973, Packard had grown to 
13,500 employees. Between 1970 and 1973, we still 
hired but in 1973 started to implement a long-range 
strategy. ... so highly labor-intense production 
was subcontracted and new plants were opened in 
the South. In 1975 I was not the Chairman—I had 
been defeated—so I went back to the machine for 
two years. Working there and listening to the peo 
ple gave me good insight as to what people wanted. 
In 1974-75 started the industrial decline and the 
biggest concern was job security—[the workers] felt 
the threat. There was a lot of emotion in the plant. 
[The President] and I got together in 1977 and ran 
on the platform that we would try to save jobs and 
have closer cooperation with management; that, 
yes, the union and its people could have an impact 
on the future. When elected, I began to implement 
that.
After that union election, weekly labor-management 
meetings were initiated involving the shop chairman, presi 
dent of the union, plant manager, and personnel director. 
That group, or the Steering Committee as it was later called, 
started its joint efforts with several noncontroversial joint 
projects, such as blood drives, the collection of funds for 
United Way and the Employee Assistance Program.
At about the same time as the Steering Committee was 
formed in 1978, a management task force was created to im 
prove the performance of Packard in Warren. The shop 
chairman then offered the union's participation in that
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group and the result was a joint union-management Jobs 
Committee. The purpose of this committee is to:
. . . develop an ongoing union-management ap 
proach that will maintain job security and identify 
opportunities for hiring in the Warren operations.
In addition to saving and creating jobs, the Jobs Committee 
is concerned with employee involvement in Packard's opera 
tions. The joint committee operates by examining various 
methods for saving and/or creating jobs and then develops 
projects to accomplish that purpose. These projects tend to 
address operational problems such as improving quality, 
production or product delivery.
As noted above, employee involvement is included in the 
philosophy of the Jobs Committee. While it is difficult to 
separate the formal "quality of working life" activities from 
the projects initiated by the committee, a wide spectrum of 
employee involvement or worker participation projects at 
Packard Electric has been started since 1978.
The Jobs Committee
As noted earlier, one of the objectives of the Jobs Com 
mittee is to build the concept of worker participation into the 
projects it undertakes to save and/or create jobs. That com 
mittee consists of eight union and eight management 
representatives. The union members include the president, 
shop chairman, two subchairmen, two committeemen, one 
benefits representative and one skilled trades representative, 
while the management representatives consist of members 
from each staff area. In order to illustrate the ac 
complishments of the Jobs Committee, three successful pro 
jects from 1978 and 1979 are briefly described below.
(1) The Maintenance Survey Project—Four new 
employees were hired as a result of this project. Its 
purpose was to identify ways to improve construction 
performance. Two teams observed construction-
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maintenance personnel, noted how time was wasted, 
and recommended the purchase of machinery and 
tooling and the creation of new jobs.
(2) The Metal Parts Project—A team of employees was 
organized to reduce costs in the metal parts area so 
the company could successfully compete for metal 
parts business on a worldwide basis. The team recom 
mended the purchase of several new presses, which 
resulted in a cost reduction and the subsequent hiring 
of 46 employees.
(3) The Skilled Trades Requirement—As a result of the 
branch plants' operations, office expansion, pro 
jected requirements and experience gained from the 
previous two projects, the Jobs Committee recom 
mended that 115 new jobs be filled in the skilled 
trades area. The result was the hiring of 115 people.
Between 1978 and 1980 the Jobs Committee participated 
in the decision to hire employees as well as the purchase and 
construction of three new plants in the Warren area. In re 
cent years, however, the committee has had a more difficult 
task, since the company announced late in 1981 that 3,900 
jobs in Warren were noncompetitive and had to be 
eliminated. In response to that announcement, the Jobs 
Committee began to search for alternatives to layoffs. As a 
result, it reduced the workforce by 900 employees through 
accelerated attrition programs. A voluntary termination of 
employment program and an early retirement program were 
developed and the parties are currently in the process of 
establishing a part-time workforce. All of these ideas were 
developed in the Jobs Committee and subsequently taken to 
the bargaining table and agreed upon during 1982 negotia 
tions.
Committees of Hourly Employees
By the summer of 1983 there were approximately 60-65 
committees of hourly employees operating. While all these
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committees could be classified as QWL groups, in fact their 
scope and functions vary considerably. The parties classify 
the committees into four groups: (1) "Non-Risky" Commit 
tees, (2) Task Forces, (3) Employee Participation Groups 
and/or Statistical Process Control Groups, and (4) Semi- 
Autonomous Work Groups. The types of hourly committees 
are listed and then defined below in order of increasing 
worker involvement.
The "Non-Risky" Committees deal with "safe" topics 
such as health and safety, housekeeping, and substance 
abuse within a work group. A greater level of involvement 
exists in Task Forces, which usually are offshoots of the Jobs 
Committee. A Task Force searches for causes of problems 
identified by the Committee and then recommends solutions.
Employee Participation Groups or EPGs (similar to 
Quality Circles) are voluntary groups of 8 to 12 employees 
who typically meet once a week for an hour to discuss work- 
related issues, identify problems and search for causes and 
solutions. Statistical Process Control Groups or SPCs are 
groups of employees using the company's concept of SPC, 
which basically is a statistical system of identifying control 
limits for defects as opposed to traditional inspection. SPC is 
not perceived by everyone to be "worker participation" but 
the employees in a work group are involved in the process as 
a team.
Three production lines in one of the new plants operate as 
Semi-Autonomous Work Groups without a direct super 
visor. These employees are involved in the most extensive 
form of worker participation.
Summary
As in the Xerox case, at Packard it is impossible to draw a 
line between the collective bargaining strategies and activities 
of this local union and its worker participation strategies and 
efforts. Improving the quality of working life was not the 
driving motivation behind the development of joint efforts.
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The driving motivation was, and still is, to save jobs by mak 
ing the operations performed by these workers more com 
petitive. The various worker participation efforts and the 
joint union-management committee structures that oversee 
them are means used to achieve these economic objectives. 
Thus, the Packard case brings our argument full circle. In 
the previous case we documented how QWL efforts gradual 
ly move into the traditional territory of collective bargaining. 
In the Packard case, the process moved in the opposite direc 
tion as the parties carried traditional topics of negotiations 
into the worker participation process.
Local 2 and the Uniform Piston Company
This case illustrates the pitfalls of a narrowly focused 
Quality Circle type of program that operates largely in a 
vacuum, without consideration for the larger set of events 
occurring in the collective bargaining relationship between 
the company and the local union. We will call this the case of 
Local 2 and the Uniform Piston Company (disguised name) 
since the company is a small manufacturer of auto parts 
employing a bargaining unit of approximately 300 semi 
skilled and unskilled workers.
Background to the "Group 33" Program
The worker participation program at this company evolv 
ed out of a "jobs evaluation committee" formed by the com 
pany and the union during the summer of 1979. The original 
committee met to discuss problems and make recommenda 
tions concerning the general work environment in the plant. 
When people realized that this committee created the type of 
communications that should be encouraged throughout the 
organization, the concept of work teams (called "Group 
33s") covering the whole company was developed. As a 
result, a central QWL Committee was created as an umbrella 
group to encourage the formation of work teams. It is im 
portant to note, therefore, that in this case the QWL process
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evolved out of an informal labor-management committee's 
decision to experiment, not out of a clause negotiated into 
the collective bargaining agreement.
Program Structure and Content
The members of the central QWL Committee are a cross 
section of the various interest groups in the organization so 
that different departments, ages and sexes are represented, 
as are both union and management. In addition, current 
members of the committee have all served as QWL 
facilitators for the Group 33s at some point in time.
Group 33s are considered by the organization to be "peo 
ple building tools." Their name is derived from the three 
phases of a person's life: community, work and home. The 
goal is to improve all three phases of the employees' lives 
through the teaching of problemsolving techniques at work. 
All participation is voluntary and groups are formed when 
people volunteer.
The Group 33s operate under the same guidelines and 
philosophy as does the QWL Committee. Each Group 33 
meets to discuss mutual problems and to develop solutions as 
often as necessary, but meetings are limited to one hour per 
week. If the entire group agrees, it will work on any problem 
that does not interfere with the negotiated contract or in 
volve any of the following subjects:
— wages and salaries
— benefits
— disciplinary policies
— employment policies
— termination policies
— personalities
— company rules
Although there is no formal training for Group 33s, 
facilitators spend two to four weeks working closely with 
new groups in order to familiarize the members with the
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QWL process. Facilitators can be either union members or 
salaried personnel and are selected by union officials and 
management representatives. Facilitators also return to 
groups periodically to ensure their progress.
Union Views of the "Group 33" Process
Twenty-five percent of the workers in the bargaining unit 
were participating in Group 33s in September 1982, one-and- 
one-half years after the start of the QWL process. Interviews 
with the local union officials indicated general satisfaction 
with the status of the QWL process. However, a number of 
clouds appear on the horizon of this program. The problems 
did not spring from what is occurring in the groups or within 
the QWL process itself, but were a consequence of the weak 
presence of the local union in the administration of the QWL 
process and in the larger strategic decisions being made by 
the company. We will draw on our interviews with the local 
union representatives to illustrate this problem.
Separation of Problemsolving from Union-Management 
Relations. While the union is formally involved in the QWL 
structure, the actual role of the union is more one of a 
"watchdog" than an active partner. As a result, the activities 
of the local union appear to be limited largely to issues that 
involve conflicts and disagreements with management, while 
the QWL process is becoming identified as the central forum 
for cooperative problemsolving. Thus, the union is 
associated with largely adversarial issues and the more infor 
mal QWL process is given credit for solving problems. The 
following quote by the vice-president of the union illustrates 
the difference in management's attitude toward him when he 
raises an issue in the QWL process compared to when he 
raises an issue as a union official.
When I come in to QWL Committee meetings 
I'm an employee working to solve a problem. The 
QWL Committee is easier [than formal union-
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management meetings]. The people from the com 
pany are not against [the union] right off the 
bat—they're willing to work with us with no prob 
lem. If we disagree with them in QWL, we discuss 
it. But as a union, if we disagree, then they get mad 
and leave—they hold grudges and it filters out into 
the shop. . . . Management is more honest in the 
QWL program than they are with union problems 
overall.
The separation between the QWL process and the han 
dling of contractual items was further illustrated by a pro 
blem that occurred when one of the QWL groups made a 
proposal for an employee evaluation system. This proposal 
was forwarded to the QWL Committee, which in turn for 
warded it to management, which in turn approved it. The 
union, however, viewed this new proposal as an infringe 
ment on the collective bargaining agreement and thus re 
jected it. This proposal arose at the time the company and 
the union were negotiating the 1981 contract. The net result 
was that the company and the union did not agree to include 
any language on this issue in their new agreement. Subse 
quently, however, the company unilaterally implemented 
part of the employee evaluation proposal outside of both the 
collective bargaining agreement and the QWL process.
Both the local union and management representatives 
agreed that this employee evaluation proposal and its han 
dling had a negative impact on the QWL process. The 
management representative responsible for the QWL process 
indicated that this controversy almost "wiped out" the par 
ticipation program. The president of the local union said 
that the union was "almost ready to throw QWL out of the 
plant" because of the proposal. Since management approved 
the proposal, the union president viewed QWL as "a union 
busting tactic." He resigned from the Group 33 of which he 
was a member in December 1981 because of this controversy.
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The company and the union did reach an accommodation 
in negotiations over the 1982 contract on the issues deemed 
to be outside the jurisdiction of the QWL process. This con 
vinced the local union officials that management's objectives 
for the QWL process were legitimate and the union subse 
quently dropped its objections to the continuation of the 
QWL process. The union president expressed his feelings 
after these negotiations as follows:
They're not touching our contract as far as we 
can see. . . . Management is asking employees 
about quite a few things. I don't think they are try 
ing to pull anything over the union any more. They 
know they couldn't get away with it.
The Opening of a Nonunion Plant. Another issue surfaced 
in early 1982 when the company opened a new nonunion 
plant in a southern state and subsequently began laying off 
employees in the northern unionized plant where the QWL 
process was underway. This was only the second layoff ex 
perienced by employees of this company in over one hundred 
years. The president of the union expressed his lack of trust 
in management as a result of this development as follows:
The company took a lot of our work out of the 
plant and put it in the new plant in the South and 
now they are working and we have people laid off. 
The people out here aren't trusting management on 
a lot of things. ... If we'd still had that work that 
is being done in the South, those people would not 
have been laid off.
Implications of this Case
This case illustrates a number of potential pitfalls for a 
local union that can arise out of a worker participation pro 
cess that is not linked to the collective bargaining relation 
ship through contractual language at the outset and where 
the QWL process at the workplace is isolated from the larger
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strategic decisions of the company. If the QWL process takes 
over more of the problemsolving functions at the workplace, 
the union is left with a more limited agenda of adversarial 
issues that it can claim as its own. New ideas, such as the 
employee evaluation proposal, which generate enthusiasm 
among a subset of employees, then create the appearance 
that the union is only an opposition force. Finally, this case 
is an example where an employer is asking its local union and 
union members to cooperate at the workplace in the short 
run while it is in the process of making a strategic decision to 
divert investments to a nonunion plant in another part of the 
country. Because the local union officials are not directly in 
volved in the design and administration of the QWL process 
and have not used the QWL process to open a dialogue with 
company officials over strategic decisions, the union is not in 
a position to link efforts to preserve jobs to the participation 
process.
Local 70 and Freeman, Inc. 
A Case Study of a Demoralized QWL Process
This case summarizes the quality of working life efforts at 
Freeman, Inc. (disguised name), a major Canadian grocery 
chain. QWL programs were initiated in several of the 
grocery stores in Freeman's Ontario division and in a new 
meatcutting plant also located in Ontario.
Freeman operates approximately 75 stores in the Toronto 
metropolitan area, all of which are organized by the same in 
ternational union (we will refer to this union as Local 70). In 
late 1981, the company also opened a new meatcutting plant 
just outside of Toronto on the same property as the Ontario 
division headquarters. This plant is also organized by Local 
70. The union participated jointly with the company in 
designing the plant on a socio-technical basis. The plant ran 
for approximately eight months on that basis but it lost 
money and operated at an unacceptably low level of produc-
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tivity and quality. As a result, the company decided to bring 
in a new plant manager and revert back to a very traditional 
management and organization style and work organization 
system.
The QWL program in the retail store division predated the 
opening of the meatcutting facility by about three years. 
Four stores were involved in some form of QWL process at 
one time or another. Experience with these QWL efforts en 
couraged the company to use the socio-technical design to set 
up the meatcutting facility. In 1981, the company began ex 
periencing severe financial pressures, largely due to the reces 
sion and to the increase in competition from independent 
grocery stores and other retail outlets. Partly because of this 
pressure and partly for other reasons, QWL programs in the 
stores faded out of existence. In short, this is a case study of 
a demoralized QWL program both in the retail stores and in 
the meatcutting plant.
Background to the Meat Plant
In the late 1970s, Freeman's management decided it was 
necessary to build a meatcutting and packaging facility. The 
general manager indicated that the decision to set up the 
plant on a socio-technical design and to work jointly with the 
union was made right at the outset. He stated,
We saw an opportunity to design a plant with a 
new approach. We wanted to do it on a quality of 
working life and socio-technical system basis. We 
saw this as an extension of the QWL philosophy 
that we were developing in our retail division.
Union and employer representatives visited meat facilities in 
the United States. The union also received advice from its in 
ternational union concerning the designs and blueprints for 
the plant as they were developed.
The personnel manager for the plant indicated that, 
although the union was involved right from the beginning,
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its involvement was generally limited to reacting to designs as 
they were drawn up. In other words, the union took little in 
itiative in developing its own ideas or suggestions. There was 
also a tapering off of union involvement about half way 
through the design phase, according to the personnel 
manager. He believed that the union's involvement in the 
design of the plant was consistent with its posture in relation 
to other QWL efforts:
Instead of committing themselves to joint 
decision-making they preferred to take the position 
of "you show us what you plan to do and we will 
tell you if it's okay." Instead of taking a joint 
design approach, the union prefers to maintain its 
veto authority role.
The union representatives indicated that they did have full 
opportunity to participate in the design of the plant and that 
they had confidence in the outside consultant hired by the 
company to help install the new work system. Indeed, the 
key union business agent involved in the QWL efforts in 
dicated that she was very satisfied with the role that the con 
sultant played and his efforts to insure that union points of 
view were taken into consideration.
The Design and Operation of the Plant
The plant cost approximately $27 million to build and 
equip. Approximately $1 million of equipment was placed at 
the front and the back end of short manufacturing lines, 
whereas a traditional plant would have had much longer 
lines and required only about $500,000 of front and back end 
equipment. In a traditional meatcutting plant with long 
lines, jobs are very highly specialized. In this plant there were 
five short lines with fewer specialized jobs. In addition, the 
lines were designed to allow workers to move across different 
operations more easily.
The work was organized around work teams of 12 to 16 
people with the goal of having everyone learn all the dif-
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ferent jobs in the plant. There were to be no dead-end jobs in 
the plant and no discrimination based on sex or race in the 
allocation of jobs to different individuals. Furthermore, the 
jobs were designed in a way so that the physical requirements 
did not exclude any individuals from any jobs. For example, 
in a traditional meatpacking plant, beef carcasses arrive in 
railroad cars or trucks and require considerable hoisting at 
all stages of the front end operations. In this plant there was 
no heavy hoisting except at one point where the carcass had 
to be raised up to the first saw. Conveyors and mechanized 
hoisting were built into the design to allow women and other 
individuals with less lifting power to work on jobs at the 
front end of the plant.
In traditional plants there are finely defined job classifica 
tions with the meatcutter being the topmost skilled classifica 
tion. Payment is based on the job being performed at a par 
ticular point in time. The design of this plant called for peo 
ple to progress through the six levels of the job classification 
system by learning the various jobs and being certified as be 
ing capable of performing the different tasks. The system 
design called for "pay for knowledge" rather than pay for 
the work performed.
The original design called for very few managers and no 
traditional foremen. Instead, work was organized in work 
teams on an autonomous work group basis with facilitators 
providing assistance and help in organizing the work. The 
collective bargaining agreement governing the first year of 
operation in the plant was a very simple and short document. 
It covered the economic terms of the contract but did not 
contain detailed provisions on seniority, bumping, or other 
job classification and work organization provisions. Instead, 
it provided that the progression system would be monitored 
by a review board which also handled recommendations, 
grievances, discipline cases, and other issues. The review 
board was made up of three workers and three managers 
from the plant, and the union business agent.
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Experiences Under the Socio-Technical System
According to the personnel manager, the workforce had a 
mixed reaction to the initial organization of work in the 
plant. The greatest sources of resistance came from the most 
skilled meatcutters. The personnel manager indicated that in 
the traditional organizations, meatcutters prefer to work 
with red meat, i.e., beef rather than poultry or pork. Some 
of the top flight butchers who earlier had transferred from 
the company's stores to the plant resented the idea that they 
had to rotate around to less skilled jobs and that other peo 
ple could be working in the high skilled classifications 
without going through the long periods of training and 
seniority accumulation that the butchers had gone through. 
According to the personnel manager, the top butcher also 
tended to be a "rough tough type guy" who served as an in 
formal work group leader.
In addition, in the past there were few women in the skill 
ed jobs in meatpacking operations because of the heavy lift 
ing and dangerous nature of the work. Finally, the idea of 
conducting team meetings where the authority and status of 
the top butcher or meatcutter was being challenged made it 
difficult for some of the workers to adapt to the new 
organization. On the other hand, many employees had an 
opportunity to learn new jobs and obtain new skills in the 
plant at a very swift pace. As a result, the overall reaction to 
the new arrangement was mixed.
Problems with the Work System 
Design and Implementation
The company expected to lose approximately $8 million in 
the first year of plant operations. However, in the first eight 
months it had already lost $20 million. Productivity and pro 
duct quality were both very poor in the months that the plant 
was operated under this system. The business agent in charge 
of the plant indicated that she saw many problems develop 
ing in the plant, both with the way in which the workers
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handled their newly found ambiguity and freedom, and in 
the general operation of the plant. Some of the workers, ac 
cording to the business agent, took the new arrangements as 
"a license to steal." For example, workers took longer cof 
fee breaks, the team meetings failed to focus on substantive 
workplace issues and accomplished little, and in some cases 
workers even rigged up a bogus reporting system where at 
one point nine workers were falsely reported to be at work. 
Workers were also being certified at classification levels well 
beyond their ability. These are only examples of the more ex 
treme problems which developed under the system.
After the plant had been operating for eight months, the 
top executives of the corporation made a decision to replace 
the plant manager and to abandon the socio-technical work 
system. Interviews with the managers and union officials in 
volved suggested the following reasons for the failure of the 
new system. First, it is clear that management made a major 
mistake in failing to staff the plant with managers experienc 
ed in either general manufacturing or meatpacking manufac 
turing. Instead, all the managers of the new plant came from 
the retail food operations and brought retail orientations and 
experience into the factory environment. Thus, they did not 
understand either the technical or the social system they were 
getting into. Second, although there was a well-articulated 
design for the social side of the plant, the consultants lacked 
knowledge of the technical nature of a meatcutting plant. 
Their prior experience in implementing socio-technical 
systems came from other manufacturing environments. 
Third, inadequate workforce training was provided regard 
ing problemsolving techniques, workers' responsibilities 
under the new work organization and semi-autonomous 
system, and management's expectations for production.
The Change to a Traditional Operation
The regional director of Local 70 believes the central 
reason for the failure of the socio-technical program was
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that people took advantage of the freedom offered under the 
system. In addition, he believes that the management was 
afraid of the union in the plant. He said, "They went along 
with anything the union wanted and didn't know how to 
manage this type of plant environment." Essentially, he 
reinforced the earlier statements that management was not 
prepared to manage this type of participatory system. In ad 
dition, he stressed that the company made a serious strategic 
mistake at the same time they were trying to get this new 
meat processing plant off the ground. The company had 
changed its marketing strategy by opening discount stores 
and cutting prices. At the same time prices were being 
lowered considerably to fit the discount model, the new meat 
processing plant was starting up and delivering meat of 
substandard quality to the supermarkets. Thus, the 
customers associated the drop in prices with lower quality 
products and the company's previous high reputation rapid 
ly declined.
Eventually new plant management turned the organization 
back to a traditionally-run operation. Team meetings were 
eliminated. Any meetings are now conducted under direct 
management control. In addition, time clocks were installed 
and production lines were sped up. Job rotation was stop 
ped.
The Aftermath of the Socio-Technical System
Six months after the shift to the traditional organization 
and management system, the union and the company com 
pleted negotiations over a successor agreement to the one- 
year contract used to establish the new plant. The union had 
originally planned to introduce only a very short list of con 
tract proposals and modifications to the skeleton agreement 
that governed the plant for the first year. The new manage 
ment, however, according to the business agent, "forced us 
to cover our ass." Therefore, the union proposed a tradi 
tional collective bargaining agreement. It essentially brought
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all of the standard seniority, job classification, union securi 
ty, management rights, and other work organization clauses 
back into the plant agreement. The management organiza 
tion was quite "shocked" at this approach since it preferred 
to maintain the skeleton agreement. However, the final 
negotiated agreement did contain most of the standard con 
tract language. In the future, the company would still like to 
have some form of team organization and would like to re 
tain the quality of work life aspects of the earlier experiment, 
but not go back to the overall socio-technical design. 
Management also is now determined to maintain traditional 
management controls and supervisory roles in any future 
participation effort in order to avoid the problems experienc 
ed under the experiment.
The Views of the General Manager
The key driving force in the development of the QWL ef 
forts and the socio-technical design of the meat plant was the 
vice-president and general manager of this company. He was 
a very strong supporter of the QWL concept and believed 
that the key to the future of labor-management relations lies 
in the development of a high-trust relationship. His com 
ments on the QWL efforts and the experience with the meat 
plant, in an interview shortly after the start of the negotia 
tion of the second year contract, are outlined below.
My overall opinion of where we are with our 
QWL efforts is that with all the excellent things 
that we have accomplished we are fundamentally 
failing. We have not yet rid ourselves of fear and 
distrust of each other. Fear and distrust are under 
mining our ability to bring about meaningful 
change. This distrust is leading to the negotiation 
of a new labor agreement in the same old way that 
we negotiated earlier agreements instead of 
building on the positive experiences we have been 
trying to develop. Instead, the union is responding
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this time the same way it has in the past. I can 
understand this because of the way we have han 
dled the socio-technical plant and the way we have 
now had to regress in our operations there.
Our hope is after we do this we can go back to 
our original intentions. Basically what we need to 
do is to eventually get on to some core issues in our 
relationship with workers and with the union to 
open ourselves up to real significant change by un 
freezing our relationship. I was really disappointed 
in our inability to move on to core issues and bring 
about change.
I believe after all I have been through so far that 
we will not get significant change until we jointly 
agree to confront the market changes and what 
they imply for employees. We can't be afraid to use 
our vision and take risks. We have to stop faking 
around the issue of productivity and recognize that 
we are in a mature industry. We have to educate the 
union and employees to know what the retail life 
cycle is all about and to recognize and realize that 
there will have to be change if we are to survive in 
this industry.
Views of the Business Agent
The business agent responsible for the plant generally 
agreed with the view that the change to a more traditional 
management system was needed to get the plant operating ef 
ficiently and profitably. At the same time, she remained 
strongly committed to the belief that some form of worker 
participation, if properly structured and managed, should be 
designed into future plans of the union and the company. 
She stated her specific views as follows:
We have to look into these ideas and develop 
them. Look at what happened here. Even though
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we had a disaster from the standpoint of the plant 
operations we had nothing to lose for trying and in 
fact no one has lost anything yet. No workers are 
worse off now than they would have been if we 
hadn't got into this effort.
In the future the union's role should be one 
that's focused more at lower levels of our organiza 
tion. We should rely less on the involvement of 
people like myself as business agents and work 
much more with our stewards and members of 
plant committees. We cannot bring about change 
from the top down through the company union- 
management core group down to the plant level 
and to the stewards in the store or plant. We have 
to work from the stewards and the membership on 
upward. The union staff has to be more of a 
resource rather than a direct coordinator or 
manager of the program.
The Broader QWL Program in the Retail Stores
In addition to the failure of the socio-technical program, 
the broader QWL process in the retail stores that had been in 
place for several years fizzled out within the last year and a 
half. Again, the regional director of Local 70 stressed the in 
teraction of the tougher economic times that the company 
faced and the internal political changes within management 
that led to the demise of the QWL experiments in the four 
stores. He described the issue as follows:
The problem was very much internal manage 
ment politics. Middle management never really got 
committed to the effort. Especially the regional 
managers were not impressed or supportive.
The regional director went on to describe the politics at the 
top of the company as well:
The whole QWL concept started because Fred 
Freeman was behind it [the chief executive officer
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and chairman of the board and the family head 
who controlled the corporation]. Fred sold the idea 
to the former president of the company and he sold 
it to three or four of the other top people in the 
company but this was still only less than half of the 
top key management officials. Then Fred died and 
the direction of the program was left in the hands 
of the other board of director members who were 
less enthusiastic about the idea in the first place. 
The other board members were not part of the 
family but approached the process from more of a 
professional management standpoint and were 
much more focused on dollars, profits, and pro 
ductivity. Therefore they panicked much quicker 
when the program began to experience problems 
and the company began to go through this period 
of tough competition and losses.
Aftereffects of the Demise ofQWL
When asked whether there were any traces of the QWL or 
socio-technical programs left on the union as an organiza 
tion, both the regional director and the business agent 
responded that there were no adverse consequences. They 
said, "We can honestly say that nobody was ever hurt by the 
QWL efforts." In fact, they believe that some very positive 
by-products came out of the process. They stated that they 
are the only union that was able to negotiate a guarantee of 
jobs for full-time workers in the stores and they attribute this 
directly to the improved climate and relationship that came 
out of the QWL process. They also saw some progress 
toward solving long-standing problems for night crews by 
bringing them into the mainstream of the company and giv 
ing them an opportunity to get onto the day crews for the 
first time. However, these efforts also fizzled somewhat as 
the QWL process eroded.
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Summary
In summary, this union's experience with both the QWL 
and the socio-technical design process illustrates that a union 
can experiment with worker participation efforts and 
manage its way through the demise of these efforts without 
any lasting negative consequences. This union did so by 
maintaining sufficient distance from the design of the pro 
gram so that it could always react to what the company was 
doing and be involved in it, but not be out in front leading 
the effort. The union, on the other hand, did not have con 
trol over the rise and fall of the process, nor could it con 
tribute to the avoidance of the disastrous consequences that 
it saw occurring under the socio-technical system. Conse 
quently, this is an example of the case where the union was 
both a junior partner in success and in failure. The parties 
are now back working under a standard contract and carry 
ing on in traditional collective bargaining fashion.
Newspaper Guild and Minneapolis Star and Tribune 
The Case of a Labor-Management Committee
In contrast to the other cases reported in this chapter, this 
case illustrates the unique features of an indirect form of 
worker participation, namely, a Labor-Management Par 
ticipation Committee. In addition, this case stands out as our 
only example of a professional employee bargaining unit. It 
is the case of a major newspaper and a group of reporters 
and other newsroom workers represented by Local 2 of the 
Newspaper Guild employed by the Minneapolis Star and 
Tribune.
Background to the Worker Participation Program
A system of worker participation was formally proposed 
by the Newspaper Guild during 1972 negotiations. Manage 
ment argued against it, saying it "wasn't necessary," but the
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Guild succeeded in making the worker participation pro 
posal a part of the contract. That provision called for a joint 
labor-management committee which would meet at least 
once a month and would discuss any topics it wished, with 
the exception of contractual matters. In 1976 the authority 
of the committee was extended to include problems arising 
out of technological change.
The Guild had first become involved in worker participa 
tion in 1971 when it consulted with management regarding 
the appointment of two assistant city editors. The position of 
assistant city editor is crucial to the efficient flow of the news 
system, a fact of which the Guild was well aware, especially 
after some "unfortunate" appointments were made to those 
jobs in the past. As a result, the Guild approached manage 
ment with the proposal that the Guild have advice and con 
sent authority over the appointment of the two assistant city 
editors. Although management representatives said they 
would not give veto authority to the Guild, the executive 
editor said he would be willing to consult with the Guild 
about these appointments as well as future appointments to 
supervisory positions.
Management and the Guild then had a meeting during 
which management discussed their candidates for the two 
positions and the Guild subsequently recommended two of 
those persons. It turned out that the Guild's choices matched 
those of management and those two persons were appointed. 
It should be noted that assistant city editors are part of the 
Guild's bargaining unit, so the Guild was participating in a 
decision which involved its own members. This was the 
Guild's "first taste" of what its members called "worker 
participation" and thus led to the Guild's proposal during 
1972 negotiations.
Program Structure and Content
The structure of the worker participation process consists 
of a joint labor-management committee known as the
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Worker Participation Committee (WPC) which meets ap 
proximately once a month. WPC members often form sub 
committees for the purpose of investigating issues and 
researching solutions to problem areas. Each news depart 
ment initially had a WPC, so there was one committee for 
the Minneapolis Star and one for the Minneapolis Tribune. 
However, the two newspapers merged in 1982, so that cur 
rently there is a single WPC. The merger and its effects on 
the worker participation process are discussed in a later sec 
tion of this case.
Guild members of the WPC are elected annually by the 
membership and represent each area of the newsroom. The 
Guild's business agent also attends all WPC meetings, as an 
observer rather than as an active participant in the discus 
sions. The editor-in-chief and assistant editor attend all 
meetings. The remaining management representatives who 
attend change from one meeting to the next. Each WPC thus 
consists of approximately 12 Guild members and a varying 
number of management representatives. In addition, any 
other interested members of both parties may attend a WPC 
meeting if they so desire.
Prior to the WPC meetings, the Guild members caucus to 
discuss possible agenda items. Then one Guild representative 
meets with a management member to formally set up the 
agenda. There is no formal process for soliciting ideas or 
suggestions regarding topics for discussion. However, Guild 
members are encouraged by the WPC representatives in their 
area to bring up any issues they wish, and Guild represen 
tatives regularly take informal polls to solicit topics for 
discussion. Minutes of the WPC meetings are posted each 
month on departmental bulletin boards and usually serve as 
a springboard for comments made by Guild members to 
their representatives on the committee.
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During the WPC's 10 years of existence, it has moved 
from a kind of "grievance committee" for noncontractual 
matters to much more of a participative decisionmaking pro 
cess for the Guild. According to the business agent, expecta 
tions of the Guild initially were "not too high," so that 
topics during the first couple of years primarily were based 
on complaints about necessary equipment for the newsroom 
and cafeteria food. Initial accomplishments of the Guild in 
cluded the installation of a refrigerator for employees' 
lunches and showers for female employees.
One of the earliest "nongrievance" type of joint decision 
by the WPC which greatly increased its visibility concerned 
the strategic direction of the afternoon paper. In response to 
the question "What kind of paper shall we be?" the WPC 
agreed that the strategy should be to become a state paper.
The "acceptability" of the WPC was proven in 1974, 
when negotiations did not involve an attempt by manage 
ment to weaken the language of the worker participation 
provision. As both management and the Guild became more 
comfortable with worker participation, the WPC meeting 
began to include broader issues. Management also started 
giving the Guild annual departmental budget figures.
As a result of 1976 negotiations, the language regarding 
worker participation was changed in order to give the WPC 
authority over any problem concerning technological 
change. This was regarded as a significant accomplishment 
by the Guild, since the newspaper industry was beginning to 
undergo massive changes in technology—the use of com 
puter terminals and VDTs was drastically changing the way 
of life in the newsroom. Due to the revised provision, the 
Guild secured permission to bring in a consultant to measure 
for radiation, and management agreed to buy glasses for 
job-related cases of eye strain.
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During the past five years, the WPC has been involved in a 
substantial number of newsroom issues. The following is a 
list of topics discussed at WPC meetings during which Guild 
members contributed ideas and recommendations:
— policy on confidentiality of sources
— how additional news space might be used
— writing seminars
— seminars on law and newspaper reporting
— newsprint
— staff size
— orientation program for new staff members
— free lance policy
— office redesign
— criteria for selection of editors
— parking
— minority hiring program
— promotion campaigns
— by-line policy
— readership projects
— circulation problems
— schedules for reporters
Current Status of Worker Participation
The Merger of the Newspapers. The merger of the Star 
and Tribune in the spring of 1982 had a dramatic impact on 
the Guild members and WPC. The merger resulted in the 
layoff of 70 people, 54 of whom voluntarily agreed to resign 
with a year of severance pay. Since prior to 1982 only four 
Guild members had been laid off for economic reasons (and 
subsequently reinstated through arbitration), the layoff due 
to the merger was a severe blow. However, it was the manner 
in which management handled the merger that was viewed as 
damaging to the Guild: the WPC was not allowed to par 
ticipate in deciding the details of the merger prior to its oc 
currence. Each Guild member of the WPC who was inter-
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viewed agreed that the merger had a " negative" impact on 
the WPC. One stated, for example:
Everyone knew the Tribune was in trouble and it 
was just a matter of time before the papers were 
merged, but no one knew whether it was 3 months, 
5 months, or 5 years. It was about 4 or 5 months 
before the merger that [the editor-in-chief and head 
of the management side of the WPC] . . . went to 
some of the people on the WPC and said, "Listen, 
there may be some changes coming down, we may 
have to merge some special sections and things like 
that. What I'd like to do is sit down with you and 
have the Worker Participation Committee help 
plan this." And in the meantime, [the editor] was 
working with some of the top people in this 
organization to merge the two papers completely, 
and never told us a word about it! All of a sudden, 
it comes to a day we find out, "Hey, the papers 
have been merged." So it was just a complete sham 
and that was just something in terms of how 
[management] saw the Worker Participation Com 
mittee in making important decisions at this place.
And so that left a bad taste in the mouths of a lot 
of people about the Worker Participation Commit 
tee and the process that I would say still hasn't gone 
away. It was like a great breach of faith, we felt, on 
the part of management. . . . and it was very dif 
ficult to conceive of continuing the committee at 
that point.
Thus, even a process that has survived for almost a decade 
can be seriously threatened by one visible action by manage 
ment (or, for that matter, by the union) which is perceived to 
be inconsistent with the trust relationship that has been built 
up by the participation process. This example illustrates the 
fragile lifeline upon which the continuity of worker par 
ticipation processes rests.
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Problems in the Worker Participation Process. In addi 
tion, many of the Guild WPC members who were interview 
ed were concerned about several other problems regarding 
the committee and the future of the process. The majority 
believed that a primary concern was the personality of the 
editor-in-chief, who acts as the chairman of the WPC 
meetings. The significance of his philosophy, particularly 
regarding his efforts to limit the scope of influence of the 
participatory process, is shown by the following statements 
about the WPC made by Guild members.
[Management] holds the cards— they decide what 
the committee will do. They have complete power 
over it. The committee will do only what manage 
ment will allow it to do. . . . but as negative as I've 
been ... my problems are more with simply [the 
editor] and the way he ran this committee, rather 
than the idea itself. I think it can work ... it 
should work ... it's a good idea, even the way it's 
set up now. Even with the way [the editor] runs it, 
it's better than nothing, just in terms of simple 
communication. At least you're airing those 
views. . . . [The WPC] is valuable, but it's just got 
ta be done with the right person. And with the 
wrong person, it can be very, very frustrating. It 
probably can even become useless. I don't think 
ours was, but it was certainly very frustrating.
Another problem with the committee, according to some 
of the Guild members interviewed, is the length of time re 
quired to accomplish something. One member attributes that 
difficulty to adversarial relations:
Because there's a tendency to see [the WPC] as 
an adversarial situation, it seems that there's too 
much time spent defining things. It's getting into 
details that really aren't that relevant. And it results 
in a sort of reluctance to try new things. That's one 
of the comments I've always heard about the com-
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mittee every since I began to work here—is that it 
takes forever for anything to get done. And having 
sat on the committee, I can see why—there's a lot 
of rhetoric on both sides, there's a lot of smoke- 
screening, a lot of devil's advocacy. All of that I 
don't particularly enjoy. I don't see why people 
just don't lay their cards on the table—"There it is, 
let's decide what would be to everyone's mutual 
benefit."
This comment points out two facts that are often 
overlooked by the most vocal advocates of worker participa 
tion processes. First, true participation by people with 
diverse viewpoints generates debates, disagreements, and 
open conflicts. While participation processes must en 
courage the building of trust and problemsolving, they do 
not necessarily mean an end to conflict and negotiations. 
Second, involvement in participation processes inevitably 
produces some degree of stress and frustration among par 
ticipants with the pace of decisionmaking and change. 
Democracy can be the enemy of decisiveness!
Evolution of the WPC
The future of worker participation for the Newspaper 
Guild members was believed to be "up in the air" by the 
WPC members who were interviewed. First, the impact of 
the merger has caused the Guild members to feel "betrayed" 
and led some to distrust management's motives. Second, a 
new editor was to joint the staff shortly after we completed 
our interviews and committee members believed that the 
WPC's functioning would be highly dependent on that per 
son.
In addition to the changeover to the new editor, others 
recognized the need for the committee to continue evolving 
by addressing bigger, more important issues.
I think that the committee has evolved, to a cer 
tain extent, from what it started out to be, and I
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think that to remain healthy, it has to change some 
more. I don't know the degree to which that is go 
ing to be acceptable to management, but I'd like to 
see it take on some bigger problems. That isn't 
something, I think, that management has an in 
terest at this point in agreeing to. But that again 
depends on the kind of person, the kind of people 
who are involved in management. If the people 
who are there from top management are the people 
who favor a reactive, bureaucratic sort of organiza 
tion that . . . kind of discourages the sharing of 
that sort of responsibility, then I think that we're 
probably going to see a slide backward.
The business agent is determined to keep the WPC function 
ing, as shown by the following statement.
Not to let [the WPC] fail is our number one goal. 
As long as the system survives, it will grow.
Summary and Conclusions
The WPC is a long-standing union-management participa 
tion committee that has survived several threats to its ex 
istence and has proven to be an effective supplement to the 
collective bargaining process. Its primary impact appears to 
be that it provides the Guild and its members with an ongo 
ing forum for communicating with management and for 
discussing issues of employer, union, and individual 
employee concern that extend beyond the normal scope of 
bargaining. As the survey data reported in chapter 4 will 
show, these Guild members appear to see their union as be 
ing more effective in representing members' interests in 
management decisionmaking on strategic topics than a com 
parison sister unit in the same local without any participation 
process. It is likely that this is due, at least in part, to the 
presence of the WPC.
Two implications emerge out of this case. First, it appears 
that this type of organization-wide labor-management com-
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mittee has improved the ability of this group of professionals 
to communicate with management and influence manage 
ment decisionmaking on some strategic issues that are not 
possible to address within the formal collective bargaining 
process. Second, if there is interest in extending the concept 
of worker participation down to the individual employee, 
this type of indirect or organization level structure must be 
accompanied by experimenting with more decentralized and 
informal participation processes that bring small groups of 
employees into the process in a more direct way.
Summary and Conclusions—All Cases
The five cases of worker participation discussed in this 
chapter all demonstrate the difficulty of drawing a clear line 
of demarcation between the participation "experiment" and 
the collective bargaining process. ACTWU and Xerox and 
the lUE/Packard Electric cases suggest that to maintain 
momentum and support for the QWL process, the job 
security needs and interests of the workforce had to be met. 
In turn, the only way to maintain the interest and commit 
ment of management to the QWL process was to find ways 
to integrate the process into the corporation's broader 
strategies for controlling manufacturing costs, improving 
productivity and adjusting to a more highly competitive en 
vironment.
The case of the Newspaper Guild demonstrated that even a 
labor-management committee that had survived for almost a 
decade was badly shaken and almost destroyed by a sudden 
management decision to merge two operations without prior 
notice or consultation with union representatives. Yet, the 
process survived this shock largely because union represen 
tatives and rank and file members see the participation com 
mittee as an integral part of their overall representational 
strategy. As one committee member put it, communications 
are not that good with the committee but without it they 
would be even worse and the union would not have any ef-
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fective on-going channel to discuss issues that affect the pro 
fessional interests of the workforce.
The case of Local 3 and the Uniform Piston Corporation 
illustrates the organizational and political pitfalls that a 
union is likely to experience when it adopts a "watchdog" 
rather than a "full partner" role in the QWL program 
dominated by an employer that is channeling investment 
resources into a nonunion plant. While no visible signs of 
trouble were evident to the union in this case at the current 
time, the seeds of destruction for the QWL process, and 
perhaps for the union itself, were firmly rooted in this situa 
tion.
Finally, Local 70's experience with a defunct QWL pro 
gram and a failed experiment with a socio-technical work 
redesign operation demonstrates that even given the best in 
tentions and good faith on the part of all parties involved, 
absent adequate worker training, management and consul 
tant expertise, and a viable technical and market foundation 
for worker participation, the process is doomed to fail. Even 
given the failure of the socio-technical experiment, this case 
suggests that if both the employer and union recognize a 
failure when one exists and deal with it openly and in good 
faith, a stable traditional relationship can be reestablished 
without serious harm to either party. Indeed, by learning 
from the lessons of the failure, it may be possible to experi 
ment with forms of worker participation again at some point 
in the future, albeit in a more cautious and thoughtful man 
ner.
Perhaps the central lesson of these cases is that there is not 
a magical single line of steady positive results or im 
provements that automatically flow from a worker participa 
tion process. Each type of experiment is likely to go through 
periods of enthusiasm followed by skepticism and perhaps 
even disillusionment and decline. What appears to separate 
out those cases that survive is an awareness of the need to 
negotiate a way through problems and conflicts without 
destroying trust.
Chapter 3
Worker Participation Under 
Centralized Collective Bargaining
In this chapter we review the experiences of two major na 
tional unions with worker participation processes scattered 
across multiple plants as they moved through the difficult 
economic period of the early 1980s. Each case illustrates the 
challenges involved in linking workplace participation pro 
grams to the broader, more centralized collective bargaining 
structure and the broader strategies of the union and 
employers involved. The cases are: (1) The United 
Steelworkers (USW) and the seven major steel companies 
covered under the Basic Steel Agreement, and (2) The 
United Automobile Workers (UAW) and General Motors 
and Ford Motor Company.
The USW and the Steel Industry
The worker participation programs in the steel industry go 
under the label of Labor-Management Participation Teams 
(LMPTs). This program originated out of the 1980 collective 
bargaining agreement. The language governing this program 
(as amended slightly in 1983) states the intent of the LMPTs 
as follows:
The strength and effectiveness of an industrial 
enterprise in a democratic society require a joint ef 
fort between labor and management at several
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levels of interaction. The parties hereto recognize 
that if steelworkers are to continue among the best 
compensated employees in the industrial world and 
if steel companies are to meet international com 
petition, the parties must pursue their mutual ob 
jectives with renewed dedication, initiative, and 
cooperation.
Collective bargaining has proven to be a suc 
cessful instrument in achieving common goals and 
objectives in the employment relationship between 
labor and steel management. However, there are 
problems of a continuing nature at the level of the 
work site which significantly impact that relation 
ship. Solutions to those problems are vital if the 
quality of work for employees is to be enhanced 
and if the proficiency of the business enterprise is 
to be improved.
The LMPTs can be viewed as a third generation labor- 
management joint venture in this industry. One of the early 
predecessors of this effort was the Human Relations Com 
mittee that was formed after the long 1959 steel strike. That 
Committee was composed of high-level company and union 
representatives and charged with the mission of developing a 
more cooperative relationship. While it was credited with im 
proving the relations between union officers and company 
representatives, it was discarded in 1964 when I. W. Abel 
defeated David MacDonald for the presidency of the USW. 
Part of Abel's campaign was the contention that the union 
leadership had lost touch with the rank and file and it was 
time to return control of collective bargaining back to the 
membership.
A second generation of efforts to improve the relationship 
between steel management and the union and solve 
workplace problems was the formation of plant level Pro 
ductivity and Employment Security Committees in the early
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1970s. These were promoted by President Abel as a 
mechanism for improving the competitive position of the in 
dustry and the job security of the membership. These com 
mittees, however, never were well-accepted by plant 
managers or by local union representatives and this initiative 
quietly faded away by the mid-1970s.
By the time the USW and the major steel companies began 
negotiating their 1980 Basic Agreement, economic pressures 
were once again posing severe challenges to the industry and 
the union. The 1970s were a decade of rising import penetra 
tion in the markets of the major steel producers and growing 
excess capacity in the steel industry worldwide. In addition, 
the visibility of quality of working life efforts in the auto in 
dustry and the interest of several key union and management 
representatives led to the inclusion of the language quoted 
above in the 1980 agreement.
Thus, after the signing of the 1980 agreement, local unions 
in each plant and local managers could agree to experiment 
with the formation of LMPTs at their locations. Between 
1980 and the negotiation of a successor agreement in 1983, 
13 plants scattered across the seven companies covered under 
the agreement formed an LMPT program. In addition, dur 
ing this time several companies and unions in the steel in 
dustry organized by the USW, but covered under separate 
agreements, established similar worker participation pro 
grams.
To examine experiences under this provision, interview 
data were collected from representatives of five locals with 
LMPTs and one local outside of the Basic Steel Agreement 
with a QWL program. Initial interviews were held with the 
local union presidents or representatives of these locals in the 
late summer of 1982 when the industry and the union were 
attempting to negotiate a successor agreement. The first at 
tempt at an agreement had broken down and another at 
tempt later failed before a new agreement was successfully
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negotiated and ratified by the USW in February 1983. 
Follow-up interviews were then held with several of the 
representatives of these locals after the signing of the suc 
cessor agreement in order to trace their experiences through 
the negotiations.
As we review the experiences of these locals, it should be 
kept in mind that the LMPT program has been operating 
during the worst depression in this industry since the 1930s. 
At the time of our interviews in 1982, the industry was 
operating at less than 30 percent capacity and layoffs had 
reduced the workforce by more than 50 percent.
Initial Stages ofLMPTs
The experiences of the first local to start an LMPT (and 
the most advanced and model project in the industry) il 
lustrates the typical LMPT start-up process. This plant open 
ed in 1903. Its peak employment was approximately 8,600 
workers during the late 1970s. As of the middle of 1982, ap 
proximately 4,600 workers were employed within the 
bargaining unit. The plant had experienced major layoffs 
starting in October 1981. Although at that time four blast 
furnaces were operating, by February 1982 the company had 
scaled its operations down to only one-half a blast furnace 
and was producing only about 1,500 tons of steel per day.
Although there had not been any actual local union strikes 
in this plant in recent years, the local union president 
described labor relations prior to the development of LMPTs 
as highly adversarial. He stated:
We always had a bad relationship. It was highly 
adversarial and each side thought the other side was 
not capable of bargaining in good faith. We did not 
have any strikes but a lot of our disputes went right 
down to the wire.
The LMPT program got started when Sam Camens, the 
USW international union representative who coordinates all
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of the unions' efforts in worker participation, asked the 
president of this local union if he was interested in starting a 
process based on the provision negotiated in the 1980 con 
tract. The union president indicated his response was as 
follows:
Of course I was quite leery of what the members 
would think. But because I was already viewed as a 
strong anti-company person it was easier for me to 
bring this idea to the members. The executive board 
was also at this meeting where Sam approached me 
about the idea. They took a very positive approach 
to the idea of getting involved.
We started in May of 1981. We believe that the 
company saw as its basic objectives in this effort 
the improvement of productivity, quality, and the 
working relationship with the union. On our part, I 
was hopeful this effort would provide more dignity 
to workers, increase their input into decision mak 
ing, ease the adversarial relationship between the 
foremen and workers, and give workers a feeling of 
participating in company and union affairs.
Structure and Operation of the LMPT Program
Most of the LMPTs are structured in the same general 
fashion. The president of the union, or a representative for 
the president, normally serves as co-chairman of a Steering 
Committee for the plant with a management counterpart. 
Often this management representative is the plant manager 
or the director of plant operations. The larger plants normal 
ly also have joint departmental or unit committees at lower 
levels of the organization. The work teams are the central 
unit within the LMPTs, normally consisting of between 7 
and 10 workers and the supervisors located within a depart 
ment. These teams normally meet one or two hours a week to 
discuss problems involving their work and review informa-
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don on competitive costs, quality, productivity, and other 
data relevant to the performance of their group. In most of 
the programs, especially those progams supported by outside 
consultants, union and management representatives and the 
members of the work teams have received training on prob- 
lemsolving. Team leaders are also often given additional 
training in group processes.
In all cases, care is taken to assure that the issues discussed 
by the teams and the suggestions offered do not violate the 
collective bargaining agreement. Union representatives on 
steering committees or on other committees above the level 
of the work teams monitor the suggestions coming from the 
teams to assure that they are not straying into contractual 
issues. From time to time, examples were cited in the inter 
views where the local union representatives had to inform the 
teams that they were talking about issues that were off- 
limits.
Gaining Initial Support Within the Plant
Each of the union representatives indicated that there was 
initial resistance to the program from a variety of sources 
within the union and within the plant. Active efforts to ex 
plain the program to union stewards, officers, and rank and 
file workers were needed in each location in order to over 
come initial skepticism with which these groups greeted the 
idea of worker participation. Skepticism was greatest in 
those locals with the most active internal political opposition 
to the union leadership. For examples, in one plant where 
there had been a history of a "two party system" in the 
local, the union president described initial reactions of rank 
and file workers to the LMPT concept as follows:
It depended on who talked to the members first. 
If those who opposed me politically talked to the 
members first the workers saw it as a company trick 
or another simple effort to increase productivity at
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the expense of the workers. If I talked to them, 
then they understood the program as a reasonable 
idea.
In some plants the members of the union executive board 
were also initially quite cautious or generally opposed. In 
one case, for example, the executive board was initially split 
with half of the members fearing that the program would cut 
into their authority. Their approach, therefore, was to take 
the idea directly to rank and file workers, make it clear to 
them that this was a voluntary effort, and leave it to them 
whether or not they wanted to participate, without any en 
dorsement or nonendorsement by the executive board. That 
approach, however, was the exception. In most other plants, 
after some initial discussion, a majority of the executive 
board endorsed the program. Over time, the support of the 
executive board typically increased as board members gained 
more experience with the program and rank and file workers 
reacted positively to the program.
Rank and file workers also were frequently somewhat 
skeptical at the beginning. Although the estimates of the 
degree of interest in the program varied from plant to plant, 
generally between 40 and 70 percent signed up for an LMPT 
team when given the opportunity. Most of the union 
representatives indicated that support for the process was 
strong among those workers who had been exposed to it, 
although there continued to be a good deal of skepticism on 
the part of rank and file workers who had not yet been in 
volved. The most common response was that "Support is 
strong where we have it and people tend to oppose it where it 
doesn't yet exist."
In one plant, the union representative estimated that 90 
percent of the workers were in favor of the LMPT process. 
This, however, is a very special case. In this plant, after the 
LMPT program was in progress for several months, the 
company closed the plant for a full one-day meeting of all
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workers at an off-site location, described the needs for pro 
ductivity improvements and reductions in costs, and put in 
motion a major effort to improve the cost performance of 
the plant. The company and union representatives joined 
forces in using the problemsolving processes and work teams 
to involve all employees in the plant in the search for solu 
tions to problems. Thus, in this plant all of the workers have 
been exposed to the LMPT concept and to a more far- 
reaching cost improvement program. This accounts for the 
high percentage of workers who support the process in this 
plant.
Among the other five plants where interviews were con 
ducted, only one union representative estimated that more 
than 50 percent of the rank and file workers support the ef 
fort. Clearly, the local and national union representatives 
face an important education and advocacy role in diffusing 
worker participation through these plants.
On the other hand, interview data collected between one 
and two years into these programs also indicated that sup 
port among union stewards and executive board members 
generally increased over time. In three out of six plants, 100 
percent of these union officers supported the process. In 
another plant, 90 percent (all but one) of the local represen 
tatives supported the program. In only one plant was there as 
much as a 50-50 split within the executive board over the pro 
gram.
While the support of the rank and file depended on their 
exposure to the process and the union officer support grew 
over time, virtually all union representatives believed that 
first-line supervisors and middle managers continued to 
resist the process. For example, one union president stated:
They [supervisors] are the problem. They are not 
educated by top management. Management has no 
means of communicating with their foremen. The 
foremen will go along with the program but they
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will do it only because they have to. On the other 
hand, those who are now in it like it. It makes them 
look good and they have less to do such as less 
discipline and fewer grievances.
This same union president had even stronger comments 
about the problems with middle managers above the first- 
level supervisors.
They are the lost people. There is no communica 
tions there. The general foreman is trapped. He is 
under the most pressure for production and has to 
both make decisions of his own and implement the 
decisions of higher management of which he is 
often not a part. This is why they are such a dif 
ficult group to deal with and have not bought into 
the idea of the program yet.
In most plants it appears that the labor relations managers 
were also initially threatened by the program. The participa 
tion process required changes in their role and often was 
viewed as a threat to their own security. These managers 
were being asked to discard their long standing roles as the 
front-line adversaries protecting the firm against union en 
croachments on management rights. For example, a union 
representative described the reactions of the labor relations 
people in one plant as follows:
In those zones where the program (LMPTs] ex 
ists the labor relations staff have trouble justifying 
their existence so they don't like it. Each zone in 
our plant has a labor relations administrator whose 
central job is to manage grievances. As the LMPT 
program goes on, these grievance and discipline 
problems go away and therefore these people have 
less to do. The company has tried to use these peo 
ple in other ways but they still fear for their own 
job security.
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Just as the management labor relations representatives 
may see the program as a threat to their job security, union 
stewards or grievance committee representatives can also see 
this process as a threat to their political positions within the 
union. The union in one plant handled this problem by 
establishing an advisory committee made up of the grievance 
committeemen and the departmental foremen. This innova 
tion appeared to work quite well in getting the grievance 
committeemen and the foremen involved in and committed 
to the LMPT process. It also served the "watchdog" func 
tion of resolving any jurisdictional problems that arose bet 
ween the LMPT process and the grievance procedure and 
day-to-day contract administration.
Diffusion of the Process Through the Plant
The slow diffusion process reflects the need to first gain 
the commitment of the various interest groups, the need to 
provide adequate training to workers and supervisors before 
they establish their work teams, and the need to provide time 
and resources to the union and management facilitators, 
trainers, and internal and external consultants. In none of 
the programs of these six plants had more than one-third of 
the bargaining unit members been participating in work 
teams at the time of our interviews (approximately one-and- 
one-half years into the LMPT process). The percentage of 
bargaining unit members actually participating ranged from 
less than 10 percent in three plants to 33 percent in one plant. 
These data reinforce a conclusion that cannot be overem 
phasized, namely, that for worker participation efforts to 
survive and endure over time, there must be a strong and 
steady commitment to their development and evolution, and 
all parties involved must take a long term time perspective 
from the outset. Results come slowly because the process 
moves through these plants at a relatively slow pace.
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Obstacles to Continuity
Internal Union Politics. Perhaps the obstacle to continuity 
in worker participation programs that has received the 
greatest degree of attention in the literature is the fear that 
worker participation processes will lead to political opposi 
tion within the local union and threaten the security of the 
union leadership. Ironically, this turned out to be the least 
significant threat to program continuity, not only in these six 
USW locals, but also in every other case we examined in this 
research. In only two out of the six locals did the LMPT pro 
cess become an issue in the election of union officers after 
the process had been underway.
In one of these two locals, the candidate opposing the 
union president who had helped initiate the LMPT program 
campaigned against the process. The result was that the in 
cumbent union president won by a stronger margin (3 to 1) 
than he had in his initial union election. Indeed, he reported 
(and it was confirmed by international union representatives) 
that this was the first time an incumbent president had been 
reelected in this local union in over 20 years. In the second 
case, where the issue became part of the internal union 
political election process, the results were more complex. 
The union president was reelected but believed his support 
for the program hurt him somewhat, especially in those areas 
of the plants where workers had not yet been exposed to the 
LMPT process. On the other hand, a number of people on 
the executive board who opposed the LMPT process were 
defeated. He described this process as follows:
After the program got started and we began to 
approach the time for union elections several 
members of the executive board began to get ner 
vous about their political support for the program 
and began to back away from it. However, those 
who did drop their support for it were defeated in 
the election.
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Perhaps the best summary of the effects the LMPT pro 
cess and other worker participation efforts had on internal 
union politics is that they can and sometimes do become an 
issue, but have not proven to be a determining factor in the 
union elections studied. Nor have internal union politics 
served as a serious threat to the continuity of the program in 
the cases studied in this research.
Layoffs. All of the plants in the steel industry have been 
experiencing employment cutbacks during the period in 
which the LMPT process was getting started. While the 
union representatives indicated in five out of six of these 
plants that the layoffs were posing some problem, in only 
one plant did the layoffs seriously erode support for the pro 
cess. The dynamics of this particular layoff process and its 
impact in that plant are worth describing in some detail since 
they illustrate the severe threat that employment cutbacks 
can pose to a worker participation program.
The union representative responsible for developing the 
LMPT process in this plant summarized the situation as 
follows:
The QWL process in this plant is dead in the 
water. We had a large layoff in November and our 
members thought that was when the QWL process 
should have helped but it didn't. Management call 
ed it off without any discussion. They laid off the 
management coordinator of QWL and the 
facilitator but kept all of the other vice presidents, 
managers, and superintendents. Our union officers 
feel that the majority of upper management wasn't 
as supportive of the program as we thought. Now 
the union officers aren't interested in starting it 
back up again even though the vice president of in 
dustrial relations wants to get it going again.
This case illustrates the important difference that a 
management commitment to maintain the program through
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hard times can make. In this plant, management's commit 
ment did not withstand the severe market pressures ex 
perienced by the firm. This, in turn, reduced the trust and 
support of union officers who were then viewed as being 
"less than supportive" by the managers. Management then 
decided to set the program aside. Later, management slowly 
tried to rebuild support for the program but faced opposi 
tion from union officers. Their only hope then was to appeal 
to the job security interests of the workers. In addition, 
because upper management failed to maintain the principles 
of consultation and problemsolving in dealing with super 
visors during the cutbacks, similar opposition arose towards 
the program from people at this level of their organization.
In the other five plants studied, although employment 
reductions occurred, their net effect was to slow the growth 
of the LMPT process rather than seriously threaten its ex 
istence.
Industry Level Negotiations. Another challenge en 
countered by the LMPTs was the process of negotiating a 
new collective bargaining agreement. Nineteen eighty-two 
was a year of widespread concessions in negotiations in other 
industries. Because of the depressed state of the steel in 
dustry, the steel companies requested an early opening of 
negotiations over the 1983 contract and proposed significant 
wage reductions. The first effort to negotiate a new agree 
ment took place in the summer of 1982 and received a lot of 
public visibility and press coverage. The process broke 
down, however, after the chief union negotiators took a ten 
tative agreement calling for wage cuts back to the Wage 
Policy Committee, a council of local union presidents which 
soundly rejected that agreement. Several of the local union 
representatives commented on the effects that experience 
had on the LMPTs in their plants. For example, one presi 
dent stated:
If we had just been starting up, [LMPT process] 
that [the negotiations] would have killed it. The im-
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pression was going around the plant that, here we 
have this program and it is just here to help the 
company get concessions. But we addressed this 
concern directly by talking to our local people and 
have overcome that impression. It will [the com 
pany's strong approach in negotiations] have a bad 
effect.
Another local president stated:
We will survive the effects of the climate set up 
by these negotiations but if it continues I don't 
know how much longer workers will be willing to 
continue to be involved in the LMPTs. If we had 
taken the industry offer to a vote in our plant it 
might have turned some people who were for our 
LMPT program against it.
Both of these union representatives, as well as the other 
local leaders, stressed that it was as much the way in which 
the company approached the negotiations process as the 
substance of the concession proposals that bothered them. 
Union leaders stated that their members would accept some 
concessions, particularly if the concessions were tied to a 
commitment to reinvest funds in the steel industry. For ex 
ample, a representative of a local from the U.S. Steel Com 
pany described the mood of the membership as follows:
There are two basic reasons why we won't agree. 
If U.S. Steel were willing to sign on the line for 
deferrals and that all of the money that they were 
saving would go back into these plants we would do 
that. We also believe that management is excessive 
in these plants given all of the layoffs that have oc 
curred. The members do not want to give up more 
concessions only to see U.S. Steel use our money to 
purchase another big oil company.
Prior to a third effort in negotiating a new national agree 
ment, the USW held a Wage Policy Committee meeting to
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outline its goals and objectives for the negotiations with the 
Basic Steel Industry and with other employers in steel and 
other industries. It decided to prepare two separate Wage 
Policy Committee recommendations. One set of objectives 
covered "distressed" industries including Basic Steel, while 
another set was drafted for industries in better states of 
health. The Wage Policy Committee report for the distressed 
industries included a statement outlining the union's objec 
tives for strengthening the LMPT process. That statement is 
provided below.
The Labor-Management participation team ex 
periment in the Steel industry has proven in 
valuable to both parties whenever it has been 
tested. Armed with these results, we are determined 
to expand and strengthen this program which pro 
vides workers with a voice in shop-floor deci 
sions—even those decisions once deemed to be the 
exclusive prerogative of management. The program 
should be installed in additional steel plants and in 
troduced into other industries, but only with local 
union agreement. Workplace Democracy is the way 
of the future.
The final contract agreed to by the union and the company 
did include a revision of the basic language on LMPTs that 
strengthens the program in many of the ways proposed by 
the Wage Policy Committee. The major changes in the con 
tract language can be summarized as follows.
(1) The words "joint efforts" were inserted as substitutes 
for "cooperative efforts" at several points in the pro 
vision. This reflected the recognition that the worker 
participation process is more than a cooperative pro 
cess but one that involves a variety of processes, in 
search of solutions that meet the parties' needs.
(2) The agreement was changed from an experimental 
program to a basic part of the permanent relation 
ship. That is, the intent of the changes in the language
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was to take the program out of the experimental stage 
and make it an ongoing permanent part of the 
bargaining relationship.
(3) The language was changed to provide that any local 
union could have an LMPT process if it so requested. 
This put the initiative for the program in the hands of 
the local union as opposed to the prior agreement 
which required more joint agreement to start a pro 
gram between the company and the union leaders.
(4) A new body of international union representatives 
and company representatives was established to 
oversee the development of the LMPT process and 
promote its diffusion to additional sites.
As a result of the industry level contract negotiations, a 
number of local unions have requested that international 
union officers begin to help them develop an LMPT pro 
gram in their plants. Thus, it appears that the participation 
program has withstood the negotiation of a successor agree 
ment, a farther step has been taken toward building the ex 
perimental program into the ongoing relationship, and 
LMPTs are likely to spread to additional plants and local 
unions during the term of this second agreement.
Company Level Negotiations. Although the LMPT pro 
cess survived the industry level negotiations, conflicts be 
tween the U.S. Steel Corporation and the USW at both the 
national and local union levels have produced a crisis which 
led to at least a temporary and perhaps a permanent 
withdrawal of local union support for the LMPT process. 
The conflict with national union officials developed over the 
company's announcement that it planned to curtail produc 
tion, purchase foreign steel, and maintain only the finishing 
portion of the steelmaking operations in one of its major 
plants. The union saw this shift in strategy as a breach of 
faith in that the announcement came shortly after the signing 
of the concession agreement in which union members ac 
cepted a pay cut in return for a promise that the money saved
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would be reinvested in steel plants. Thus, this union- 
company dispute was a disagreement over the linkage the 
union thought it had achieved between the collective 
bargaining agreement and the employer's basic business 
strategy.
Conflict also arose in a U.S. Steel plant over a local work 
rules dispute. Following the signing of the industry-wide 
contract, management proposed to the local union that a 
number of key job classifications be consolidated. When the 
local union rejected this proposal, the company began mak 
ing the changes unilaterally and thus precipitated a major 
conflict with local union leaders. The local union leadership 
took the position that any changes in the organization of 
jobs should be discussed within existing LMPTs or through 
collective bargaining. Since the unilateral management ac 
tions were viewed as an act of bad faith, the local union ex 
ecutive board announced it would not participate in any 
LMPT activities unless this crisis was successfully resolved. 
At the time of this writing, the conflict had not been resolved 
and, therefore, the LMPT process was suspended. Whether 
it is only a temporary or a permanent breakdown of the pro 
cess in this plant remains to be seen.
This breakdown illustrates the difficulty of maintaining a 
cooperative worker participation process in the context of 
fundamental union-company conflicts over basic business 
strategies. What makes the LMPT process especially 
vulnerable to these conflicts is that there is generally a low 
level of trust between this firm and the union. Furthermore, 
the company is known to prefer a traditional arms-length 
relationship with the union and to have a relatively weak 
commitment to the LMPT process.
In contrast, in one plant of a different corporation, the 
worker participation process expanded beyond its original 
intent and successfully addressed work rule issues as part of 
a major effort by the company and the union to attack their 
cost problems. A summary of this joint effort is presented 
below.
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Early in 1982, this company began to lose significant 
amounts of money. The company and the union represen 
tatives had both believed that it would take about five years 
before the LMPTs would develop to the point where they 
would be paying off, so that more direct action was 
necessary to address the financial losses. They therefore 
agreed to use the basic philosophy and approach underlying 
the LMPT, namely, discussing the problems of the plant 
directly with the workers.
A team of approximately 70 people was formed to try to 
decide what to do. This team in turn recommended they take 
the problem to the entire plant population. The president 
agreed to shut the plant down for one full day, rented a large 
auditorium, and invited all employees to the meeting. At the 
meeting, the president, the plant manager and the industrial 
relations manager, outlined the cost, profit, and competitive 
restrictions facing the plant. The workforce was then divided 
into groups of about 50 to 60 people. Workers who had been 
trained as leaders of teams under the LMPT program led the 
sessions in group problemsolving and brainstorming. About 
3,000 suggestions came out of these sessions and were later 
reduced to approximately 900 ideas. Between May and 
August of 1982 the implementation of these suggestions was 
estimated to have saved the company approximately $13 
million. This was a result of an investment of approximately 
$250,000 (the cost of shutting the mill down for one day and 
paying the workers for the time at the plant meeting). The 
company and the union hoped to save approximately $26 
million by the end of the year by implementing additional 
suggestions on their list.
The president of the local indicated that this strategy was 
successful in making that mill the low-cost producer within 
the company. In fact, it was getting some work that had 
previously gone to other mills. Finally, the union president 
summarized his view of where the LMPT program was 
leading.
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We always told management that we could run 
the plant and they are now essentially giving us a 
chance to show that we can. If we are successful in 
doing so there will be fewer management people 
around in the future. We have already seen this 
happen since they just combined two of the general 
foremen's jobs into one by not replacing someone 
who had retired.
Summary
The experiences of the USW and the steel industry il 
lustrate the various obstacles to continuity which arise as 
participation programs move through changes in the 
business cycle, the internal political processes within local 
unions and management organizations, and contract 
negotiations. Yet the majority of these programs (four out of 
the six examined here) survived. In the absence of strong 
local and national union support, the programs are likely to 
fail. Also, the absence of strong management commitment 
to the worker participation process, the absence of a high- 
trust relationship between the company and the union, or the 
unwillingness of management to adopt a business or in 
dustrial relations strategy that is compatible with labor- 
management cooperation will kill the programs. In these 
cases the participation process is likely to succumb to the 
polemics often associated with hard negotiations during for 
mal contract renewal discussions. This apparently was the 
fate of the LMPT process at the U.S. Steel Corporation.
It is clear that, over time, it becomes increasingly difficult 
to completely separate out the LMPT process or any other 
worker participation program from the larger collective 
bargaining relationship. The strongest supporters of worker 
participation at the local level escalate their interest in prob- 
lemsolving activities, and see grave inconsistencies between 
the problemsolving behaviors they have learned to use and 
the adversarial strategies and tactics traditionally used by 
unions and employers to negotiate new labor agreements.
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They also see inconsistencies between the open sharing of in 
formation and consultation processes and traditional 
management practices in responding to economic pressures 
and short term crises. Finally, the statements of the local 
union leaders further suggest that experience with worker 
participation in its very narrowest sense may lead to an 
escalation of interest in involvement in decisionmaking on 
broader issues. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this point is 
with a statement made by one of the union presidents in sum 
marizing his views of the process.
I would like to think we will get more involved in 
bigger issues over time. We are satisfied with the in 
volvement we have now but as the program grows 
our input should also grow. We should become 
more involved in the running of the plant if only no 
more than in an advisory role.
The UAW and the Automobile Industry
The auto industry's experimentation with worker par 
ticipation programs began in the early 1970s. The well- 
publicized strike at General Motors' Lordstown plant in 
1972 led to wide-ranging discussions in and out of the in 
dustry concerning the workplace environment, worker 
motivation, and potential avenues by which work might be 
reorganized and enriched.
In 1973, a letter of understanding was added to the GM- 
UAW national agreement recognizing
. . . the desirability of mutual effort to improve the 
quality of work life for the employees. In consulta 
tion with union representatives, certain projects 
have been undertaken by management in the field 
of organizational development, involving the par 
ticipation of represented employees. These and 
other projects and experiments which may be
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undertaken in the future are designed to improve 
the quality of work life thereby advantaging the 
worker by making work a more satisfying ex 
perience, advantaging the Corporation by leading 
to a reduction in employee absenteeism and turn 
over, and advantaging the consumer through im 
provement in the quality of the products manufac 
tured.
A joint national committee was created to review and en 
courage the QWL projects.
A variety of experimental projects followed. Among these 
projects was a program to enhance communication between 
workers and managers accompanied by a survey of worker 
attitudes which showed signs of early success at the GM- 
Lakewood assembly plant. At a van assembly plant in 
Detroit, assembly line operations in one work station were 
replaced by a team (stall) work organization. Later, the 
QWL program at the GM-Tarrytown assembly plant was 
heralded as successfully reducing absentee rates and 
grievance rates, and improving worker attitudes.
The pace and extent of these experimental programs 
varied widely within companies and across the industry. At 
Ford, the development of such programs stalled after a few 
unsuccessful pilot projects and was not revived until the end 
of the decade. Meanwhile, at Chrysler and American 
Motors, very few participation projects have been initiated. 
At GM, where the widest diversity of programs emerged 
under the leadership of Irving Bluestone of the UAW, there 
were failures as well as successes. For example, the team 
organization at the van assembly plant mentioned above fail 
ed to reach performance expectations and soon ended. The 
new cooperative relationship at the Lakewood assembly 
plant lasted only for a few years and then evaporated when 
plant management changed.
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In some other GM plants, such as Tarrytown, there ap 
parently are continuing successes. In the early and 
mid-1970s, GM also was experimenting with new work 
systems and managerial styles in their southern plants, most 
of which remained nonunion until the late 1970s. In a few of 
these plants workers were organized into "operating teams" 
with a single job classification for production workers (ex 
cluding tradesmen) and a "pay for knowledge" wage system 
which contained six pay levels. One of these facilities, the 
Delco-Remy plant in Albany, Georgia was organized by the 
UAW, but continued to use the team concept with the 
union's approval. After GM management's adoption of a 
neutrality pledge in 1976 and an automatic recognition 
clause in 1979, all of the nonunion southern plants were 
organized by the UAW. The development of the operating 
team concept, however, has had lasting effects as the use of 
such teams spread in the late 1970s to GM plants. This team 
system also is significant because, as discussed in more detail 
below, the system integrates basic changes in work organiza 
tion and collective bargaining with worker participation.
The late 1970s witnessed a sharp economic decline in the 
auto industry which precipitated the development of a sec 
ond generation and wider range of worker participation pro 
grams. The scale of the industry's economic decline has been 
massive. The employment of production workers in the in 
dustry has dropped from a peak of 802,800 in December 
1978 to 511,500 as of July 1982. Furthermore, shifts in the 
demand for autos, heightened international competition, 
and the resulting imperative for rapid technological change 
suggest that employment levels are unlikely to return to 
anywhere near their earlier peaks. In addition, the enormous 
success of the Japanese production system raised doubts 
about the soundness of American labor relations practices 
and helped to induce a new wave of experimentation.
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The economic troubles in the industry after 1979 led to 
significant changes in the conduct of labor-management 
relations. These changes include the initiation of Quality 
Circles at the shop floor level, and enhanced communication 
between workers and management through other less formal 
channels. To preserve jobs, a number of plants have 
modified local agreements and work rule practices. In the 
process, the role of union officers has changed dramatically. 
Union officials in many plants now communicate frequently 
with management outside of normal collective bargaining 
channels and receive information regarding business plans, 
new technologies, and supplier relations information on sub 
jects that heretofore were deemed to be exclusive managerial 
prerogatives.
At Ford, worker participation programs had largely disap 
peared until 1980 and were encouraged by the appointment 
of Donald Ephlin as the vice-president of the Ford-UAW 
department and Peter Pestillo as the Ford vice-president of 
industrial relations. A further push for participation pro 
grams came in the national agreements at GM and Ford sign 
ed in 1982 which created new training programs, guaranteed 
income stream benefits, pilot employment guarantee pro 
jects, plant closing moratoriums, and outsourcing limita 
tions. These agreements also included significant pay conces 
sions (the removal of the annual improvement factor and 
deferral of COLA payments) and reduced the number of 
paid holidays by 10 per year.
The elaboration of worker participation programs in the 
early 1980s in the auto industry confronted two central 
issues. First, economic pressure clearly was a major force 
which spurred these programs and raised the issue of how 
participation programs were to relate to other cost cutting 
measures adopted in response to this economic pressure. Sec 
ond, labor and management faced a decision regarding 
whether or not participation programs were to expand to the
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point that they entailed a more systematic transformation in 
industrial relations. The operating team concept adopted in a 
few plants provides one potential route by which this type of 
transformation can occur. The question is whether plants 
that so far have adopted more piecemeal participation pro 
grams can and will choose to move to this sort of full scale 
revision in the conduct of labor-management relations. To il 
lustrate the dynamics of the participation process and the 
emergence of these issues, in the next section we describe 
events within one plant that has adopted both Quality Circles 
and a major work rule concessionary agreement. Then, the 
experiences of plants which utilize operating teams are 
reviewed.
A Piecemeal Participation Process
Participation programs began in this plant in 1980 in the 
aftermath of enormous layoffs and the emergence of doubts 
regarding the long term viability of the plant. This plant 
manufactures parts for the Ford Motor Company. Employ 
ment peaked in 1979 at 3400 hourly workers and by 1982 had 
fallen to 1400. Labor relations in the plant always had been, 
in the words of the bargaining chairman, "extremely adver 
sarial." Facing layoffs and frustrated by their acrimonious 
relationship, labor and management set out in early 1980 to 
experiment with a worker participation process. The local 
union shortly discovered that language encouraging such 
programs had been included in their company's 1979 na 
tional agreement. Following the guidelines of the national 
agreement, and with advice and encouragement provided by 
national UAW officers, labor and management then em 
barked on a new program.
The participation program initially centered around the 
creation of "Employee Involvement" (El) groups, essential 
ly Quality Circles, where workers on a voluntary basis would 
meet for one hour a week (on paid time) and discuss
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workplace issues. These groups, as of the spring of 1983, in 
cluded 20 percent of the hourly workforce. Expansion of El 
groups has been limited by two factors—the disruptive in 
fluence of continuing layoffs and the large resources needed 
for group start-up. Specific issues that have been addressed 
by the El groups include: the placement of a conveyor belt, 
the improvement of gauging operations, better lighting and 
the rearrangement of some work stations to better coor 
dinate work.
The local union has made sure that contractual issues are 
not discussed in the El groups. If issues such as job jurisdic 
tion or production standards come up, discussion is "halted 
by the union committeeman" and the issue is sent to the 
plant's bargaining committee. However, in some depart 
ments, workers have become involved in broader workplace 
issues. A few involvement groups have been in touch with 
vendors to resolve production problems. Another involve 
ment group performed a feasibility study of the use of a 
robot and in the process altered the ultimate decision reached 
by the engineering staff.
On a separate track, the relationship between union of 
ficers and plant management was changing in the plant. 
Union officers were being provided with information regard 
ing business plans. For the first time, the plant manager was 
forewarning union officials about upcoming layoffs and new 
machinery, and asking for advice regarding how these 
changes might best be implemented. Some of their discus 
sions have occurred as part of "Mutual Growth Forums" 
which follow the guidelines outlined in the 1982 national 
Ford-UAW agreement. Other discussions occur on a more 
informal basis.
An important part of the communication between plant 
and union officials concerned the competitive pressures fac 
ed by the plant and steps that might be taken to lower in- 
house production costs so as to compete more successfully
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for new business. These discussions led to a local agreement 
in 1982 which modified a number of work rules. The con 
tractual modifications included agreements to: increase pro 
duction standards; have production workers perform some 
housekeeping, inspection and incidental maintenance job 
functions; alter overtime and shift preference arrangements; 
and allow production workers to assist tradesmen in the 
repair of machines. These concessions were provided by the 
union on the grounds that they would lead to the arrival of 
new business (the plant would become a parts source for 
Ford's new models). In the work areas involved in any new 
business, it also was agreed that workers would be selected 
(transferred) with some consideration of ability rather than 
rely exclusively on existing contractual seniority provisions.
In one work area in the plant where new business has been 
brought in, a single ("universal") classification system has 
been adopted. The original plan was to include a "pay for 
knowledge" system in this area, though so far implementa 
tion issues have postponed that step. Management hopes 
that positive experience with the single classification system 
will encourage the system's expansion to other work areas. 
Expansion of this system to the whole plant essentially would 
amount to introduction of the operating team system.
Discussion in this plant recently has focused on shifting 
the Employee Involvement groups to a department team 
basis. Like the use of a single classification system, this shift 
entails a fundamental redirection of the participation pro 
cess. At the core, the issue is how the participation process 
can be linked more closely to work rule issues, and thereby, 
to many of the rules currently resolved through collective 
bargaining procedures. From management's side, the need 
to more closely integrate participation and work rule issues 
arises from their concern that the participation process not 
only address "housekeeping issues," but rather focus on the 
problems that affect this plant's competitive position.
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To date, work rule issues and the Employee Involvement 
process (the Quality Circles) have been procedurally kept 
apart. This has created two central problems. By not focus 
ing on work rules, the agenda within the Employee Involve 
ment groups has been limited to the point that some 
employees and management have become disillusioned with 
the outputs of the process. Furthermore, insecurities have 
been created within the workforce. Employees are hesitant to 
give up the traditional classification system and experiment 
with a universal classification system or other work rule 
changes because the job specifications and seniority rights 
embedded in the traditional system provide the workers with 
protection from the abuse of discretion by managers. If this 
security and protection is given up, the workers want 
something to be put in its place. As we will see in the later 
discussion of the operating team system, there it is enhanced 
information and participation through team structures that 
partially satisfies these needs.
In this plant, union officials have acquired more informa 
tion and input into business decisions. Yet, this has occurred 
in a disassociated manner from other programs in the plant 
and, perhaps most important, has not fully involved the 
hourly workforce. Thus, although enormous change has oc 
curred within the plant, a series of problems exist which 
jeopardize the future of the participation process. First, both 
workers and managers complain that many of the Employee 
Involvement groups seem to have plateaued and need to be 
invigorated. Second, the pace at which work rule changes 
have been adopted and classification systems revised has 
slowed due to the resistance of some work groups. Third, 
debilitating problems, such as whether participation in the 
new department teams or a new statistical quality control 
program are voluntary (as with the Employee Involvement 
groups), have slowed the adoption of these programs. Addi 
tionally, there is a sense of unease within both union and 
management ranks concerning where the participation pro-
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cess is headed and how it relates to the economic pressures 
confronting the plant.
To allay some of the anxieties which surfaced regarding 
the participation programs, a plant-wide meeting was held 
which involved the participation of the hourly workforce, 
corporate management, and national officers of the UAW. 
One purpose of this meeting was to show workers that the 
participation programs had the support of the national 
union. The meeting also provided the opportunity to point 
out the relationships between this plant's particular pro 
grams and the novel programs adopted at the national level 
in the 1982 negotiations.
This meeting apparently did help to broaden the support 
within the rank and file for the participation process. 
However, labor and management are still left with the prob 
lem of how to institutionalize the connection between the 
participation process and mainstream collective bargaining 
issues and procedures. The operating team system described 
below sets out one possible solution.
The Operating Team System
Operating teams are now utilized in 10 GM plants in 
cluding the Delco-Remy plant in Albany, Georgia, Cadillac 
engine plant in Livonia, Michigan, and Buick 81 plant in 
Flint, Michigan. These plants provide an example of how the 
participation process can be integrated more fully with other 
industrial relations systems and processes.
The core of the operating team system is the departmental 
teams which contain a single production classification. A 
worker's pay thereby no longer is explicitly linked to a par 
ticular set of job tasks. Instead, there exist six pay levels 
which workers move up as they master a wider variety of job 
tasks. The work team also has responsibility for such things 
as inspection, material handling, housekeeping and repairs. 
In this way, the system involves an expansion of job tasks.
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There is a "team coordinator" who functions as super 
visor of the team (the former first-line supervisor's role) and 
an assistant team coordinator (an hourly worker). The teams 
regularly meet to discuss production problems, review the 
pay system, and discuss impending business decisions such as 
the introduction of new machinery or upcoming work 
schedules. Part of the function of team meetings is to 
establish a business focus within the work area. To ac 
complish this the team regularly reviews the costs and 
revenues associated with the work area. In one team meeting 
we observed the team coordinator reviewing the purchase 
vouchers accumulated by the work area in the previous week 
and comparing the total operating costs to operating 
revenues generated by the work area.
Two aspects of the typical start-up of the team systems 
were particularly important in providing the local union with 
assurances regarding management's objectives. Represen 
tatives from the local union were involved in the planning 
committees that shape the design and implementation of 
each team system. Furthermore, local union officials had a 
say in the initial selection of the team coordinators and con 
tinue to maintain involvement in the placement of super 
visory staff.
One of the values of the single classification is that it 
allows greater flexibility and coordination across work sta 
tions. For instance, absenteeism is less of a problem since 
workers are qualified to carry out a variety of jobs. The 
"pay for knowledge" system reinforces this flexibility by 
providing a direct reward for the mastering of a large 
number of jobs. The work teams also allow job rotation and 
worker input into job design. Although these forms of work 
reorganization have occurred, observation of some of these 
plants suggests that the abandonment of assembly line 
techniques has not been a frequent product of the teams' 
operation. For one thing, the basic technologies within these 
plants are traditional, though being of recent vintage, and
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they do tend to involve a high degree of computer control. In 
addition, it does not appear that workers within the teams 
have chosen to shift away from short cycle jobs, even where 
they could have.
What the teams do provide is a process which links the 
modification of work rules and work organization to worker 
participation. Consider how some of the problems, which 
have arisen in the plant engaged in a piecemeal participation 
process described earlier, are resolved in the operating team 
system. In the piecemeal plant, participation workers are 
reluctant to agree to further work rule concessions for fear 
that the relaxation of the traditional classification and 
seniority system would pass too much unregulated control to 
management. Yet, in the operating teams it is the fact that 
workers receive information about upcoming changes and 
have a right to make their influence felt in the team meetings 
that provides a substitute for the security relinquished 
through abandonment of the traditional classification 
system. Furthermore, local union officials within the 
operating team plants receive extensive information from 
plant management regarding business plans. In this respect, 
the roles of the local union are much the same in the two 
plants. The difference is that in the team plants this exchange 
of information extends down to the level of hourly workers 
and is institutionalized through the team meetings.
This is not to say that all conflicts have evaporated in the 
team plants. One of the team plants we visited has con 
fronted the following problems. A dispute arose over the 
varying pace at which workers had progressed up the levels 
of the "pay for knowledge" scheme across the teams. Some 
workers resented the fact that pay progression had been 
faster in an area of the plant that holds low status and in the 
past was a department that workers had bid out of upon ac 
cumulating seniority. This has led plant management to 
closely monitor and somewhat standardize pay progression 
across the teams. Another more serious problem exists in this
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plant as a consequence of the suspicion with which skilled 
tradesmen view the team system. In fact, a year after the 
start-up of teams, the skilled trades in the plant campaigned 
hard to have the "pay for knowledge" system (which applies 
only to production workers) removed. An election followed 
in which 65 percent of the total plant workforce voted to re 
tain the "pay for knowledge" system. However, manage 
ment has not been as successful as they initially had hoped in 
getting tradesmen to participate in the team system. 
Tradesmen apparently believe that the job-broadening and 
flexibility inherent in the team system ultimately threaten the 
identity of their crafts.
Yet, the use of teams has accomplished the removal of any 
artificial separation between work rule issues and participa 
tion processes. This has facilitated the creation of bargains 
that cut across the various issues, and thereby, allowed the 
kinds of compromises that are more difficult to achieve 
where collective bargaining and worker participation pro 
grams are kept separate.
Summary and Conclusions
The steel and auto industries have gone through their most 
serious economic crisis since the Great Depression. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that each of the worker participation 
processes described in this chapter has been under pressure 
to contribute to the economic recovery of their plants and 
firms. This has led the parties to search for ways of 
reorganizing work, improving product quality, and improv 
ing productivity. While none of the parties would agree that 
the primary focus of their participation efforts is to improve 
productivity, neither would any of the union or management 
representatives involved deny that improved productivity 
and lower operating costs are valued outcomes of their ef 
forts.
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If productivity and costs are part of the agenda, then 
employment security is bound to be an equally central agen 
da item. When participation processes begin to address these 
issues, it becomes increasingly difficult to draw a clear line 
between worker participation and collective bargaining. 
Thus, as the focus of the process expands, it no longer can be 
treated as solely a local union or local plant management 
issue. National union leaders and corporate executives must 
get involved and must decide whether or not to adjust their 
collective bargaining strategies in ways that support the ex 
pansion and innovation underway within the participation 
process. As the contrasting experiences of U.S. Steel and 
Ford, and to a lesser extent General Motors, illustrate, the 
adjustments in strategy and practice required are substantial. 
Top union leaders must accept significant changes in work 
organization and compensation structures and increased 
variability within previously standardized local contracts. 
Top management must accept greater information sharing 
and must stand behind commitments to business strategies 
that preserve the employment base of the union. It is clear 
that only some top executives and union leaders are ready to 
accept these changes.
Chapter 4
Views of the 
Rank and File
Unions are political organizations whose leaders need to 
be responsive to the interests of their members. Therefore, 
no participation process is likely to succeed over an extended 
period of time in the absence of rank and file support. Con 
versely, if rank and file interest in quality of working life 
issues and participation processes is strong, opposition from 
higher level union leaders is unlikely to deter management 
from developing programs that build on this interest. Thus, 
it is appropriate to start our analysis of views toward par 
ticipation experiments by assessing the views of the rank and 
file. By starting at this grassroot level, we also mirror the 
way that QWL activities evolved—from local experiments to 
a broader movement of significance to national union 
leaders.
This chapter analyzes survey data collected from rank and 
file union members in five national unions involved in dif 
ferent types of worker participation projects. The 
background and dynamics of four of these cases were 
described in chapter 2. Our analysis of the views of union 
members toward participation programs and the effects of
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these programs on members' perceptions of their jobs and 
their local unions will center around the following questions:
(1) Do union members assign a high enough value or 
priority to QWL types of issues to warrant union sup 
port for a worker participation process?
(2) Does actual participation in a QWL program lead to 
even greater worker interest in gaining greater say or 
influence over QWL types of issues?
(3) Does actual involvement in a worker participation 
process lead to perceptions of greater real influence 
over decision areas related to QWL?
(4) Does the participation process modify workers' views 
of their job on the key dimensions of work that par 
ticipation is expected to affect such as the amount of 
employee job involvement, freedom, opportunity to 
learn new skills, etc.? These are the dimensions of job 
experience most often cited as the targets of QWL 
strategies.
(5) Does involvement in worker participation processes 
influence members' assessments of the performance 
of their union on QWL and/or other issues?
(6) To what extent do union members not currently par 
ticipating in a QWL or related process want to get in 
volved in the experiments that are underway in their 
plants or offices?
The Sample
The five cases for which rank and file survey data are 
available are not "random" samples of the experiences of all 
unions and their members. They do, however, span the range 
of worker participation programs and employer-union rela 
tionships needed to make useful comparisons and, with ap-
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propriate caution, some limited generalizations. The cases 
might be viewed as "samples of convenience." That is, with 
the help of our advisory committee we identified local unions 
and employers where some form of worker participation ac 
tivity was underway. We then discussed our research in 
terests with representatives of these locals. A decision to con 
duct a survey of rank and file workers was then made if all of 
the following conditions held:
(1) Sufficient time had elapsed under the worker par 
ticipation project to allow for a meaningful assess 
ment of worker views of their experiences.
(2) Some basis existed for comparing workers who were 
covered or actively involved in a worker participation 
process with similar workers who were not covered or 
actively involved.
(3) Both the union and the employer representatives 
agreed to cooperate with a survey. This proved to be 
one of the decisive criteria since permission to con 
duct a survey was needed from multiple levels of 
management (industrial relations or personnel profes 
sionals, QWL coordinators, plant managers, and 
sometimes corporate officials), multiple levels of the 
unions (international representatives, local union 
business agents, local union presidents, local union 
executive boards, etc.) and in some cases, the joint 
union-management steering committees overseeing 
the participation processes. Each of these different 
groups often had valid reasons for opposing surveys. 
Among the most common reasons were: (a) surveys 
had been done in the past and workers were tired of 
being surveyed; (b) surveys raise expectations of 
workers and should not be conducted unless there was 
a clear action plan for following up on the results; 
(c) the timing of the proposed survey was problematic 
because internal union elections were about to be
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held, layoffs were in progress, about or occur, or had 
just occurred, or the negotiation of a new collective 
bargaining agreement was about to take place; or 
(d) the parties belived the participation process had 
not advanced to the point where workers were able to 
evaluate their experiences.
(4) The group added diversity to the sample. That is, we 
wanted to collect data on a range of different types of 
participation programs in a variety of different 
employer-union relationships.
With these characteristics of the sample selection process 
described, we can now turn to the five cases analyzed in this 
chapter. It should be noted that in each case the parties were 
assured we would not identify individual respondents nor use 
the actual names of the unions and the firms without their 
permission. Thus fictitious union and employer names are 
used to describe two of the five cases (cases 2 and 3). Only 
brief descriptions of the cases are provided here since four of 
the five are analyzed in more detail in the case studies 
presented in chapter 2. (The case of Freeman, Inc. is not in 
cluded here since the QWL and socio-technical experiments 
had already ended by the time our research started.)
Case 1: Local 14B and Xerox Corporation
As described in chapter 2, this case involves a large, highly 
skilled, blue-collar bargaining unit located in Xerox's 
manufacturing complex in Rochester, New York. The union 
and the company began a jointly administered QWL pro 
gram in late 1980 after a clause authorizing experimentation 
with such a program was included in their 1980 bargaining 
agreement. Survey data were collected from a sample of 387 
out of a bargaining unit of approximately 4,000 workers. 
The data were collected during the summer of 1982, approx 
imately 20 months after the start-up of the QWL project. In 
this case the union involved in the QWL project acts as a full
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joint sponsor and sits with representatives of management 
on all of the various steering and oversight committees. The 
actual participation process resembles a Quality Circle (QC) 
program.
Case 2: Local 2 and the Uniform Piston Company
This is a bargaining unit of approximately 300 semi-skilled 
and unskilled workers located in a small manufacturing 
plant. The structure of the participation process again 
resembles a QC program. In this case, the union is less cen 
trally involved in the different stages of the process and 
adopts more of a "watchdog" rather than a joint sponsor 
role. The program had been in effect for approximately two 
years prior to conducting the survey in the autumn of 1982.
Case 3: Local 25 and the Communication Services Corporation
This is a large bargaining unit of blue-collar workers 
covering a wide range of skills employed in a facility of a 
large communications services firm. The QWL process in 
this firm is only in the early stages of development. It had 
been in place less than one year prior to our survey in late 
1982. For this reason, we did not conduct a full case study of 
the program and therefore this case is not discussed in 
chapter 2. It is included here, however, because it provided 
data on a sample of workers in the early stages of a QWL 
process. The process is part of a nationwide program that 
has been underway since the signing of a national agreement 
in 1980 in which the union and the company agreed to jointly 
develop a QWL program in its various locations. The union 
and management serve as joint sponsors of the process which 
also is similar to a QC program.
Case 4: Local 717 and Packard Electric
This is a large bargaining unit of approximately 9,000 
workers represented by Local 717 of the IUE employed by
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Packard Electric, a division of General Motors Corporation. 
Data were collected from 104 workers in various adjacent 
plants of a large manufacturing complex located in Warren, 
Ohio. This case serves as our longest running QWL process 
in the sample. Discussions of joint activities between the 
union and the firm date back to 1977 and formal QWL ac 
tivities have been underway since 1978. In addition, this case 
provides data from union members in a QWL process that 
has gone beyond the QC stage by experimenting with 
autonomous work groups and work team organizations. The 
local union has been a full joint partner in developing and 
administering the participation activities since 1977.
Case 5: The Newspaper Guild and the Minneapolis and St. 
Paul Newspaper
These data are collected from two units in the same local 
of the Newspaper Guild (NG) located in Minneapolis and St. 
Paul, Minnesota. The Minneapolis unit is covered by the 
labor-management committee called the Worker Participa 
tion Committee (WPC) described in chapter 2. The WPC 
grew out of a 1972 collective bargaining agreement. It is a 
joint union-management committee that discusses a wide 
range of topics including working conditions, new 
technology, systems for performance appraisal, the selection 
of assistant editors, etc. The St. Paul unit of the NG does not 
have a labor-management committee in place and therefore 
provides a comparison group of comparable workers not 
covered by a labor-management committee. This case pro 
vides both a different type of participation structure (a 
labor-management committee as opposed to direct involve 
ment of individuals and small work teams) and a white-collar 
professional employee group as opposed to blue-collar 
manufacturing or service workers. Because this unit and its 
participation program differ in these ways from the others, it 
will be treated separately in much of the statistical analysis
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that follows and will not be included in the regression 
analyses which combine the data from the other four cases.
Research Design Considerations
Obviously, the ideal way to assess the effects of participa 
tion processes on a set of workers would be to collect data on 
their views of their work and their union prior to the start of 
the process and then collect follow-up data at some ap 
propriate point after the process has been in effect. That was 
not possible given the time and resource constraints of this 
study. Instead, we took advantage of the variation in ex 
posure to these processes within each organization by com 
paring the views of workers participating in the processes 
with the views of workers who were not involved at the time 
of our survey. Regression analysis was then used to control 
for other differences in the characteristics of the workers 
that might be correlated with their assessments of their jobs 
and their union. The key results of the regressions are 
reported in the text. The specific coefficients are reported in 
an appendix to the chapter.
Our preference was to collect the survey data from the par 
ties directly as part of our case study process. This was possi 
ble to arrange in three of the five cases (cases 1,2, and 4). 
Surveys were administered to small groups of workers at the 
workplace on company time by a member of our research 
team. In cases 3 and 5, however, we needed to collect the 
data by mail survey since the employees were too dispersed 
to make the collection of data in small groups of workers 
feasible. The response rate for the mail surveys was 38 per 
cent in case 3 and 40 percent in case 5. In both cases the pro 
portions of participants and nonparticipants who responded 
mirrored the actual proportions in these two groups in the 
larger bargaining unit. Analysis of the distributions of the 
data across the cases showed no systematic differences due to 
the nature of the data collection method used.
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Demographic Characteristics
Table 4-1 provides a demographic profile of the pooled 
sample of union members included in these cases. Overall, 
survey data are available from approximately 931 workers of 
whom approximately 446 are currently participating in or 
covered by a worker participation process and 485 are non- 
participants. The exact sample size varies in the analyses 
reported below because of missing data on some of the ques 
tions.
The average worker in the sample is 39 years old, earns ap 
proximately $11.80 per hour and has 13 years of seniority 
with his or her employer. Thirty-one percent of the sample is 
female and 13 percent are members of a minority group. Six 
percent of the sample have less than a high school education, 
95 percent completed high school, 29 percent have some col 
lege or post high school experience, and 20 percent have a 
college degree. As the data in table 4-1 indicate, there are few 
significant differences in the characteristics of the par 
ticipants and nonparticipants. Participants have, on average, 
two years more seniority with the company and are less likely 
to be members of a minority group than are nonparticipants. 
Although these average differences appear to be relatively in 
significant, in the analyses to follow we will control for 
variations in these characteristics as we attempt to estimate 
the net effects of these worker participation processes.
Participants, on average, have a history of being slightly 
more active in union affairs than nonparticipants. These dif 
ferences are also highlighted in table 4-1. For example, par 
ticipants were more likely to be members of union commit 
tees, have attended union meetings, and voted in union elec 
tions. While these are not large differences, they do indicate 
that those who get involved in worker participation processes 
tend to be the same individuals who have higher than average 
rates of participation in union affairs. We control for degree 
of prior union participation in the regression results reported
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Table 4-1 
Demographic Profile
Age (Years)
Sex (% Female)
Race (% Nonwhite)
Education (°7o High
school or beyond)
Company seniority
(Years)
Hourly wage rate
($/hour)
Union steward (%)
Member of a union
committee (%)
Member of union
executive board (%)
Local union
officer (%)
Attended a meeting
in last year (%)
Voted in last union
election (%)
Ran for union
office (%)
Called union office
in last year (%)
Total 
sample
N = 931
39.3
30.7
12.3
94.5
12.5
11.80
3.5
6.2
3.0
1.8
48.2
85.3
6.2
62.2
Participants
N = 446
39.2
28.2
10.4
94.4
11.7*
12.20
4.1
9.7***
3.1
1.2
54.4**
90.1***
7.2
63.9
Nonpar ticipants
N = 485
39.3
33.1
14.0
94.6
13.3*
11.50
3.0
3.0***
2.8
2.4
42.6**
80.1***
5.3
60.6
* Indicates a significant difference at a 10% confidence level. 
"""Indicates a significant difference at a 5% confidence level.
***Indicates a significant difference at a 1% confidence level.
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below in order to avoid attributing any differences due to 
prior union involvement to the effects of involvement in a 
participation process.
Interest in Participation
One of the first questions union leaders must consider 
when deciding whether or not to support a worker participa 
tion process is whether rank and file union members are in 
terested enough in gaining some say or influence over the 
issues likely to be discussed for the union and the company 
to embark on a participation program. More specifically, 
union leaders need to ask whether rank and file interest in 
QWL types of issues is equal to or greater than interest in the 
bread and butter issues that unions have traditionally em 
phasized in collective bargaining. In addition, union leaders 
must often educate their members to the importance of 
longer run strategic issues that may be rather distant from 
the consciousness of most workers, yet may affect their long 
run interests. Thus, in evaluating the degree of interest 
workers express in QWL issues, it is useful to compare the 
relative priorities members attach to QWL, traditional bread 
and butter, and longer run strategic issues generally reserved 
to management.
The data presented in table 4-2 allow this type of com 
parison for participants and nonparticipants across the five 
cases. To measure the importance of the QWL issues, those 
surveyed were asked whether they wanted "no say," "a little 
say," "some say" or "a lot of say" over a range of 
workplace issues. Table 4-2 reports the percentage of par 
ticipants and nonparticipants from each case that responded 
they wanted "some" or "a lot" of say over QWL, bread and 
butter, and strategic issues.
The responses show there generally is a very high level of 
interest among workers in all five cases in the issues most 
central to QC or QWL processes. For example, between 67
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percent and 96 percent of these union members want some or 
a lot of say over the way work is done or the methods and 
procedures used to perform their jobs. Similarly, between 79 
percent and 96 percent want some or a lot of say over the 
quality of the work produced and between 67 percent and 88 
percent want this much influence over the pace of work. In 
terest tapers off slightly in having a high degree of influence 
over two QWL issues that are central topics of experiments 
in work reorganization or autonomous work groups. That is, 
between 39 percent and 73 percent of the respondents report 
wanting some or a lot of say over how much work should be 
done in a day and over how jobs are assigned within a work 
group.
While the desire for influence over QWL issues is quite 
high, worker interests are not limited to this subset of issues. 
For example, between 64 percent and 93 percent of the 
respondents want some or a lot of say over the traditional 
bread and butter issue of wages. Similarly, approximately 
two-thirds to four-fifths of the respondents want to in 
fluence the handling of complaints or grievances and a 
similar number want to influence the strategic issues of new 
technology. There is, however, considerably less interest ex 
pressed by the majority of these union members in gaining 
say or influence over other personnel decisions that have 
traditionally been left to management discretion (subject to 
relevant provisions of the bargaining agreement) such as the 
hiring, firing, and promotion of bargaining unit members, 
the setting of management salaries, and the selection of 
managers. The major exception to this statement, however, 
is found in the responses of the professional employee group 
(case 5). Among this sample there is considerably more in 
terest expressed in the issues of selection of supervisors, 
managers, and fellow workers and in the handling of promo 
tions. These are all critical issues that have been discussed by 
the labor-management committee covering this group. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the group expresses a higher 
level of interest in these issues.
Table 4-2 
Interest in Participation by Areas of Concern
o
oo
.1. Ml ll%'l|*Mlllty M11U A V Vll|f«lA l.l%*l|*CllllCy
(°7o of respondents agreeing they want "some say" or '
QWL Concerns
The way the work is done — 
methods and procedures
The level of quality of work
How fast the work should be
done — the work rate
How much work people should
do in a day
Who should do what job in
your group or section
Bread and Butter Concerns
When the work days
begin and end
Pay scales or wages
Who should be fired if they do a
bad job or don't come to work
Case
Part's
N = 218
87
85
80
59
52*
52
70
38
1
Non- 
part's
N=169
79
79
68
50
39*
48
64
40
Case!
Part's
N=15
67**
80
67
47
73
33
73
33
Non- 
part's
N = 45
91**
81
71
43
51
33
80
40
Case
Part's
N = 31
87
94
84
63
42
74
74
42
'a lot of say")
3
Non- 
part's
N=139
92
87
81
65
53
60
84
38
Case 4
Part's
N = 52
96**
92
77
64
69
62
73
44*
Non- 
part's
N = 49
78**
82
76
59
56
69
74
25*
Case
Part's
N=130
96
96
88
72
63
77
93
52***
5
Non- 
part's
N = 83
94
96
81
66
57
74
90
27***
n
V)
O
fa
3
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Who should be hired into
your work group
Handling complaints or grievances
Who gets promoted
Strategic Concerns
The use of new technology
on your job
Management salaries
Hiring or promotions to
upper management
The selection of your supervisor
Plant expansions, closings,
or new locations
The way the company invests its
profits or spends its money
* Indicates a significant difference at a
39
66
43
73*
29
38*
50*
47
48
30 20 24
67 60 73
35 27 27
63* 80* 67*
24 20 22
23* 7 9
30* 20 18
43 13 24
44 53 51
29 33
71 72
36 43
65 69
3* 15*
23 26
36 40
48 52
36 42
42
62
44
85
39
27
56
67
49
31
57
37
69
43
35
47
74
38
10% confidence level.
**Indicates a significant difference at a 5% confidence level.
***Indicates a significant difference at a 1% confidence level.
52** 35**
83 74
54* 40*
82 77
27** 15**
52*** 30***
63** 49**
42 39
36 27 <-
n'
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For cases 1 and 4, both blue-collar units where the local 
union is actively involved as a joint partner in the QWL pro 
cess, there is a tendency for participants to indicate a 
stronger interest in having "some" or "a lot" of say over 
QWL issues than their comparison group of nonpar- 
ticipants. The same general position, although weaker in 
magnitude, is present in the responses of the white-collar 
unit in case 5. In the other two cases, however, there are no 
consistent differences in interest in QWL issues across the 
two groups. When the average responses of participants and 
nonparticipants are compared as a whole across all the cases 
(without controlling for other characteristics), there is a 
statistically significant difference that indicates participants 
do on average have greater interest in QWL issues than non- 
participants.
Participants also indicate a stronger interest in a number 
of strategic issues, most notably those relating to manage 
ment and supervisor hirings, promotions, salaries and the in 
vestment policies of the firm. Again these differences are 
more consistent in cases 1 and 5 than in cases 2 and 3.
There are at least two possible explanations for differences 
in the preferences observed bejtween participants and non- 
participants. One interpretation is that those who volunteer 
for QWL training and team activities had a higher degree of 
interest in participation from the outset than those who 
chose not to get involved. Alternatively, one could interpret 
the data as suggesting that the actual experience of par 
ticipating in the QWL process has increased the interest of 
employees in gaining some say over these issues and/or over 
issues traditionally left to the prerogatives of management. 
Undoubtedly, both of these interpretations are partially true. 
Indeed, further analysis of these data using a regression 
equation are reported in the appendix to this chapter. This 
regression controls for differences in demographic 
characteristics between participants and nonparticipants in 
cases 1 through 4 (the Newspaper Guild observations are ex-
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eluded from these and all subsequent regressions since the 
structure of their program is one of a labor-management 
committee rather than a direct form of worker 
participation). The regression results show that after con 
trolling for demographic characteristics, the amount of say 
and influence desired over QWL issues by participants is still 
higher, but not significantly higher than by nonparticipants. 
Similarly, after controlling for demographic differences, 
participants show a slightly higher degree of interest than do 
nonparticipants in influence over both bread and butter and 
strategic issues. These results imply that participation in a 
QWL process does marginally increase the average worker's 
interest in having greater say over QWL as well as over 
selected bread and butter and strategic issues.
The results of the analysis of worker preferences for say or 
influence in QWL and other issues can be summarized as 
follows. First, a strong majority—more than four out of five 
workers—want to have say over the issues typically 
associated with Quality Circles, namely, the way work is 
done and the quality of the work produced. This suggests 
that union efforts to address these issues are well placed. Sec 
ond, those who are currently participating in a QWL process 
on average report a slightly higher degree of interest in QWL 
issues than those not currently involved in such a program. 
Furthermore, participants also report a somewhat stronger 
interest in gaining a say over several strategic managerial 
decisions and over those personnel and working conditions 
issues that most directly affect their work group. While some 
of these differences in preferences may be due to differences 
in the predispositions of participants and nonparticipants 
(i.e., those with a higher degree of interest in gaining a say 
over these issues volunteered for the programs), some of the 
differences between participants and nonparticipants appear 
to be due to involvement in QWL programs. Third, a ma 
jority of workers, regardless of whether or not they are par 
ticipating in QWL activities, want some or a lot of say over 
the traditional bread and butter issues of wages and
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grievance handling. Fourth, while a majority of blue-collar 
workers did not express a strong interest in having a say over 
most of the strategic issues generally reserved to manage 
ment, between two-thirds to four-fifths do want to be involv 
ed in decisions over the use of new technology on their jobs.
Amount of Actual Influence
We now turn to the question of whether workers who are 
currently participating in a QWL or other type of worker 
participation process perceive actually having greater say or 
influence over workplace issues. The data needed to answer 
this question are reported in table 4-3.
All workers report having considerably less actual say or 
influence over QWL and other issues than they prefer to 
have, regardless of whether or not they are currently involv 
ed in a worker participation process. Only in the case of the 
newspaper workers does a majority report having some or a 
lot of say over the way work is done and over the quality of 
the work performed. Only in case 4 does a larger percentage 
of participants consistently indicate having greater say or in 
fluence over QWL types of issues than nonparticipants. In 
the other cases, apparently the worker participation pro 
cesses have not significantly altered the degree of actual say 
or influence workers experience on their jobs.
When cases 1 through 4 are combined and differences in 
demographic characteristics are controlled, only marginal 
and nonsignificant differences are found between par 
ticipants and nonparticipants in the amount of actual in 
fluence. Thus, of the worker participation programs studied 
here, only case 4 has produced a measurable increase in the 
say or influence experienced by the workers involved.
Table 4-3
Perception of Actual Influence by Areas of Concern 
Participants and Nonparticipants
i of respondents agreeing they have "some say" or "a lot of say") 1
QWL Concerns
The way the work is done —
methods and procedures
The level of quality of work
How fast the work should be
done — the work rate
How much work people should
do in a day 
Who should do what job in
your group or section
Bread and Butter Concerns
When the work days
begin and end
Pay scales or wages 
Who should be fired if they do a
bad job or don't come to work
Who should be hired into
your work group
Case 1
Part's
31
43
17
11
8
9
11
3
3
Non- 
part's
38
42
16
9
9
9
13
6
4
Case 2
Part's
40
47
13
0
20
7
53*
7
2
Non- 
part's
26
47
26
5
19
16
30*
7
0
Case 3
Part's
32
36
23
3
7
16
10
0
0
Non- 
part's
28
40
24
11
7
13
8
1
1
Case 4
Part's
35
50
14
6
36***
12
12
4
4
Non- 
part's
25
34
10
8
10***
4
10
0
2
Case 5
Part's
58
57
32
17
18
33*
54
8
2
Non- 
part's
47
57
28
19
22
45*
47
10
5
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Table 4-3 (continued)
Handling complaints or grievances
Who gets promoted
Strategic Concerns
The use of new technology
on your job
Management salaries
Hiring or promotions to
upper management
The selection of your supervisor
Plant expansions, closings,
or new locations
The way the company invests its
profits or spends its money
Case 1
Part's
14***
2
18
2
3
4
3
4
Non- 
part's
22***
4
22
2
2
4
4
4
Case 2
Part's
40
0
20
0
0
0
0
0
Non- 
part's
40
0
17
0
0
2
2
0
Case 3
Part's
13
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
Non- 
part's
18
1
12
0
0
1
3
4
Case 4
Part's
12
4
22
2
4
6
8
4
Non- 
part's
2
0
14
0
0
0
2
0
Case 5
Part's
40
6
16
1
2
7
0
0
Non- 
part's
37
4
13
1
1
2
0
0
n'
V)
O
?
p3
3
3CL 
Tl
1?
NOTE: Sample sizes are the same as in table 4-2. 
'Indicates a significant difference at a 10% confidence level. 
***Indicates a significant difference at a 1% confidence level.
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Views of the Job
Another way of examining the effects of worker participa 
tion processes is to determine whether participants have dif 
ferent perceptions of the nature of their jobs than nonpar- 
ticipants. Specifically, QWL processes are often viewed as 
strategies for allowing workers to learn new skills, increase 
their freedom on the job, provide more control over the pace 
and content of their work, and provide more information on 
how their work fits into the overall production process. To 
assess the effects of worker participation processes on these 
job dimensions, those surveyed were asked the extent to 
which they agreed with the statements listed in table 4-4. We 
have reported the percentages of participants and nonpar- 
ticipants who "agreed" or "strongly agreed" with each of 
these statements. Since these questions once again are more 
relevant to participation processes that involved workers 
directly rather than indirect forms of participation such as a 
labor-management committee, data from the Newspaper 
Guild local are not included in these analyses.
Responses to these questions in cases 1, 2, and 3 are mixed 
and form no consistent pattern. The participants in the QWL 
process in case 4, however, consistently rate their jobs more 
favorably than nonparticipants. It should be recalled that 
case 4 is the bargaining unit in which the union has been a 
full joint partner in major work reorganization efforts and 
the QWL program there goes considerably beyond the more 
limited programs found in the other three cases. Thus, these 
data suggest that those participation programs that move 
beyond the limited problemsolving focus of the standard QC 
process and directly modify the structure and layout of the 
organization of work are more likely to have significant ef 
fects on the workers' perceptions of the favorableness of 
their jobs. Since our sample provides only one case where the 
QWL program has evolved to this point and shows this 
result, the evidence on this point is only suggestive.
Table 4-4 
Views of the Job by Participants and Nonparticipants
My job requires that I keep
learning new things.
I have the freedom to decide
what I do on my job.
I get to do a number of
different things on my job.
My job lets me use my skills
and abilities.
Most of the time I know what
I have to do on my job.
I never seem to have enough time
to get everything done on my job.
I determine the speed at
which I work.
It is hard to tell what impact my
work makes on the product or service.
The work I do on my job is
meaningful to me.
\ rv wi i Wi
Case 1
Part's
77
41
82
66*
96
38
65
54*
80
3|^V/11WIW111
Non- 
part's
69
41
84
58*
95
40
67
44*
75
j TV uw agi \
Case 2
Part's
87
67
100**
60
93*
33
93
20
87
f\f \S1 i
Non- 
part's
71
47
76**
76
100*
29
98
29
78
311 V/lAgAJ «•£>*<•
Case3
Part's
94
61
87
71
90
48
61*
39
84
'*• >
Non- 
part's
86
51
86
70
96
42
76*
34
80
Case 4
Part's
75**
39**
83*
45*
100
23
35*
23***
79***
Non- 
part's
51**
19**
65*
27*
92
25
18*
56***
52***
Case 5
Part's
89
62
91
85
98
48
59
37**
87
Non- 
part's
92
64
93
86
94
42
58
23**
87
a
O
£r
3**
CL
3<r
I feel personally responsible for
the work I do on my job. 94 92 87 96 90 94 94* 81* 98 95
My job has rules and regulations
concerning everything I might
do or say. 58 57 47 56 74 68 54 53 21 17
NOTE: Sample sizes are the same as in table 4-2. 
indicates a significant difference at a 10% confidence level.
**Indicates a significant difference at a 5% confidence level.
***Indicates a significant difference at a 1% confidence level.
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When we control for demographic differences in the total 
sample, a significant difference between participants and 
nonparticipants is still observed. Part of this is undoubtedly 
due to the influence of the respondents from case 4, but the 
marginal differences seen in the other cases also contribute 
to this result. Thus, overall, there is some evidence that these 
QWL processes are improving the extent to which workers 
see their jobs as challenging, offering opportunities to learn 
and use existing skills and abilities, and provide more 
freedom. The largest differences on these dimensions of 
workers' jobs are found in the program that goes the farthest 
in broadening the scope of the job and reorganizing the work 
to conform to more of a team organization concept.
Views of Union Performance
One of the most important and hotly debated issues within 
the labor movement pertains to the effects that union par 
ticipation in these QWL types of programs will have on 
members' views of their union. Advocates of greater union 
involvement in worker participation programs argue that as 
a result, workers will see the union as more effectively 
representing their interests at the workplace because their job 
experiences are improving and union efforts are seen as an 
important cause of the improvement. Those who argue 
against union involvement in these programs, on the other 
hand, fear that membership support for their union will 
decline as a result of these participation programs, since the 
perceived need for a union will decline.
To address this set of issues, respondents were asked to 
rate the performance of their local union on a variety of 
QWL, bread and butter, strategic, and internal union ad 
ministration issues. In addition, respondents were asked to 
rate their overall satisfaction with their local union. The 
responses of participants and nonparticipants are shown in 
table 4-5.
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Several clear patterns emerge from these data. First, all of 
these local unions are given higher performance ratings on 
the traditional bread and butter issues than on the strategic, 
QWL, or internal union administration issues. For example, 
across the sample the five issues for which the unions are 
given the highest performance ratings are all bread and but 
ter issues, namely, improving wages, improving fringe 
benefits, protecting members against unfair treatment, 
handling grievances, and improving safety and health. A 
strategic issue (challenging management policies) and a 
QWL issue (making this a better place to work) only compete 
with the remaining bread and butter issue Gob security) for a 
place in the performance ranking. Further examination of 
the percentages rating their union on QWL issues shows that 
only in the case of the white-collar Newspaper Guild group 
and case 4, the blue-collar unit that has gone beyond the QC 
program to modify the organization of work, do a majority 
of union members rate their union as doing a "somewhat 
good" or "very good " job. Thus, overall, there appears to 
be considerable room for improvement in union perfor 
mance on QWL issues.
Examination of the differences in union performance 
ratings between participants and nonparticipants suggests 
three key conclusions. First, the union in case 4 again receiv 
ed significantly more positive ratings from participants ver 
sus nonparticipants on all measures of union performance. 
No other case approaches the size and strength of the dif 
ferences between participants and nonparticipants observed 
in this unit. For example, 85 percent of the participants in 
this local rate the union as doing a good or very good job in 
improving productivity, compared to 57 percent of the non- 
participants. Eighty-one percent of the participants give the 
union this rating on the issue of making their plant a better 
place to work, compared to 49 percent of the nonpar 
ticipants. The same pattern continues for each of the QWL, 
strategic, bread and butter, and internal union administra-
Table 4-5
Perceptions of Union Performance by Areas of Concern 
Participants and Nonparticipants
(% of respondents rating the union as doing a "good" or "very good job") 1
QWL Concerns
Getting workers a say in how
they do their jobs
Helping make jobs more
interesting
Making this a better place to work
Helping improve productivity
Getting management to listen
to workers' suggestions
Bread and Butter Concerns
Protecting members against
unfair treatment
Getting good wages
Getting good fringe benefits
Improving job security
Handling grievances
Improving safety and health
Case 1
Part's
39
20
55
40
51
80***
89
87
45
73*
68
Non- 
part's
37
23
52
41
52
68***
87
82
45
64*
66
Case 2
Part's
33
7
43
27
47
53***
67
67
53
73
60
Non- 
part's
50
24
53
38
32
89***
82
76
67
87
80
Case 3
Part's
32
13
45
30
36
55
84
81
45
45
58
Non- 
part's
20
15
49
28
32
53
83
80
41
42
62
Case 4
Part's
62*
58***
81***
85***
69***
87***
83
77*
75***
85***
83***
Non- 
part's
43*
25***
49***
57***
39***
50***
71
57*
41***
49***
55***
Case 5
Part's
58***
28**
69
33
77***
85
97
86***
82
85
82***
Non- 
part's
29***
16**
70
23
36***
84
98
67***
88
86
42***
w
3**
3
O-
n"
Strategic Concerns
Getting workers a say
in the business
Representing worker interests in 
management decisionmaking
Challenging management policies 
that are harmful to workers' 
interests
Union Administration Concerns
Giving members a say in how 
the union is run
Telling members what the 
local union is doing
Overall Union Satisfaction
Percent "satisfied" or "very 
satisfied" with the union
30** 
36
59**
35 
32
55
16** 13 23 
30 36 40
45** 60 40
31 53 73 
34 53 65
49 67 84
NOTE: Sample sizes are the same as in table 4-2. 
* Indicates a significant difference at a 10% confidence level. 
** Indicates a significant difference at a 5% confidence level. 
***Indicates a significant difference at a 1% confidence level.
26 15 52*** 20*** 57*** 16*** 
19 24 64*** 33*** 78*** 46***
36 41 77*** 35*** 77 76
29* 47* 54*** 25*** 80 75 
29* 45* 65* 45* 83 81
37 45 75*** 31*** 84 81 <-
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tion issues. Similarly, in response to the global question on 
satisfaction with the union, 75 percent of the participants in 
dicated that they are "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with 
their union, compared to 31 percent of the nonparticipants. 
These differences remain significant even after controlling 
for differences in demographic characteristics between par 
ticipants and nonparticipants. This provides some assurance 
that the differences reported in this table are not due to some 
factor other than the worker participation process.
Second, those Newspaper Guild members covered by the 
labor-management committee (case 5) rate their union higher 
on those QWL and strategic issues that deal with the union's 
ability to represent its members in management decision- 
making. For example, the largest differences between those 
covered by the committee and those not covered are found 
on the issues of: (1) getting management to listen to workers' 
suggestions (77 percent to 36 percent); (2) getting workers a 
say in the business (57 percent to 16 percent); (3) represent 
ing worker interests in management decisionmaking (78 per 
cent to 46 percent); and (4) getting workers a say in how they 
do their jobs (58 percent to 29 percent). Those covered by the 
committee also give the union higher ratings on helping to 
make jobs more interesting (28 percent to 16 percent), get 
ting good fringe benefits (86 percent to 67 percent), and im 
proving safety and health (82 percent to 42 percent). These 
differences imply that a labor-management committee that is 
successful in engaging management in serious discussions of 
issues that normally lie beyond collective bargaining can 
enhance the effectiveness of the union in dealing with a set of 
strategic issues that it otherwise would have difficulty in 
fluencing.
Third, in case 1, the union also receives consistently higher 
ratings from those participating in the QWL program on 
several issues measuring the union's influence in manage 
ment decisionmaking. None of these differences, however,
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approach the size of the differences found in case 4. Further 
more, there are no significant differences in the ratings of 
participants and nonparticipants for this union on QWL 
issues. This pattern is consistent with the responses of 
members of the unions in case 2 and 3 as well. Thus, the role 
and efforts of the union in case 4 has produced a greater dif 
ference in participant versus nonparticipant ratings of union 
performance than the other cases.
When the data from all cases are combined and a regres 
sion equation is computed that controls for differences in 
demographic characteristics, we again find that, on average, 
participants rate union performance on QWL issues 
marginally, but not significantly, higher than nonpar 
ticipants.
In summary, there is no evidence in these data to support 
the critics' argument that the presence of a QWL program 
will undermine workers' support of their union. Indeed, the 
evidence suggests that local unions are rated as being 
marginally more effective by members who are involved in 
worker participation processes than by nonparticipants. Fur 
thermore, the local union is rated as significantly more effec 
tive in the case of the union with the highest degree of in 
volvement and the most advanced form of participation.
Interest in Future Participation
The final question addressed in the survey was whether 
nonparticipants were interested in getting involved in the 
worker participation process. Thirty-five percent of the non- 
participants in cases 1 through 4 indicated a desire to get in 
volved, however wide variations existed in the response to 
this question across these four cases. For example, only 15 
percent of the nonparticipants in case 2 indicated an interest 
in getting involved in the QWL program and only 25 percent 
expressed this interest in case 1. In contrast, 55 percent in-
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dicated an interest in getting involved in the participation 
program in case 4, while 63 percent indicated an interest in 
joining the QWL program in case 3.
What accounts for these large differences? One thing that 
does not appear to explain these differences is variation in 
the demographic characteristics of the respondents. A 
regression showed there were no significant differences in 
age, education, race, sex, company seniority or nature of 
current job between those indicating a preference for getting 
involved in the worker participation process in their 
organization and those indicating that they prefer to not get 
involved. Thus, it appears to be the way in which the specific 
programs are perceived by nonparticipants that influences 
their interest in joining them.
In case 1, where only 25 percent of the nonparticipants in 
dicated an interest in joining the QWL process, evidence 
gathered in less structured interviews strongly suggests that 
worker interest in the QWL process had plateaued and begun 
to taper off. We noted the reasons for this in chapter 2, 
namely, a large number of layoffs and permanent workforce 
reductions were occurring in this bargaining unit. As a 
result, at the time of our survey the QWL process was going 
through a major testing period with many of its early sup 
porters questioning its utility for making their jobs, and the 
jobs of their co-workers, more secure. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that three out of four of the nonparticipants ques 
tioned the benefits to be derived from joining the QWL pro 
cess.
In case 2, where only 15 percent of the nonparticipants 
want to get involved, we have a similar situation where 
layoffs had been occurring as the firm shifted production out 
of the plant to a newer nonunion plant in the South. Case 2 is 
also a QC type of process with a limited "watchdog" role for 
the union. Thus, there appears to be a limited commitment 
from the employer to the long-run job security of the
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workers and the organizational security of the union. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, there is limited rank and file interest 
in joining the QC program.
Case 3 is an emerging QWL process in its first year of 
development. At the time of our survey only 18 percent of 
the bargaining unit was involved in the QWL program. 
However, a great deal of interest was expressed by the parties 
in seeing the program expand to more workers consistent 
with the finding that 63 percent of the nonparticipants 
wanted to join the QWL process.
Case 4 is our best example of a long-standing participation 
process with a high degree of union involvement and com 
mitment. It also is a case in which the union has treated the 
participation process as part of its larger representation 
strategy for improving the job security of the membership 
and enhancing the competitiveness of the firm. It also is the 
case in which the data show that those currently participating 
rate their jobs and the local union more favorably than those 
not participating. All this helps explain why 55 percent of the 
nonparticipants in this organization express an interest in 
joining the participation process.
Summary and Conclusions
No survey data should ever stand alone. Conclusions 
reached from surveys are always strengthened when combin 
ed with more intensive knowledge of the context in which the 
data are collected. Therefore, the conclusions reported here 
build not only on the specific survey results, but also on the 
insights gained from the case studies presented in chapter 2.
In case 1, the QWL process started with a great deal of 
rank and file interest in the process (both among those cur 
rently involved and those not involved), but tapered off con 
siderably as concerns for job security increased in the face of 
layoffs. Despite the strong presence of the union in the QWL
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process, neither the participants nor the nonparticipants 
gave the union high marks for its performance on QWL 
issues. Indeed, the limited QC nature of this program did not 
produce any perceptible improvements in the amount of say 
or influence on the job experienced by participants, nor did 
it significantly alter these workers' evaluations of their jobs. 
Thus, from this case we have learned the difficulty a union 
will experience in maintaining rank and file support for a 
limited QWL process in the face of deteriorating cir 
cumstances that challenge the ability of the union to effec 
tively represent rank and file interests on traditional bread 
and butter issues. It also suggests that a QWL process may 
experience a plateauing of support and interest after the first 
blush of excitement and experimentation wears off. This 
plateauing phenomenon challenges the union and the 
employer to decide whether they are to recommit their 
organizations to enhancing the QWL process or allow it to 
continue to erode and eventually fade out of existence.
Case 2 illustrates the pitfalls a union may experience with a 
limited QC program in which it chooses to play only a 
"watchdog" role. The survey data in this case suggest that 
the union members do not see significant change in their jobs 
or their influence in decisionmaking and do not see the union 
as performing significantly better on QWL issues as a result 
of the program. At the same time, rank and file evaluations 
of union performance have not yet suffered from the QC 
program.
Case 3 represents a QWL process in the early stages of 
development. It demonstrates that QWL programs diffuse 
slowly through organizations and that while interest in par 
ticipating is often quite strong in its initial stages, positive 
results from the process may not be visible in the short run.
Case 4 is an example of a participation process that has 
been in place for more than five years, that has moved into 
the area of work reorganization, and that has achieved the
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most positive response from rank and file workers. It sug 
gests that the participation processes that are likely to have 
the most positive long-run outcomes for unions and their 
members are ones that become integrated into the union and 
the employer's broader strategies for enhancing workers' job 
security and the firm's economic performance.
Case 5 is different from the other cases since it includes a 
labor-management committee covering white-collar profes 
sional workers. The survey results for this group suggest that 
while the indirect participation structure of a labor- 
management committee is unlikely to significantly affect in 
dividual worker experiences on their job on a day-to-day 
basis, it can serve as a useful forum for discussing on an on 
going basis the larger strategic issues that otherwise are left 
to management's discretion.
When considered as a whole, these survey data suggest 
that worker participation processes can have a positive effect 
on workers' job-related experiences and on their evaluation 
of the performance of their union. Positive impacts, 
however, are slow in developing and do not stand indepen 
dent from other union activities, accomplishments, or short 
comings. That is, there is no evidence in these data that a 
union would be strengthened by being an active and visible 
partner in a worker participation process in the face of poor 
union performance on its traditional bread and butter 
responsibilities. Stated differently, effective performance on 
QWL issues will not serve as an effective substitute for an in 
ability to deliver economic benefits, job security and protec 
tion from any arbitrary actions on the part of management. 
The variations across these cases suggest that improvements 
in workers' views of their jobs and their unions are greater 
where:
(1) the union serves as a visible joint partner in the pro 
cess;
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(2) the participation process leads to actual changes in 
work organization that enhance the security of the 
labor force and the economic performance of the 
firm;
(3) union leaders link their support for QWL to their 
larger collective bargaining and representational 
strategies, and;
(4) sufficient time has passed for the union's contribu 
tion to improving QWL experiences of their members 
to be seen while at the same time the union continues 
to effectively deal with bread and butter concerns.
Union performance on QWL issues still has considerable 
room for improvement. Even in cases where unions are serv 
ing as a joint partner in delivering QWL services, union per 
formance on these issues is rated lower than performance on 
bread and butter issues. On average, less than a majority of 
union members rate their union as performing well on QWL 
issues, even in those cases where a QWL process is under 
way.
QWL programs go through various stages of development 
in which worker reactions to the process and to the union's 
role are likely to vary. Since interested workers may get in 
volved first, there is likely to be an initial burst of enthusiasm 
and interest in the process prior to the participants forming a 
judgment about its effects on their jobs and their relation 
ship to the union. Later, a tapering off or plateauing of en 
thusiasm may occur and the remaining nonparticipants are 
likely to resist efforts to get them involved. The ultimate 
degree of interest in and support for the process is likely to 
be determined by the extent to which the union is able to suc 
cessfully use the process to both improve individual workers' 
direct or day-to-day job experience as well as improve the 
long-run security of those jobs.
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While rank and file support provides the essential founda 
tion for worker participation processes, their long-run 
viability also depends on the views of local and national 
union officers and on the ability of the parties to fit the par 
ticipation process and its results into their larger bargaining 
relationship. In the chapters that follow we move up from 
the grass roots level and analyze the views of local union of 
ficers and national union leaders to better understand where 
participation processes fit into labor-management relations.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
The table contained in this appendix reports the results of 
regression equations used to estimate the effects of worker 
participation on the workers' views of their job and their 
union. The numbers reported in the table are unstandardized 
regression coefficients for dummy variables that took the 
value of 1 if the worker was participating in a worker par 
ticipation process and 0 if the worker was not participating. 
The following control variables were entered into each equa 
tion: age, race, sex, educational level, years with the firm, 
hourly wage rate, and an index of participation in union ac 
tivities. Another set of equations was computed which con 
tained dummy variables for each union. The conclusions 
discussed in the chapter are based on the more conservative 
results that contain the controls for differences across the 
local unions.
The dependent variables were calculated by first grouping 
the issues into (1) quality of work, (2) bread and butter, and 
(3) strategic categories as shown in tables 4-2, 4-3, and 4-5. 
Averages within group scores were then computed and serve 
as the dependent variables for these analyses. The dependent 
variable for the test of whether participation affects workers' 
views of their job content is the average response to all the 
items contained in table 4-4. The dependent variable for 
overall union satisfaction is the response to a single item 
satisfaction question as shown in table 4-5. Copies of the 
questionnaires and the actual regression equations used to 
obtain these results are available from the authors upon re 
quest.
Table 4-A
Regression Results for the Effects of Participation 
on Various Dependent Variables
Not controlling for 
cross union differences
Dependent Variable
Interest in Participation
QWL Issues 
Bread and Butter Issues
Strategic Issues
Actual Influence
QWL Issues 
Bread and Butter Issues
Strategic Issues
Views of Union Performance
QWL Issues 
Bread and Butter Issues
Strategic Issues
Overall Union Performance
Views of Job Content
Regression 
coefficient
0.88 
1.54**
1.12*
1.56** 
1.70**
0.46
2.41*** 
2.96***
1.41***
0.56*
1.80***
Standard 
error
0.55 
0.72
0.79
0.52 
0.40
0.31
0.64 
0.67
0.24
0.32
0.44
Controlling for 
cross union differences
Regression 
coefficient
0.54 
1.27
1.16
0.88 
0.54
0.28
0.98 
0.54
0.20
0.13
1.62*
Standard 
error
0.94 
1.20
1.37
0.90 
0.69
0.55
1.07 
1.12
0.40
0.23
1.26
* = significant at 10%.
** = significant at 5%.
*** = significant at 1%.
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Chapter 5
Views of Local Union 
Activists and Officers
Introduction
This chapter presents our findings on the views of local 
union activists and officers toward worker participation pro 
grams. The individuals included in the analysis are elected 
local officers, executive board members, stewards, members 
of union committees and, in a few cases, union represen 
tatives serving as union "facilitators" of QWL or other par 
ticipation processes.
The views of these groups are critical for a number of 
reasons. First, these individuals form the political lifeline of 
the local union. Opposition from significant numbers of 
these activists would pose severe political problems for any 
elected leader who supports the participation process. Sec 
ond, the responsibilities of these groups span the entire range 
of union-management relations. Therefore, if any conflicts 
occur between the participation process and other local 
union responsibilities (e.g., handling grievances, negotiating 
local bargaining agreements, etc.), representatives of these 
groups would be among the first to experience the conflict. 
Third, in many respects one might predict that union ac 
tivists are likely to be among the most skeptical critics of
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worker participation since, like first-line supervisors on the 
management side, it is their functions that are most directly 
affected by the move toward broader worker participation 
and problemsolving. For these reasons, we believe it is 
critical to understand how union leaders view worker par 
ticipation processes.
The issues addressed in our analysis include local union 
leaders' views concerning: (1) the effects of worker par 
ticipation programs on workplace issues; (2) the effects of 
the programs on local union officers and election outcomes; 
(3) the problems which impede the spread or operation of 
participation programs; and (4) the relationship between 
worker participation programs and traditional collective 
bargaining.
The analysis draws from in-depth structured interviews 
with local union officials from eight industries which recent 
ly experimented with one form of participation program or 
another. In total, approximately 30 individuals were inter 
viewed. In addition, a detailed survey was administered to 
union officials (executive officers and committeemen) within 
five auto plants. These plants range from assembly to parts 
manufacturing facilities and generated approximately 110 
responses.
The discussion which follows goes back and forth in 
reviewing both the quantitative survey responses and the 
qualitative information gathered in the interviews. In 
general, the two data sources reveal very similar views. That 
is, union activists and leaders seem to be telling us the same 
things in both the interviews and survey.
Effects of Worker Participation Programs 
on Workplace Issues
The survey asked union officers in the auto industry to 
rank the observed effects participation programs have on a
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wide range of workplace issues on a five point scale ranging 
from Very Negative Effect, to No Effect, to Very Positive 
Effect. The responses are reported in table 5-1. The strongest 
response was registered for Union Officer-Plant Manage 
ment Relationship, Product/Service Quality, and Produc 
tivity where, respectively, 78.3 percent, 74.6 percent and 73.3 
percent of the respondents reported the programs had either 
a Somewhat or Very Positive Effect. For a number of other 
issues there was a high percentage of union officers who 
responded there was a Somewhat or Very Positive Effect. 
The respective percentages were: 72.2 percent for Worker 
Morale or Job Satisfaction, 73.3 percent for Worker- 
Supervisor Relations, 64.5 percent for the Grievance Rate, 
63.9 percent for Ability to Resolve Grievances, 61.3 percent 
for Labor Costs, 55.6 percent for Union Member-Shop 
Committeemen Relations, 55.0 percent for Safety and 
Health Conditions, and 41.7 percent for the Absenteeism 
Rate.
There were no workplace issues on which more than 12 
percent of the officers thought the participation programs 
had a Very Negative Effect. The most negative responses ap 
peared in regard to the effects of the programs on Member 
Satisfaction with the Union and Job Security where, respec 
tively, 32.4 percent and 25.0 percent of the officers thought 
the program had either Very or Somewhat Negative Effects.
However, union officers frequently did respond that they 
thought there was No Effect of the programs on some issues. 
For instance, officers responded that the programs had No 
Effect on Membership Identification with the Union in 39.8 
percent of the responses, and No Effect on Member Satisfac 
tion with the Union in 27.8 percent of the responses. Since 
these responses raise issues concerning the effect of the pro 
grams on the local union, which were questioned in more 
detail in other sections of the survey, they are discussed more 
fully later.
Table 5-1 
Effects of Participation Programs on Workplace Issues
1 . Worker morale or
job satisfaction
2. Worker-supervisor 
relations
3. Productivity
4. Product/service quality
5. Labor costs
6. Job security
7. Union member-shop 
committeemen relations
8. Member satisfaction
with the union
9. Grievance rate
10. Union officer-plant 
management relationship
1 1 . Absenteeism rate
Very negative 
effect
2.8
0.0
3.8
3.8
4.7
11.1
1.9
6.5
1.9
1.9
2.8
Somewhat 
negative effect
12.0
14.7
5.7
4.7
5.7
13.9
18.5
25.9
4.7
4.7
7.4
No effect
13.0
17.4
17.1
17.0
28.3
36.1
24.1
27.8
29.0
15.1
48.1
Somewhat 
positive effect
54.6
56.2
56.2
34.0
50.0
26.9
42.6
31.5
38.3
49.1
34.3
Very positive 
effect
17.6
17.1
17.1
40.6
11.3
12.0
13.0
8.3
26.2
29.2
7.4
r oo
p 
3 
CL
12. Safety and health
13.
14.
15.
conditions 2.8
Union member-officer
relationship 4.7
Membership identification
with the union 5.6
Ability to resolve
grievances 1.9
2.8 39.4 44.0 11.0
11.2 34.6 39.3 10.3
17.6 39.8 29.6 7.4
8.3 25.9 42.6 21.3
1
o
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In the interviews, local union officers repeatedly and 
strongly stated their view that the participation programs 
had contributed to a significant reduction in the grievance 
and absentee rates, a statement consistent with the survey 
responses. A number of union officers stated that recent 
layoffs which had displaced less senior workers also had con 
tributed to a reduction in grievance and absentee rates. 
However, they firmly believed that it could be a mistake to 
attribute the decline in these rates solely to the layoff of less 
experienced workers. It was their view that the participation 
programs had significant independent impacts on these rate 
declines.
Union activists were able to cite a number of specific work 
organization and work process changes which had been iden 
tified and adopted through the participation processes. 
These changes include better lighting, relocation of par 
ticular machines, improvements in physical access to 
machinery, and better coordination between workers. It is 
their opinion that these changes contributed to both im 
provements in product quality and costs, and to a resulting 
enhancement in job security.
Effects on the Local Union
As shown in table 5-2, union activists had a mixed view 
regarding the effects of worker participation programs on 
local union affairs. There was some support for the view that 
the programs had positive effects on the local union. When 
asked in the survey about the overall effects of the participa 
tion programs on the union, 58.0 percent of the officials 
thought the programs would either probably or definitely 
strengthen the local union. As one union activist summarized 
the likely effects of the participation process on his local 
union,
Probably strengthen. It's going to give the union 
guy more say on his job, how it's designed and
Table 5-2 
Effects of Participation Programs on Local Union Affairs
1 . Interfered with the proper role of 
the grievance procedure.
2. Given workers another channel to get 
their problems solved.
3. Reduced member interest in the union.
4. Improved the ability of union 
representatives to solve problems or 
complaints workers bring to them.
5. Undermined the union's ability 
to enforce the contract.
6. Improved the union's communications 
with its members.
Strongly 
disagree
23.8
2.8
17.9
3.7
28.4
2.8
Definitely 
weaken
Disagree
29.5
5.5
29.2
14.8
33.9
15.0
Probably 
weaken
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
25.7
6.4
34.0
23.1
18.3
30.8
No 
effect
Agree
18.1
64.2
13.2
43.5
13.8
36.4
Probably 
strengthen
Strongly 
agree
2.9
21.1
5.7
14.8
5.5
15.0
Definitely 
strengthen
7. Overall effect of worker participation 
process on the local union 8.4 12.1 21.5 34.6 23.4
r oo
3 
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more knowledge of the business. It will hopefully 
strengthen employment. If job security increases, 
some credit will go to the union. But the union is 
not perceived yet as a 50-50 partner with manage 
ment. The union doesn't have all the training 
management does.
Another union activist said,
The union's going to change, they won't be so 
much adversarial. Once they understand the 
benefits of the process, they will solve a lot of prob 
lems easier. If it weakens the union, it weakens to 
day's role, but it can strengthen the future role of 
being more active between contract times. Now the 
people have more of a voice, they will learn a lot of 
skills. For example, people will learn the union 
system. They're a very strong group of people. I 
don't think the union leadership really realizes that 
yet. Only three percent show up at a membership 
meeting. The union leaders now have to be more 
exposed, to be part of the people. Otherwise the 
people say "Hey, you're never there, I never see 
you."
Union officers also frequently agreed (85.3 percent) with 
the statement that the participation programs would give 
workers another channel to get their problems solved, and 
62.3 percent disagreed with the statement that the programs 
would undermine the union's ability to enforce the contract.
There were several individuals who conditioned their judg 
ment of the effects on the local union upon how the union 
participates in the process. The following statements il 
lustrate this type of response.
If the union realizes the strength of QWL to the 
people, QWL will probably strengthen the union. It
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will weaken the union if the union doesn't get more 
involved with the people within the process.
I guess it depends on the definition of weakness 
and strength. If we look at the union as encourag 
ing grievances and opposing management, if that's 
perceived as strength, then I would hope this pro 
cess would weaken that. I think the role of the 
union might be strengthened if it evolves into 
something else, a new role. I'd hope to see lower 
decision making in the organization so that it will 
be flatter than it is now, one in which good 
employees would be given more time and recogni 
tion. Now the union is protecting the bad people. If 
we could better take care of the good, I'll be happy.
There was also a minority viewpoint expressed that the 
participation programs interfered with proper union ac 
tivities. Within one auto plant, 6 out of 16 survey 
respondents agreed with the statement that the participation 
process "interfered with the proper role of the grievance pro 
cedure," while in another plant, 6 out of 24 respondents 
agreed with that statement. In these two plants, respectively, 
19 percent and 25 percent of the survey respondents also 
agreed with the view that the participation programs "under 
mined the union's ability to enforce the contract."
As one local union official put it:
Some of the issues being discussed [in the par 
ticipation program] are in violation of the national 
agreement and the union's rights as exclusive 
bargaining agent. The younger people are giving 
away gains that have been won through much 
struggle and hardship in the past.
However, in the other plants a lower percentage of 
surveyed union officials agreed with these statements. Thus,
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as stated earlier, on average, union leaders disagreed with the 
view that participation programs either interfered with the 
proper role of the grievance procedure or undermined the 
contract.
At the same time, union officers suggested that there was 
no clear evidence that the participation programs increased 
member satisfaction or identification with the union. As 
described earlier, union officers saw little, if any, effect on 
member satisfaction or member identification with the local 
union. When asked in the question included in table 5-2 
whether the programs reduced member interest in the union, 
a large percentage of respondents (34.0 percent) neither 
agreed nor disagreed and few officers witnessed strong ef 
fects. However, officers tended to agree (51.4 percent) with 
the view that the programs improved the union's com 
munication with its members.
Interview data supported this ambiguous assessment of 
the effect of the worker participation programs on member 
interest in the local union. Officers repeatedly stated that 
they saw no increase in member participation in union 
meetings or activities in the aftermath of the creation of par 
ticipation programs. This is consistent with the worker 
survey data discussed in chapter 4. Furthermore, union 
leaders often remarked that any differences in the level of ac 
tivism in union affairs arose from the fact that union ac 
tivists are more willing to get involved in participation pro 
grams. Hence, the participants always were more involved in 
union affairs and did not become more involved because of 
their experiences in worker participation programs.
Some leaders pondered whether additional steps could be 
taken to inform workers of the local union's role in the par 
ticipation process. Many officers expressed the view that the 
programs had little effect on union affairs because members 
did not perceive or understand the role played by the local
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union in the programs. To some extent, this may be a conse 
quence of the local union's actions, as union leaders chose 
not to become clearly identified with participation programs 
in their early stages because of doubts regarding the ultimate 
course and worker reaction to the programs. Yet, even in 
situations where the local union leadership had decided to 
fully support the participation effort, the leaders often were 
at a loss to explain why workers did not perceive the union's 
active role in the programs.
A number of union activists wrestled with the problem of 
both what to decide regarding the proper separation between 
collective bargaining and participation programs, and how 
to maintain any desired level of separation. A variety of ap 
proaches had been tried. In one plant explicit lists were kept 
on what were deemed permissible or "on-line" subjects for 
consideration in participation processes, and those 
"off-line" subjects that were deemed to be the domain of 
collective bargaining. As a participant in this process 
described it,
We have an online and an offline sheet. It shows 
what the teams can work out. If they think an issue 
is offline, they will get the shop chairman in on a 
meeting to talk. The people generally listen to 
supervision when they say "it's offline, it's con 
tractual."
In another plant, union officers monitored the activities of 
shop floor Quality Circles, a part of the participation pro 
gram. Whenever a "contractual" issue arose as a topic 
within a circle, these officials intervened, stopped discussion 
of the contractual issue, and brought the issue under dispute 
to the shop committee so it could be resolved through 
negotiations with management. Then, when the issue was 
resolved, the settlement terms were brought back to the 
Quality Circle for implementation.
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Another issue we probed was the effects of the participa 
tion program on union elections. We found no instances 
where union officers who strongly supported participation 
programs had been turned out of office because of that sup 
port. Most union officials expressed the view that support 
for participation programs had been irrelevant to election 
outcomes. Some officers did state that support for these pro 
grams had become an election issue, and that in a few cases 
this support had, on net, even lost individuals some votes. 
Yet, consistent with the evidence from the steel industry 
reported in chapter 3, there were no reports of elections be 
ing decided on the basis of participation program views.
The operation of worker participation programs typically 
involves the creation of a set of union and employer 
representatives who are designated as participation "coor 
dinators" who are responsible for training and advising par 
ticipation teams in problemsolving activities. This coor 
dinator job creates a new role for union representatives. 
Since this new job requires the union activists to mediate any 
tensions between the participation process and traditional 
bargaining procedures, it is illuminating to look more closely 
at how these participation coordinators function and what 
coordinators say about their jobs.
One participation coordinator described his role as 
follows:
I have a couple of different roles. First, I am a 
demonstrator of the process, trainer or teacher. 
That's the fun and easy part. Second, I'm a 
monitor of the process—living it once you're in 
volved. We interface with so many organizations: 
engineering, plant manager's staff, materials peo 
ple. It's a nice job, a learning experience, a con 
tinuous high. I enjoy working with people. I held 
the job of shop chairman before and also enjoyed 
that job.
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Two union coordinators emphasized the intermediary 
nature of the role they play as facilitator of the participation 
process.
We're neither fish nor fowl. We're a buffer zone 
between the union and management. I try not to 
take a union line or a management line. That's 
where our strength lies.
We train one day per week. Initially it was three 
days per week. We also train the Business Center 
Steering Committees in groups of three. We train 
problem solving teams and then we monitor weekly 
meetings and give followup action to help make 
sure things are followed through. We also spend a 
lot of time debating the philosophy of QWL, the 
change it represents to management—first line, 
general foremen, and managers. We are constantly 
in meetings with the plant manager or the personnel 
director or internal or external consultants.
In contrast to the focus on training, improving com 
munications and problemsolving, and the intermediary 
nature of the coordinators' role, the shop chairmen describe 
their jobs as more focused on the enforcement and protec 
tion of worker rights under the collective bargaining agree 
ment. Still, however, there are common problemsolving 
functions that cut across these two positions.
Consider, for example, the following description of his 
job provided by one shop chairman.
A lot of times I act as a peacemaker, a lot of 
times it is not tied into grievances. Some issues are 
contractual and you have to get the message 
through. Lots of times people don't like contrac 
tual wording. You have to make a decision of right 
versus wrong. I also have a lot of personal relation 
ships with union members. They need somebody to
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talk to regarding personal problems. I handled 
disputes between management and union personnel 
on problems. I solve a lot of problems before they 
are grievances.
We asked participation coordinators to compare their job 
to that of union committeemen. Below are some statements 
by coordinators which illustrate their perceptions of the 
similarities and differences in these two union positions.
They are similar in that sometimes I feel like an 
arbitrator when people have a bitch about 
something. They are different—we have more 
positives than negatives. The shop chairman's call 
ed when something goes wrong. We are helping 
people to develop—that's a big role—and the shop 
chairman doesn't.
The shop chairmen only deal with the "five 
percenters." The shop chairman is there to preserve 
jobs. You don't have the time to associate with the 
other 95%. As a trainer I'm now associated with all 
the kinds of people that are generally concerned 
about their job and their organization. They have 
the same goals and objectives that I have in my job.
Problems Impeding the Expansion 
of Participation Programs
Union officials were asked in the survey to weigh the im 
portance of various factors as problems that limited the ex 
pansion of participation programs. Their responses are 
reported in table 5-3. The factors that were ranked as the big 
gest problems were layoffs, management efforts to change 
work rules or practices, and supervisor resentment or 
resistance. Respectively, 53.2 percent, 44.4 percent and 42.8 
percent of the respondents thought these problems had
Table 5-3 
Problems that Limit the Expansion of the Participation Process
Worker disenchantment
Supervisor resentment or resistance
Loss of union support
Loss of plant management support
Conflict between workers and supervisors
Management efforts to change work
rules or practices
Layoffs or other employment cutbacks
Disruptions of groups caused by worker 
transfers to different jobs
Not at all
3.8
10.5
54.7
43.0
12.4
7.4
19.6 
21.3
Somewhat
61.9
46.7
35.8
37.4
57.1
48.1
27.1 
40.7
Quite a bit
23.8
29.5
7.5
11.2
21.9
32.4
28.0 
25.9
A very
great deal
10.5
13.3
1.9
8.4
8.6
12.0
25.2 
12.0
3?
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limited the expansion of the program either quite a bit or a 
very great deal.
The interviews were consistent with these survey 
responses. Union officials repeatedly stated that a chief 
problem in the participation process was resistance en 
countered in the ranks of middle management. As one union 
official put it,
Front-line managers don't endorse it [worker 
participation]. The Vice President and President 
think it's great, but the word has not filtered down 
to foremen that it is going to be a management 
policy.
A number of union officials asserted that the continuing 
economic decline in their industry had led to member 
frustration and disenchantment with the participation pro 
cess. These officials suggested that unless participants saw 
some clear gains from participation, activity levels eventually 
declined. Here, the problem was that deterioration of the 
larger economic environment overwhelmed many of the im 
mediate short-run improvements of the participation pro 
cess. Thus, although these improvements were real and 
valued, it was difficult to sustain the energy needed to sup 
port participatory programs in the face of continued large 
scale layoffs.
External events also affected workers' willingness to 
engage in cooperative efforts with management. In one 
plant, a union officer suggested that worker interest in par 
ticipation programs waned considerably when management 
began to move business out of the plant and into a nonunion 
southern facility. As noted in chapter 3, some workers in 
steel plants were hesitant to commit themselves to a par 
ticipation process because of their suspicion that manage 
ment would utilize any cost savings generated by these pro 
grams to invest more heavily in businesses other than the 
steel industry.
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Overall Assessment and Thoughts 
Regarding the Future
In general, union activists and officials had a very positive 
attitude toward worker participation programs. Union of 
ficials frequently stated that they were in favor of workers 
participating more directly in production decisionmaking 
and were in favor of workers gaining wider input into the 
determination of their working conditions. When asked 
whether they advised workers to actively participate in the 
program, 81.7 percent indicated that they encourage workers 
to participate (see table 5-4). When asked what the union's 
role in the participation process should be, 84.3 percent of 
the union officials said the union should support and actively 
participate in running the program with management.
Another issue relates to the future course of their worker 
participation programs. When asked about what kind of 
participation process would likely be around in five years, 
65.1 percent of the surveyed local union officials in the auto 
industry held the view that the participation process will have 
grown and expanded (table 5-4). To probe this issue, we ask 
ed in the interviews how either a new economic boom or fur 
ther decline in economic conditions would affect the course 
of the participation program. Some officials expressed the 
view that a strong economic recovery would probably lead 
management to be less concerned with the participation pro 
grams and their associated emphasis on improved product 
quality, and rather would lead to the return of an emphasis 
on "getting it out the door." Yet, if this were to occur, these 
union leaders generally believed workers would resent any 
management efforts to roll back worker participation and, in 
fact, "would just not let it happen." This supported their 
claim that they and the workforce truly valued the additional 
input received via the participation programs, and hence 
would not willingly let such programs dissipate.
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Table 5-4 
Overall Views of the Participation Programs
Question: What do you think the union's role ought to be in the par 
ticipation process?
3.7 The union should oppose the program.
12.0 The union should remain neutral but not actively participate 
in the process.
84.3 The union should support and actively participate in run 
ning the program with management.
Question: If we were to come back five years from now, what kind of 
participation process do you think we would find here?
13.8 The participation process will have ended by then. 
21.1 The participation process will look about the same as it is to 
day. 
65.1 The participation process will have grown and expanded.
Question: If workers ask you about whether they should participate in 
the participation program, what do you generally advise?
81.7 I encourage them to participate. 
17.4 I don't take a position one way or the other. 
.9 I discourage them from participating.
Union officials' views regarding the likely course of events 
if the participation process actually took hold and expanded 
differed according to their views regarding the role of these 
participation programs. Some officials viewed the participa 
tion process as a useful but limited complement to the collec 
tive bargaining process. In their eyes, the proper role of par 
ticipation programs is to provide a supplementary channel 
through which workers could provide suggestions regarding 
working conditions on those issues where there were clear 
gains to be had by both sides. In line with this role, these 
union leaders thought that even if participation programs 
flourished, they always would have a limited function. In 
this case, these programs would not preclude the operation
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of the collective bargaining process, and the local union's 
place in the bargaining process would continue in much the 
same fashion as before introduction of the worker participa 
tion program.
Some other union officials envisioned the possible expan 
sion of the participation process to the point that workers 
would carry out many of the responsibilities now held by 
supervisors and middle management. In this scenario, the 
participation process would come to play a much more in 
tegral role in the determination of work conditions and 
thereby take over some, and possibly many, of the functions 
now performed by collective bargaining. These local officials 
speculated that the local union's role might then shift toward 
representation of either wider community interests at the 
workplace or towards greater satisfaction of the career goals 
or nonwork-related interests of their membership.

Chapter 6
Views from the Top 
of the Labor Movement*
The purpose of this chapter is to review the contemporary 
thinking of key national labor movement leaders on worker 
participation issues. We will draw on data from interviews, 
speeches, other public documents and selected internal union 
documents to understand how the top of the labor move 
ment views worker participation.
While the worker participation processes studied in this 
book are inherently local activities, leaders of national 
unions and of higher level union federations such as the 
AFL-CIO influence participation processes in at least two 
important ways. First, through their public statements na 
tional labor leaders mold the public's perceptions of the at 
titude of the labor movement toward worker participation 
and quality of working life improvement efforts. While the 
public's perceptions are perhaps not critical in any direct 
way, two specific groups of interest to the labor movement 
may listen with greater attentiveness, namely, unorganized 
workers whom unions would like to recruit and high level ex 
ecutives who shape their firm's strategies toward unions and 
worker participation programs. Thus, the public statements
*We wish to thank Alan Birbaum for collecting much of the background data for this 
chapter while he was a student intern at the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO 
in 1982.
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of labor leaders are important in shaping the overall image 
of the labor movement in the minds of at least these two key 
groups.
Second, top union leaders are responsible for shaping the 
overall strategy of their organizations toward worker par 
ticipation and designing an organizational structure capable 
of implementing that strategy down through the union to its 
grass roots level. The structure put into place will in turn 
serve as the channel of information from local to top union 
leaders. For these reasons, therefore, it is important to 
understand how national level labor leaders are responding 
to the question of whether worker participation processes 
are, indeed, a threat or an opportunity for their organiza 
tions.
The AFL-CIO
The AFL-CIO does not have any official policy on QWL 
or any other form of worker participation program. This is 
consistent with its historical role in the structure of the 
American labor movement since the AFL-CIO does not 
directly negotiate nor administer collective bargaining 
agreements. Instead, its role is to provide political leadership 
to the labor movement, to share information, to coordinate 
the efforts of the^ various national unions, and to provide 
staff assistance and advice to national and regional affiliates. 
Consistent with their leadership role, however, from time to 
time the president and secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO 
have outlined their personal views on the matter of worker 
participation. Most recently, the clearest and most detailed 
statement was provided by Mr. Thomas Donahue, secretary- 
treasurer of the AFL-CIO. The central points contained in 
his January 1982 speech to a QWL conference are summariz 
ed below. 1
Donahue indicated to the group that, as noted above, the 
Federation has no policy on quality of worklife programs
Views from the Top 155
and believes it is more appropriate to leave it to each national 
union to chart its own course after considering the types of 
employers it deals with.
For strong unions, able to insist on an equal and 
active voice in how the program works, or able, if 
necessary, to veto actions that aim at subverting its 
bargaining position, [QWL] isn't an insuperable 
problem. That accounts for the general acceptance 
of quality of worklife programs by such dominant 
and secure unions as the Auto Workers, Steel 
Workers, and Communications Workers. Even 
they have sometimes had to take strong action to 
prevent their employers from using the programs as 
conduits for company propaganda in bargaining 
situations.
A second key point stressed by Donahue was that while 
collective bargaining will always remain an adversarial pro 
cess, i.e., the basic conflict of interests between workers and 
employers will not go away because of worker participation 
or cannot be wished away by QWL advocates, the conflict 
should be limited to the negotiation of the labor agreement. 
During the period of the contract there should be room for 
cooperation.
I do believe that the adversarial role, appropriate 
to the conflict of collective bargaining, ought to be 
limited to the period of negotiation—and during 
the lifetime of a contract so arrived at, it ought to 
be replaced by a period of cooperation, aimed at 
maximizing the potential success of the joint enter 
prise, i.e., the company's business or production.
Above all, Donahue stressed that any QWL or other 
worker participation process should be viewed as a supple 
ment to, not a replacement for, the collective bargaining pro 
cess—"the collective bargaining process is the cornerstone to
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honest labor-management cooperation." He also warned 
against elevating QWL efforts to the status of a 
"movement" or a "philosophical belief." Instead, he 
prefers to treat them for what they are—experiments design 
ed to improve productivity and quality and the satisfaction 
of workers with their jobs.
In summary, Donahue's approach is one of cautious skep 
ticism. He is skeptical because he recognizes that American 
employers have embraced worker participation most recently 
during times of economic adversity as part of their efforts to 
regain a stronger competitive position. Other employers are 
using employee involvement strategies to keep unions out of 
their organizations. These two facts are consistent with 
employer behavior at earlier points in American labor 
history—labor and management have banded together to 
cooperate during periods of economic or military crisis only 
to return to more open periods of conflict when the crisis 
eased. Thus, collective bargaining is viewed as a more flexi 
ble and appropriate instrument for dealing with American 
employers; it allows unions to exert an independent voice for 
employee interests in whatever fashion works most effective 
ly given the existing environment.
Finally, Donahue noted the biggest obstacle to the 
development of a more lasting form of labor-management 
cooperation in the U.S.:
I might note parenthetically that the ability of the 
trade union movement as a whole to sense a part 
nership would be vastly enlarged by the elimination 
by management of the "Union-Free Environment" 
mentality which nowadays so apparently affects 
thousands of employers, large and small, and 
leaves the trade union movement embattled and 
badly disposed to cooperate on the macro- 
economic and political issues which could benefit 
from such an approach.
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We [the labor movement] have long 
demonstrated our willingness to join with manage 
ment in developing more prosperous communities 
and in revitalizing our industries, and we'll con 
tinue to do so. What we expect in return is a little 
less short-term manipulation and more fidelity in 
the relationship over the long haul.
As we review the diversity of views of other national union 
leaders, we will see that despite differences of opinion on 
other matters, all are in essential accord with this basic point.
Representative Views of National Unions
We will now turn to a survey of the views and perspectives 
on worker participation issues found across different na 
tional unions. These views are generally captured by four 
different approaches which are discussed below. As il 
lustrated in figure 6-1, the continuum of views across na 
tional unions ranges from general opposition to general en 
dorsement of worker participation strategies. In between 
these two extremes are two decentralized policies. One is a 
general policy of leaving the decision of how to respond to 
worker participation programs entirely to the local unions. 
The other is a modified decentralized policy of leaving it up 
to the locals, but providing national level staff and/or 
elected leaders who both promote the development of 
worker participation processes and provide expert assistance 
to locals interested in implementing specific processes. For 
each of these types we will summarize some of the ap 
proaches of specific unions.
General Opposition: The Case of the I AM
The clearest case of a union that is generally opposed to 
worker participation processes as they are currently carried 
out is the International Association of Machinists and
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Figure 6-1
Representative Views of National Unions 
on Worker Participation
General Opposition
* outspoken critics
* resist initial involvement
* end any ongoing programs 
3 * collective bargaining is sufficient
* joint committees may be acceptable
ctf 
D-
o> Decentralized Neutrality
* leave decision entirely to local unions
* no statement of general opposition or support
* no international staff support or leadership to interested 
locals
* provide locals with summaries of related researcha
3 
C/3
Ofl
* provide locals with checklist of suggested questions to 
answer prior to start-up of project
Decentralized Policy with National Union Support
* leave decision to local unions
* promote development and provide assistance in imple 
mentation through international level staff and leaders
* encourage local union experimentation
* no public endorsement by International president
* articulate national promoters
* letters of understanding between parties in bargaining 
agreements
General Endorsement
* support from the International president
* promote development and provide assistance in implemen 
tation through international level staff and leaders
* encourage local union experimentation
Aerospace Workers (IAM). The president of the IAM, 
William Winpisinger, was an early outspoken critic of QWL 
programs when they were first introduced into U.S. industry
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in the early 1970s and continues to be their harshest contem 
porary critic. 2 1 AM policy toward QWL and QC programs is 
outlined in a 1982 letter from Winpisinger to I AM local 
lodges. 3 The letter suggests the following guidelines for local 
leaders who need to decide how to respond to QWL types of 
programs in their plants.
First, notify the management that under IAM 
policy every aspect of the employer-employee rela 
tionship is subject to negotiation through collective 
bargaining.
Second, warn members to watch for dilution of 
contract clauses governing job description, train 
ing, wage structure, promotion, benefits, grievance 
procedures or other factors normally decided 
through collective bargaining.
Third, set up a watchdog committee within the 
lodge to monitor quality of worklife committees.
Fourth, keep Grand Lodge informed of your ex 
periences with quality of worklife programs.
A discussion with George Poulin, general vice-president of 
the IAM, further clarified the international's policy toward 
worker participation. 4 The union's first preference would be 
for its members and local leaders not to get involved in these 
programs in the first place and to bring an end to them where 
they have started. The I AM believes that it has not seen any 
issues raised by QWL programs which cannot be effectively 
dealt with through collective bargaining.
If the participation effort continues to exist in an IAM 
facility, its representatives are advised to proceed as follows:
1. Guarantees should be obtained that the process will not 
in any way circumvent the negotiations process or the 
collective bargaining agreement.
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2. Union stewards should participate and be involved in all 
discussions of the QWL groups and play a watchdog 
role to insure the agreement or the rights of any workers 
are not violated.
3. No workers should be laid off as a result of recommen 
dations or decisions of the participation process.
4. Management should agree to negotiate all aspects of the 
issues discussed in the participation process. That is, if 
the union agrees to open itself up to discussions that 
may introduce changes in practices within the bargain 
ing unit, then management should also be willing to 
discuss aspects of issues that traditionally have been 
treated as managerial prerogatives.
This fourth condition is a key to understanding the views 
of the IAM. In contrast to its stated opposition to QWL pro 
grams, this union has been a leader in calling for full joint 
discussions of the use of new technology. It has proclaimed a 
"Workers' Technology Bill of Rights" for the introduction 
of new technology, reproduced in figure 6-2. 5 One of the 
central points contained in this statement on technology is 
that employers and union representatives should consult on 
all aspects of the decision to introduce new technology from 
the earliest stage of the employer's decisionmaking process. 
Thus, the IAM is not opposed to union-employer joint pro 
grams per se. Instead, it supports joint discussions which it 
believes allow the union to participate as a full joint partner 
in all aspects of the issues involved.
Poulin summarized another important reason for the 
lAM's general opposition to cooperative programs with 
employers:
Basically, the whole issue comes down to one 
word: recognition. Employers can have it either 
way but they can't walk down both sides of the
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aisle. If they want cooperation, they have to be 
willing to fully accept unions. On the other hand, if 
they want to engage in a ten to fifteen year fight to 
see who comes out on top, they can have that too. 
But we cannot help them to destroy us slowly by 
cooperating in specific plants while they screw us 
out of others. The day that the employers in this 
country truly accept the right of unions to exist we 
will see more changes than anyone could ever 
believe.
Our problem is that there is always a hidden 
agenda [in the minds of employers]. Employers 
have trained us well to know this. They were our 
teachers and we have learned this lesson again and 
again over the years in the school of hard knocks.
The IAM strategy toward QWL and related workplace 
cooperative efforts is part of the union's larger industrial 
strategy for revitalizing American industry and reforming 
national economic policy. For example, Winpisinger's com 
ments on the viability of business-labor-government 
cooperative efforts at the national level of the economy are 
fully consistent with the I AM policy toward joint 
cooperative efforts with specific employers at the workplace:
Since [European style] social-contract systems 
work elsewhere and our employers profitably live 
with them in other countries where they invest, we 
can demand no less here in America. This is where 
the discussion of cooperation must begin. In 
plainer words, the business community and the 
Government must call off their antiunion and an 
tisocial dogs. It is unreasonable to expect coopera 
tion on the part of workers in the workplace, only 
to find a management, in complicity with Govern 
ment, stabbing them in the back and cutting the 
safety net out from under them in the policy out-
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side the plant gate or office. Cooperation requires 
good faith on the part of all parties. It is a two-way 
street. 6
Figure 6-2
International Association of Machinists Statement 
on Workers' Technology Bill of Rights
Amend National Labor Relations Act, Railway Labor Act, and other ap 
propriate acts to declare national policy through a new Technology Bill 
of Rights:
I. New Technology shall be used in a way that does not decrease 
jobs, but creates or maintains jobs and promotes community- 
wide and national full employment.
II. Unit cost savings and labor productivity gains resulting from the 
use of New Technology shall be shared with production workers 
at the local level and shall not be permitted to accrue solely for the 
gain of capital, management and shareholders.
Increased leisure time resulting from New Technology shall result 
in no loss of real income or decline in living standards.
III. Since the greater part of local, state and national tax revenues 
come from taxes on labor, communities and the nation have the 
right to require employers to pay a Robot Tax, as a replacement 
tax, on all machinery, equipment, and production systems that 
displace workers and cause unemployment.
IV. New Technology shall improve the conditions of work and shall 
enhance and expand the opportunities for knowledge, skills and 
compensation of workers. Displaced workers shall not be penaliz 
ed with loss of income and shall be entitled to training and retrain 
ing.
V. New Technology shall be used to develop the U.S. industrial base, 
consistent with the Full Employment goal, before it is licensed or 
exported abroad.
VI. New Technology shall be evaluated in terms of workers' safety 
and health and shall not be destructive of the workplace environ 
ment, nor shall it be used at the expense of the community's 
natural environment.
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VII. Workers, through their trade unions and bargaining units, shall 
have an absolute right to participate in all phases of management 
deliberations and decisions that lead or could lead to the introduc 
tion of New Technology or the changing of the workplace system 
design, work processes and procedures for doing work, including 
the shutdown or transfer or work, capital, plant and equipment.
VIII. Workers shall have the right to monitor control room centers and 
control stations and the New Technology shall not be used to 
monitor, measure or otherwise control the work practices and 
work standards of individual workers, at the point of work.
IX. Storage of an individual worker's personal data and information 
file by the employer shall be tightly controlled and the collection 
and/or release and dissemination of information with respect to 
race, religious or political activities and beliefs, records of 
physical and mental health disorders and treatments, records of 
arrests and felony charges or convictions, information concerning 
sexual preferences and conduct, information concerning internal 
and private family matters, and information regarding an in 
dividual's financial condition or credit worthiness shall not be 
permitted, except in rare circumstances related to health, and then 
only after consultation with a family or union-appointed physi 
cian, psychiatrist or member of the clergy.
The right of the individual worker to inspect his or her own per 
sonal data file shall at all times be absolute and open to him or 
her.
X. When the New Technology is employed in the production of 
military goods and services, workers, through their trade union 
and bargaining agent, have a right to bargain with management 
over the establishment of Alternative Production Committees, 
which shall design ways to adopt that technology to socially- 
useful production and products in the civilian sector of the 
economy.
SOURCE: Let's Rebuild America, International Association of Machinists, 1983, Appen 
dix B.
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Decentralized Neutrality
Perhaps the dominant national union strategy toward 
worker participation can be described as decentralized 
neutrality. That is, while national leaders speak out from 
time to time for or against QWL or other worker participa 
tion efforts, each local of the national union is left to decide 
generally on its own, in accordance with its own needs and 
preferences, how to respond to employer initiatives in this 
area. Under this strategy no high ranking national union 
leaders or staff specialists are identified as public supporters 
of worker participation and no staff specialists are assigned 
specific responsibility for encouraging locals to get involved 
in joint efforts or assisting them when the issue comes up.
Some of the unions that follow this genuinely neutral and 
decentralized strategy have provided locals with summaries 
of research on participation. The IUE, for example, has 
done this. The guidelines that its local unions are encouraged 
to follow are reproduced in figure 6-3 for local unions.
Other unions such as the Allied Industrial Workers (AIW) 
provide locals with a checklist of suggested questions to ask 
itself and the employer before embarking on a joint program 
(see figure 6-4).
Many of the unions that follow this strategy of decen 
tralized neutrality, such as the IUE, the AIW, and the 
UFCW, deal with a large and very diverse range of 
employers, none of which employ a majority of the national 
union's members. For this reason, it is difficult for national 
union leaders to announce one single policy that fits each 
situation. What sets these unions apart from the IAM on the 
one hand, and the unions that will be classified in the two re 
maining categories on the other, is that they have neither 
stated a general opposition to workplace level participation, 
nor provided international staff support or leadership to 
locals that show an interest in pursuing a joint program.
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Figure 6-3
IUE Guidelines for Local Union Participation 
in Quality Circles
1. Go slowly. Make sure the Quality Circle idea is not just a gimmick of 
management to improve its own position. Make sure, too, that union 
membership knows what Quality Circles are designed to accomplish.
2. Be sure the union is an equal partner in the Quality Circle program. In 
this way, the union can insure that its interests and the interests of its 
members are protected and respected.
3. Be sure that any management initiation of Quality Circles can deliver 
top management support—and that means demanding meetings with 
top management. Union leadership does not want to go out on a limb 
with its membership and endorse something that is later discontinued.
4. Get assurance that the Circle will not be involved with conditions of 
employment and work which is provided for in the terms of the collec 
tive bargaining agreement. One way of insuring this is to make certain 
that Quality Circle facilitators and leaders are adequately and proper 
ly trained.
5. To protect its membership, unions must get some guarantee that the 
implementation of Quality Circles does not eliminate jobs. These 
guarantees should be put in writing.
6. Unions must be assured that the adoption of Quality Circles does not 
turn into a speed-up.
7. Unions must insist that management maintains a balance between the 
two aims of the program: management benefits and worker benefits.
8. Unions must insist that savings resulting from the Circles must be 
shared with employees. Unions need to ask:
* Are savings being used to improve the company's operation?
* Are savings going to be returned to the workers in improved bene 
fits?
Once the Quality Circle is set in motion, the union must:
* Insist workers who take time off for Quality Circles be paid for 
that time.
* Keep workers fully informed on all activities beginning with the 
first meeting with management.
* Insist on union representation at every Circle.
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* Provide initially for access to company data.
* Make certain there is an organized evaluation system to see if the 
program is serving its agreed-upon purpose.
* Make sure there is a clear understanding of operational procedures 
on both sides.
* Communication is the most important ingredient.
* One suggestion has been that the union start with a survey of the 
membership to determine their needs and interests.
* Another is to get an agreement to periods of discussion on the 
proposed program.
* A third is to insist that bulletin boards be placed throughout 
the plant to post exclusively what is developing (or taking place) 
within Quality Circles.
And, finally, local unions should keep their Internationals informed of 
the establishment of Quality Circles so that the Union can keep track of, 
as well as develop an analysis of, the impact of these on its members.
SOURCE: "Quality of Working Life Outline," International Union of Electrical, Radio 
and Machine Workers, internal document, no date.
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Figure 6-4 
Allied Industrial Workers Checklist on Quality Circles
Some Important Questions to Ask
Regarding the Implementation and Operation
of Quality Control Circles at Your Plant
I. Prior History
A. Prior to the introduction of a Quality Control Circle program 
at your location, was your relationship with the Company 
cooperative?
B. Did the Company propose language for economic conces 
sions during the last round of negotiations?
C. Did the Company try to settle most grievances at the lower 
steps of the grievance procedure or force most to the final 
step?
D. Prior to initiating QCCs did the Company participate on any 
joint committees with the Union, for example, a joint health 
and safety committee?
II. Program Introduction
A. Was the QCC program discussed with local Union officers 
prior to being announced to the general membership?
B. How much information did the Company give the Union 
prior to introducing the program?
C. Was the Local Union involved in discussions to determine the 
priority problems which would be addressed by the QCCs?
D. Was the Union involved in the initial QCC orientation pro 
gram?
E. Was the Union involved in discussing the procedures that 
would be adopted in order to implement the program?
III. Implementation and Operation
A. Is the Union officially represented on the QCC Steering Com 
mittee?
B. Are there an equal number of labor and management 
representatives on the Steering Committee?
C. Is the Union involved as an equal partner in each Circle orien 
tation program?
168 Views from the Top
IV. Program Evaluation
A. Prior to the introduction of QCC did the Company provide 
the Union with a statement, with supporting data, as to the 
problems they were trying to solve?
B. Has there been any discussion between the Company and the 
Union as to how the program will be evaluated? That is, how 
will success or failure be measured?
C. Is the Union involved in the evaluation procedure and receiv 
ing all material related to the evaluation?
D. Does the Union receive minutes of all Circle and Steering 
Committee meetings and related correspondence?
V. Impact on Collective Bargaining
A. Is there a written agreement between the Company and the 
Local Union which specifies that the QCC program will not 
deal with subjects covered by the Collective Bargaining agree 
ment?
B. Has there been any noticeable change in management's 
behavior in handling grievances?
C. Has there been a decline in grievance activity since the in 
troduction of the Quality Circle program?
D. Will the introduction of this Quality Circle program pose any 
problems for your next round of negotiations?
E. Is there the potential that the introduction of a Quality Con 
trol Circle program will interfere with the administration of 
the Collective Bargaining agreement?
VI. Union Management Cooperation
A. During the implementation of the QCC program did the local 
propose any changes in the workplace which would solve 
some of its problems?
B. What are some of the local issues which you feel could be pro 
posed to management as an indicator of management's 
"cooperative spirit?"
SOURCE: Research Department, Allied Industrial Workers, 1983.
Views from the Top 169
Decentralized Policy with 
National Union Support
A third group of unions, most notably the UAW and the 
USW, encourage local union experimentation with worker 
participation and have one or more high level international 
union leaders and/or staff representatives who serve as ac 
tive promoters and supporters of such efforts. However, 
public endorsement of participation stops short of the office 
of the international president of these unions. To understand 
the nature of the support provided by these unions, we will 
review in some detail the history of the roles of worker par 
ticipation in the UAW and the USW.
The UAW. The earliest articulate spokesman for QWL 
programs within the labor movement was Irving Bluestone, 
who served, until his retirement in 1979, as the UAW vice- 
president for the General Motors Department. Bluestone 
was the driving force behind the negotiation of the first 
QWL clause to be included in a national level bargaining 
agreement. Largely at his insistence, the following letter of 
understanding was appended to the 1973 agreement between 
the UAW and General Motors:
In discussions prior to the opening of the current 
negotiations for a new collective bargaining agree 
ment, General Motors Corporation and the UAW 
gave recognition to the desirability of mutual effort 
to improve the quality of work life for the 
employees. In consultation with Union represen 
tatives, certain projects have been undertaken by 
management in the field of organizational develop 
ment, involving the participation of represented 
employees. These and other projects and ex 
periments which may be undertaken in the future 
are designed to improve the quality of work life, 
thereby advantaging the worker by making work a
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more satisfying experience, advantaging the Cor 
poration by leading to a reduction in employee 
absenteeism and turnover, and advantaging the 
consumer through improvement in the quality of 
the products manufactured.
As a result of these earlier discussions and fur 
ther discussions during the course of the current 
negotiations for a new collective bargaining agree 
ment, the parties have decided that a Committee to 
Improve the Quality of Work Life composed of 
representatives of the International Union and 
General Motors will be established at the national 
level.
This Committee will meet periodically and have 
responsibility for:
1. Reviewing and evaluating programs of the 
Corporation which involve improving the 
work environment of employees represented 
by the UAW.
2. Developing experiments and projects in that 
area.
3. Maintaining records of its meetings, delibera 
tions and all experiments and evaluations it 
conducts.
4. Making reports to the Corporation and the 
Union on the results of its activities.
5. Arranging for any outside counselling which it 
feels is necessary or desirable with the expenses 
thereof to be shared equally by the Corpora 
tion and the Union.
The Corporation agrees to request and en 
courage its plant managements to cooperate in the
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conduct of such experiments and projects, and 
recognizes that cooperation by its plant floor super 
vision is essential to success of this program.
The Union agrees to request and encourage its 
members and their local union representatives to 
cooperate in such experiments and projects, and 
recognizes that the benefits which can flow to 
employees as a result of successful experimentation 
is dependent on the cooperation and participation 
of those employees and the local union represen 
tatives. 7
Since the signing of this agreement in 1973, the UAW and 
General Motors have participated in an ongoing QWL pro 
gram and have carried out the intent of this letter by en 
couraging the development of QWL programs throughout 
GM plants. Bluestone served as the key union proponent for 
QWL and advisor to the local unions as they embarked on 
their own experiments. Although the same basic letter of 
agreement and national committee structure were included in 
the Ford and Chrysler agreements with the UAW, Chrysler 
has yet to actively embark on a vigorous joint participation 
effort with the UAW. Ford and the UAW only began im 
plementing this language since 1979, when Donald Ephlin 
became UAW vice-president for the Ford Department (see 
chapter 3). Thus, the UAW is an example of a major na 
tional union that has encouraged the spread of worker par 
ticipation projects from the top levels of the union.
Still, however, none of the three UAW presidents who 
held office from 1973 to the present time (Leonard Wood 
cock, Douglas Fraser, and Owen Bieber) have taken the lead 
as the spokesman for the desirability of participating in joint 
workplace participation programs. Instead, they have left it 
to the international vice-presidents, such as Bluestone and 
Ephlin, to serve as the union's publicly recognized pro 
ponents of this concept. A recent statement of Bluestone's to
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a GM-UAW plant QWL team perhaps best captures his per 
sonal views and the views of the UAW as expressed over the 
years by these two vice-presidents.
In my thirty-eight years with the UAW, I par 
ticipated in countless hard core bargaining sessions 
with General Motors Corporation at both the na 
tional level and the local plant level. The collective 
bargaining relationship in the U.S. is characterized 
by an adversarial climate, strong debate over highly 
controversial issues, and occasional crises. In the 
years ahead the adversarial aspects of labor- 
management relationships will no doubt continue 
to play a significant role in advancing the standard 
of living of workers and their families in improving 
the working conditions.
It is equally true, however, that a vast array of 
subjects related to managing the work place and 
managing the enterprise are, indeed, not adver 
sarial in nature, but are subject to joint problem- 
solving efforts as matters of common and mutual 
concern. As to these issues the negotiating parties 
have a stake in undertaking, jointly, initiatives 
which are designed to achieve mutually desirable 
objectives.
Solving problems at the work place should not lie 
solely in the domain of managerial prerogatives. In 
fact, in its practical application, problem solving 
must be rooted in a process which affords workers 
the opportunity for meaningful participation in the 
decision-making process. In this sense, "improving 
the quality of work life" represents a further step 
toward fulfillment of a persistent, historic objective 
of unionism: to bring, to the extent feasible, 
democratic values and procedures into the work 
place. 8
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In this same speech, Bluestone went on to state, as other 
union leaders have who are more skeptical of QWL, that 
there will always be a need for collective bargaining. He went 
farther, however, than most other labor leaders are yet will 
ing to go, by endorsing the notion that under appropriate cir 
cumstances, QWL processes should be allowed to modify 
terms of the collective bargaining process, and indeed serve 
as the avenue by which changes in the basic terms of the 
employment contract are arrived at.
Unions have and will always have the legal and 
moral responsibility to protect fairly and ag 
gressively the rights of their members. There will be 
a continuing need to utilize a grievance procedure 
and engage in collective bargaining negotiation. 
The representation collective bargaining role of the 
union cannot be jeopardized.
This is not to say that collective bargaining 
agreements cannot be altered to meet mutually 
desirable objectives of the QWL process, subject of 
course to the bargaining process and membership 
ratification. At Livonia, (a Cadillac engine plant) 
for example, the traditional wage and classification 
structure was altered to accommodate the pay-for- 
knowledge wage system. I expect the natural pro 
gression will lead to gain-sharing programs, in 
which the workers receive financial or other 
benefits as their fair share in the improved perfor 
mance of the enterprise.
This is more than a subtle difference from the statements 
of other labor leaders. It recognizes that QWL efforts can 
evolve into more than a supplement to collective bargaining 
and not always remain totally subservient to the terms of the 
bargaining agreement. In this view, worker participation 
processes can serve over time as vehicles for proposing major 
modifications in the bargaining agreement. The only con-
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straint is that any actual changes in the agreement must be 
negotiated and approved, as would any other modification.
The Bluestone/Ephlin UAW view of the role of worker 
participation has expanded in another important way. No 
longer is QWL, or Employee Involvement (El) as it is called 
at Ford, viewed as an isolated experiment limited only to the 
workplace level of the bargaining relationship. Instead, in 
volvement of workers and their employers at the local level is 
viewed as an integral piece of the larger company and union 
effort to return the American automobile industry to a posi 
tion of competitiveness, profitability, and growth. At Ford, 
for example, the El process is only the most micro part of an 
integrated set of structures and practices for information 
sharing and consultation at the plant- and company-wide 
levels of the bargaining relationship. It was the positive ex 
periences with the workplace level El processes at Ford be 
tween 1979 and 1982 that set the stage for the 1982 Ford- 
UAW agreement that provided for these higher levels of con 
sultation as well as expanded joint efforts at retraining and 
efforts to negotiate pilot employment guarantee programs in 
selected plants.
The USW. Like the UAW, the USW international office 
has been actively promoting the diffusion of worker par 
ticipation processes (called Labor-Management Participa 
tion Teams or LMPTs) since the signing of the 1980 bargain 
ing agreement with major employers in the steel industry (see 
chapter 3). Responsibility for encouraging and monitoring 
the development of LMPTs is assigned at the national level 
of the USW to Mr. Sam Camens, special assistant to the 
president. Like Bluestone, Camens sees workplace participa 
tion teams as a logical step toward the development of full- 
fledged industrial democracy. 9
He also sees the LMPT experiments as the first step in an 
evolving process that will eventually modify the basic nature
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of the employment relationship and the role of management, 
unions, and workers.
I tell companies don't start this process if you 
think you can stop it. By that I mean the process 
takes on a life and a direction of its own and will in 
crease the interest of workers in participation as 
they get experience with it. It also helps to cut out a 
lot of the red tape and standardization and 
bureaucratization within management.
It has to be a cultural change. I don't think 
enough people understand what labor-management 
participation is all about. It is not simply labor- 
management cooperation or collaboration. If 
that's what people think it is it won't amount to 
anything. We might get to more collaboration and 
cooperation through participation but the basic 
thing that participation must do is to break down 
the barriers between workers and supervisors and 
the rest of management. Unless this is treated as a 
cultural change it will not work. It also has to be a 
part of a trade union's strategy—part of the drive 
for union and worker democracy. It has to be part 
of our strategy to stem the losses of young 
members. 10
Thus, Camens—like Bluestone and Ephlin at the UAW, 
and as we will see shortly, Glen Watts at the CWA—believes 
worker participation must become part of the overall 
strategy of the labor movement for reforming the employ 
ment relationship and for organizing new union members. 
Yet, these beliefs still constitute a minority view within both 
the UAW and the USW. They have not been publicly em 
braced by the presidents of either the USW or the UAW, nor 
have they been officially built into the general policy 
statements of either union. The USW, for example, formally 
endorsed the use of LMPTs for "distressed" industries and
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firms (i.e., those in serious economic trouble and in need of 
cooperative efforts from the union and the workers to regain 
competitive health), but it chose to leave any mention of 
worker participation out of its statement of bargaining 
priorities for firms and industries not currently in financial 
trouble. Lynn Williams, secretary/treasurer of the USW 
stated the current views of leaders within this union as 
follows:
.... the majority of the people in the union still 
see [worker participation] as a strategy for helping 
those companies in crisis and do not see it as a 
natural part of an overall strategy for healthy situa 
tions. This point of view probably captures the 
position of most of our top leaders. Our leadership 
in general is very supportive of the concept of 
labor-management participation teams because of 
the severe crisis.
There is another group within the union that is 
very supportive of the concept of labor- 
management participation in general. This group 
has a long history within the Steelworkers. One can 
go back to the days of Phillip Murray (the first 
president of the Steelworkers) and find a statement 
of his that endorsed worker participation as his 
program for economic recovery. The Scanlon Plan 
came out of the Steelworkers. David MacDonald 
was an active supporter of human relations and 
labor-management cooperation. I.W. Abel endors 
ed and supported the concept of productivity and 
job security committees and joint efforts at the 
plant level.
Finally, there is a third group that is extremely 
committed to the concept of worker participation 
as a means of extending industrial democracy to the
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American workplace. Sam Camens best reflects 
this point of view within our union.
My own view is that there will always be two 
elements to the role of unions. One is to help in 
crease the size of the pie and the other is to use col 
lective bargaining to divide up the pie. Traditional 
ly, the union has approached this first task mostly 
at the very macro levels of the economy through its 
political lobbying and support for national policy 
that will promote the growth of the American steel 
industry. The tri-partite steel committee that was 
active during the Carter Administration is an exam 
ple of this. I see the labor-management participa 
tion teams at the plant level as the enterprise 
counterpart efforts to increase the size of the pie. 
Over the long run I think these two functions will 
fit together comfortably in the union's strategy. 11
In summary, both the USW and the UAW have articulate 
national promoters of worker participation. In both cases, 
however, the spokesmen are one step removed from the of 
fice of the international union president. Both unions also 
have assigned national level staff people to assist locals in 
developing participation programs and have put con 
siderable resources of the national union into training its 
staff and supporting local union participation activities.
Support from the President: The CWA
At this point in time, only one president of a major interna 
tional union has publicly gone on record as supporting the 
introduction of worker participation efforts as an integral 
part of the union's long-run strategy. Glen Watts, president 
of the CWA, summarized his views and the posture of the 
CWA in a recent speech to a national conference on labor- 
management cooperation.
178 Views from the Top
.... aspects of QWL are seen by many in the 
labor movement as a threat. But others—and I in 
clude myself among them—see it as offering a great 
opportunity to extend the reach of collective 
bargaining.
Labor is concerned with the development of 
democracy in industry. The collective bargaining 
process will always be the foundation of industrial 
democracy; but QWL gives us the tools to build 
higher than we ever have before.
.... collective bargaining has not been weaken 
ed. We work on the traditional issues of wages and 
basic working conditions just as we always have.
But through QWL, we are extending our in 
fluence into the murky territory of "management 
prerogatives," help-to-shape management prac 
tices and policies while they are being formed 
rather than after the fact.
In the long run, I believe this cannot help but 
strengthen the union. That is why we have commit 
ted significant resources and effort to QWL. 12
Like his more skeptical colleagues within the labor move 
ment, Watts recognizes that many employers and some con 
sultants use QWL as strategies for avoiding or undermining 
unions. He likewise condemns the use of participation 
strategies for these purposes. However, he favors a different 
response than some to this tactical use of QWL:
Now I want to come back for a moment to the 
other kind of QWL—the gimmicky type—the kind 
that aims at narrow productivity goals or undercuts 
unions. What should Labor's stand be toward 
these?
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I don't think it is sufficient to stand on the 
sidelines and attack management's motives. That 
strategy puts unions on the defensive and makes 
management appear more concerned about 
workers than we are.
.... our experience, along with that of the 
UAW and the Steelworkers, has provided us a new 
strategy.
We have a way of telling good programs from 
bad programs. We can offer our own Labor model 
of a good QWL process as a challenge to manage 
ment. We know that a good worker participation 
process involves some basic elements, which I will 
repeat:
1. Protection of worker rights, especially the 
rights to job security and voluntary participa 
tion.
2. Separation of collective bargaining from 
QWL.
3. Full equality between union and management.
4. The goal of a better working life for all—not 
just higher productivity for the company.
Watts ended his statement on QWL with a comment that 
is identical to the views articulated by the leaders of the 
IAM—a union at the other end of the continuum of support 
for current forms of worker participation:
There has to be a greater acceptance of unions. 
The business community cannot ask for coopera 
tion on the one hand, and conduct anti-union war 
fare with the other.
Several internal union documents further spell out the 
CWA's short range, intermediate, and long range strategies
180 Views from the Top
for worker participation. 13 Key excerpts from a report 
prepared by the CWA research staff are reproduced below, 
since they illustrate one union's views of how worker par 
ticipation might be linked to its broader representational 
strategies and activities.
CWA entered into the Quality of Work Life pro 
cess with AT&T last year for one immediate 
reason: to help reduce job pressures among our 
membership. . . . The Union recognized that this 
problem could not be dealt with effectively by col 
lective bargaining alone; the cooperative QWL 
strategy was an attempt to approach it in a new 
way.
At the same time, the QWL effort can be seen in 
a broader context as just one of a number of routes 
by which the Union has tried to increase its role in 
managerial planning. As the pace of change 
quickens, we have found too often that once the 
Company has made a decision it is too late to re 
spond effectively. Increasingly it appears that we 
need to be in on the ground floor if we are to have a 
real effect.
Strategy: The Short Range
Between now [December, 1981] and the 1983 
contract [negotiations] the strategy goal should be 
to establish "model" workforce teams to explore 
the potential of the QWL process. . . .
The Middle Range
The second phase of QWL develop 
ment—perhaps the two contracts after 1983—will 
present two major strategic issues. The first is con 
solidating QWL as a part of normal management 
and Union operating style. The second is tying
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QWL into the larger attempt to expand the Union's 
role in managerial planning. . . .
The Long Range
In the long run the strategic goal should be to 
develop the Union as the representative of workers 
in all phases of management decision-making. . . .
The CWA recognizes that the QWL efforts may evolve in 
a variety of different ways and will be shaped by forces that 
are only partially within the control of the union. This union 
has, however, gone farther than any other in attempting to 
chart a strategy for shaping this evolution and making 
worker participation an integral part of its strategy for 
representing current and future members.
Summary
On one key issue there is unanimity within the American 
labor movement—the need for employers to accept the 
legitimacy of unions at the American workplace in order for 
QWL or other forms of worker participation to survive over 
time. What differs, as the statements contained in this 
chapter demonstrate, are views on the extent to which unions 
should take the offensive by cooperating with employers 
who do accept the basic right of unions to exist in current 
and future workplaces. National union leaders differ as to 
whether unions should take a defensive posture while waiting 
for a more general acceptance of unions by employers and 
within the larger political and social community before en 
dorsing workplace participation efforts.
Beyond this basic point, the remaining differences describ 
ed in this chapter come down to the questions of how high a 
priority current worker participation efforts should be given 
on the agenda of the American labor movement and how 
much top level union leaders should assert the lead in endors-
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ing and promoting the concept of worker participation. 
Ultimately, the strategic question comes down to whether it 
is better for the labor movement to be viewed as a cautious 
and skeptical watchdog or limited participant in employer- 
initiated participation efforts, or whether it would be better 
for the movement to be viewed as an equal partner with 
management, and even the initiator and driving force for 
worker participation. Unions must decide whether worker 
participation can enhance the effectiveness of their represen 
tational role at the workplace and eventually be used as a 
means of enhancing industrial democracy within American 
society. In our final chapter, we will attempt to spell out in 
more detail some of the consequences of these different 
strategies for the American labor movement.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions 
and Implications
The data presented in the preceding chapters suggest there 
is strong potential for worker participation processes as 
judged by the degree of interest union members expressed in 
gaining greater say over decisions affecting their jobs. 
However, only some of these processes were successful in 
achieving significant improvements in worker influence and 
in union member evaluation of their local union perfor 
mance. Those that were most successful were ones in which 
the union served as a full joint partner in the process, actual 
changes were made in the organization of work which 
enhanced employment security and improved the economic 
performance of the firm, and union leaders were able to link 
their support of QWL to their larger collective bargaining 
and representational strategies.
Union involvement in worker participation has led to im 
portant positive effects for union leaders and their organiza 
tions. Specifically, local leaders report that their relations 
with management representatives and supervisors have im 
proved. Training union activists to serve as QWL facilitators 
has produced new leadership skills and enhanced problem- 
solving without jeopardizing the grievance process. On the 
other hand, there is no evidence that worker participation
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processes increased membership attachment to unions or in 
volvement in local union affairs. The case studies 
demonstrated that worker participation processes tend to go 
through a natural cycle. Following an initial skepticism on 
the part of members and many local officers, a period of en 
thusiasm and support tends to occur among those gaining ex 
perience with participation. This is often followed by a 
plateauing of interest and support within the broader 
membership of the local union. Whether the process survives 
this critical testing period depends on the ability of the 
employer to achieve tangible improvements in economic per 
formance and the ability of the union to link its support for 
worker participation to its broader bargaining objectives in 
representing the bread and butter interests and needs of its 
members.
Thus, the central implication of this research is that for 
worker participation processes to survive the economic and 
political obstacles they encounter over time, each party must 
see these processes as contributing to their separate economic 
and organizational interests. While improvements in the 
psychological rewards workers derive from their jobs are 
necessary conditions for success, psychological rewards 
alone do not appear to be sufficient to maintain the commit 
ment of management, the union and its leaders, or rank and 
file workers.
Implications for the Labor Movement
These conclusions imply that rather than adopting a 
uniform position for or against worker participation on 
some philosophical ground, union leaders need to think 
strategically about the conditions that must exist for worker 
participation to be in the interests of their members and the 
steps needed to link these processes to the union's broader 
strategies for improving the effectiveness of its bargaining 
relationship.
Conclusions and Implications 187
Issues Facing Local Union Leaders
The ultimate choice of whether or not to actively support 
the development of a worker participation process in a 
specific plant, office, or worksite can best be made by local 
union leaders based on a consideration of the need for 
change in their bargaining relationship and the viability of 
some form of worker participation as a partial solution to 
their problems. At least three conditions are necessary to 
make union support viable: the employer must accept the 
legitimacy of the union, top management must be deeply 
committed to supporting the process and there must be a 
viable economic future for the plant.
Management Acceptance of Unions. Clearly, if union 
leaders believe the employer is intent on using the participa 
tion process to undermine the support for the union, if clear 
evidence exists of the employer's unwillingness to accept the 
legitimacy of the union, then it makes little sense for the 
union to cooperate with a worker participation process. To 
support or endorse a participation process under these cir 
cumstances would be tantamount to the local union par 
ticipating in its own slow demise. The more difficult case, 
however, is one where local management accepts the 
legitimacy of the union in its plant, but higher corporate 
management uses union avoidance strategies to keep unions 
out of other new or existing sites. Local union opposition to 
QWL and other participation processes under those cir 
cumstances would appear to be a necessary step toward im 
plementing the strategy that is favored by most national 
union leaders, namely, to force employers to make a choice 
between (1) acceptance of unions and the potential growth 
of worker participation and other joint union-management 
efforts, or (2) continued low trust/high conflict arms-length 
relationships.
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Management Commitment. Without a deep commitment 
among the key management decisionmakers to supporting a 
participation process over an extended period of time, 
neither union commitment nor rank and file enthusiasm for 
the process can make a worker participation process succeed. 
This means, among other things, the willingness to allocate 
resources to support participation efforts and to maintain 
the commitment of resources through periods of short term 
economic crisis. Management (and union) commitment is 
likely to be severely tested at various points during the evolu 
tion of the process as inconsistencies arise between other 
company strategies and objectives and the worker participa 
tion process. Thus, the real tests of commitment come when 
hard decisions and tradeoffs must be made between main 
taining support for the process and pursuing other valued 
objectives.
Economic Viability. Worker participation programs can 
not be a panacea in the face of economic problems which lie 
beyond the control of the local union, the employer, or the 
workers. In those cases, a worker participation process may 
simply serve to divert attention for a short period of time 
from more basic problems and will eventually lead to disen 
chantment among the rank and file as the problems worsen. 
Sometimes participation programs can be combined produc 
tively with steps such as compensation concessions and other 
cost reduction strategies. But, unless the economic founda 
tion upon which the worker participation process will rest is 
itself viable, the union's efforts might better be put to other 
uses.
Linkages to Collective Bargaining. Where the conditions 
necessary for a potentially viable worker participation pro 
cess exist, local union leaders need to consider how this pro 
cess will fit into their overall bargaining and representational 
strategies. For unions and their members to benefit from the 
process, union leaders must do more than react to the
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employer's or the consultant's vision or expectations for 
worker participation. As the case studies clearly pointed out, 
over time a total separation of worker participation from 
collective bargaining is neither possible nor desirable. Thus, 
union leaders need to anticipate how the process will evolve 
and to consider what part they want it to play in their collec 
tive bargaining relationship and in the union's role in the 
workplace.
One of the biggest challenges to the traditional role of the 
union that a successful participation process will produce is 
increased variability in practices and conditions within the 
bargaining unit. Three different sources of variation will 
arise that will require union leadership attention.
First, because worker participation processes diffuse slow 
ly through an organization, for an extended period of time 
there will be a group of "participants" and a group of "non- 
participants." Even after the process is widely diffused, 
there are likely to be some individuals who prefer to not get 
involved in group activities and problemsolving processes. 
The existence of these two groups provides a fertile ground 
for rumors, competition, and internal political conflicts 
within the union. Since participants are likely to be introduc 
ing changes in traditional work practices, nonparticipants 
may rationalize their noninvolvement by voicing skepticism 
toward the QWL process.
Second, introducing changes in work practices based on 
the ideas generated in the worker participation process has a 
general decentralizing effect on the collective bargaining 
relationship. Proposals to modify established customs and 
practices, if not formal collective bargaining agreement pro 
visions, are likely to arise. This has the effect of reducing the 
"common rule" strategy that American unions have used to 
limit competition and standardize conditions among in 
dividuals and groups in their bargaining units. The standar-
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dization of practices and rules established through the collec 
tive bargaining agreement and enforced through the contract 
administration process historically has served as a basic 
source of worker security and internal union control.
Third, over time there is likely to be a shift away from 
detailed job and contractual rules through work reorganiza 
tion experiments which broaden out job responsibilities. In 
the more advanced cases, such as work team arrangements, 
the concept of an individual job description or assignment is 
replaced with a set of tasks that lie within the general respon 
sibility of the group. The movement toward work teams, 
payment for knowledge compensation systems, job rotation, 
and semi-autonomous work groups all require workers and 
their local unions to partially abandon their historic 
strategies for maximizing job control through enforcement 
of detailed rules governing specific, narrowly defined jobs. 
In return, the workers receive greater training in a variety of 
job responsibilities and more control over how the group 
organizes itself.
In team systems, workers and their union representatives 
often also gain more information about the work and its 
contribution to the overall production process and the 
economic performance of the enterprise. In short, all of 
these changes reduce the reliance on strict rules governing in 
dividual worker job rights and responsibilities and increase 
the variations in practices and flexibility in the use of human 
resources. The shift away from standardized and tightly 
detailed jobs also increases the variability across and within 
workplaces. Managing this variability and flexibility without 
increasing divisiveness and competition will become a major 
new role for the national and local union.
Although our findings stress the need to link worker par 
ticipation processes to the larger collective bargaining efforts 
on a strategic level, this does not imply that there necessarily
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need be a total integration or merger of the participation 
process with the procedures for resolving grievances and 
negotiating collective bargaining agreements. Issues of con 
tract interpretation or alleged violations of individual worker 
rights best suited to resolution through the established 
grievance procedure will continue to occur. Likewise, basic 
differences in economic interests which will require hard 
bargaining at periodic intervals will continue to exist between 
workers and their employers. The key challenge to union 
leaders and management representatives is to manage these 
"mixed-motive" relationships such that cooperative prob- 
lemsolving efforts can comfortably coexist with hard 
bargaining and the formal adjudication of disputes.
Strategies for National Unions
Even though worker participation processes are carried 
out through local unions, the case studies of the UAW and 
the USW experiences reported in chapter 3 suggest that na 
tional union leaders and staff play key roles in implementing 
a coherent union strategy on worker participation. First, na 
tional union leaders must clearly communicate their views on 
the conditions under which they believe participation pro 
cesses are viable and the conditions under which they would 
advise against union endorsement and involvement. Second, 
where locals are involved in these processes national leaders 
need to provide the training and leadership development ser 
vices required to integrate QWL and related processes with 
broader national union strategies. One of the most positive 
byproducts of QWL experiments is the emergence of a 
talented group of new local labor leaders wo have been train 
ed in group dynamics, problemsolving, and team building. 
Through their roles as QWL facilitators these local union 
representatives are also gaining a greater exposure to and 
serving a much wider cross section of union members than 
most shop stewards or grievance committee members. These
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individuals represent a rich pool of potential future union 
leaders.
Along with these facilitators stand the elected local leaders 
who have taken the political risks associated with supporting 
a QWL process. Together, these elected leaders and QWL 
facilitators represent a highly committed group that believes 
deeply in both the need for strong unions and in the value of 
worker participation. One of the most important contribu 
tions that a national union can make toward strengthening 
the role of worker participation within the union and diffus 
ing the process to a wider spectrum of union members is to 
reinforce, support, and draw on the talents and experiences 
of these individuals. Failure to provide career opportunities 
within their unions for these local activists entails the risk of 
losing many of them to management positions or 
underutilizing them if they fade back into a less active rank 
and file status. Taking advantage of their training and ex 
perience by, for example, using them in educational and 
training conferences, not only will help others to learn from 
their experiences but also will provide the support and rein 
forcement needed to encourage them to continue to be active 
in their union.
The Role of the AFL-CIO
While there is no expectation that the AFL-CIO, or any 
unit at the Federation level, will or should deviate from the 
approach of leaving policies regarding worker participation 
to their constituent unions, there are several critical func 
tions for leaders at this level that are consistent with their 
role in the structure of the American labor movement. These 
functions are to: (1) foster dialogue on this issue among na 
tional union leaders and with representatives of business and 
government; (2) convey to the larger public the labor move 
ment's strategies for relating worker participation to collec 
tive bargaining and broader national economic and labor
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policies; and (3) encourage experimentation with worker 
participation efforts that operate under appropriate condi 
tions.
There clearly will remain a range of views about the 
viability of worker participation efforts and their ap 
propriate role within the broader strategies of the labor 
movement. While it may not be possible or desirable to press 
for a consensus on these issues across the various national 
unions and their leaders, it is clear that the issue of how 
worker participation efforts fit within the larger collective 
bargaining and public policy agenda of the labor movement 
needs to be more actively debated at the highest levels of the 
labor movement. Out of these discussions may emerge a 
clearer picture of what the labor movement's model for 
QWL and related processes should be—a limited supplement 
to collective bargaining or an evolving step toward an 
American brand of shop floor industrial democracy that is 
an integral part of the collective bargaining process.
It was noted at the outset of chapter 6 that national labor 
leaders have an important role in shaping the image of 
unions in the eyes of workers, employers, and the larger 
society. If, under appropriate conditions, worker participa 
tion is seen as an integral component of the broader 
strategies for strengthening the roles and effectiveness of 
unions at the workplace and supplementing collective 
bargaining, then the task of the top leaders will be to convey 
this view of QWL or worker participation efforts to all of 
these audiences. The current message conveyed from the top 
of the movement is one of "cautious skepticism" and 
neutrality. One can envision, however, a different message 
that specifies the conditions that must be present, but then 
conveys enthusiastic support for experimentation with par 
ticular types of worker participation. This shift in the 
message communicated would again help challenge manage 
ment for the initiative on worker participation efforts and
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would serve to further legitimize and encourage the activities 
that are underway within the various national unions.
Implications for the U.S. 
Industrial Relations System
Integrating worker participation efforts into the broader 
bargaining and public policy strategies of the labor move 
ment could potentially lead to a number of important 
changes for the larger U.S. industrial relations system.
Impact on Job Control Unionism
The most direct effect of expanded worker participation 
efforts, especially those that involve work reorganization, is 
a movement away from the detailed job control form of 
unionism characteristic of U.S. collective bargaining. This 
does not mean that the collective bargaining agreement will 
no longer govern the terms and conditions of employment. 
However, detailed specification of contractual rules may 
give way to a more flexible and varied form of work 
organization at the plant level. This implies a major change 
in the roles of the local union, supervisors, and higher levels 
of management.
For the union, this requires relinquishing one of its tradi 
tional bases of power and security in return for greater infor 
mation and perhaps influence over a wider array of issues 
that traditionally have been reserved to management. The 
traditional principle that "management acts and workers 
grieve" will have to give way to more joint planning and con 
sultation at the workplace.
For the worker, this new arrangement means exposure to a 
wider variety of tasks and more advanced training, and, 
therefore, wider opportunities for skill acquisition and 
enhancement. On the other hand, it also implies greater
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responsibility for decisions that would otherwise have been 
left to a supervisor or higher manager.
For management, this development implies a trade of 
some traditional prerogatives in return for greater flexibility 
in human resource management and a reduction in the 
detailed rules governing job definitions and assignments. In 
summary, for all the parties, expanded worker participation 
implies a more proactive form of labor-management rela 
tions based around greater joint research and analysis, plan 
ning, and consultation.
Effects on Labor Law
Over time, the expansion of new forms of work organiza 
tion and participation may lead to a breakdown in the legal 
line of demarcation between "labor" and "management." 
These changes place the role of the supervisor in an even 
more nebulous status than before. This, in turn, should call 
into question provisions in the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) governing the definitions of "worker" covered 
under the Act and "supervisor" excluded from the Act. It 
also challenges the relevance of the NLRA's scope of 
bargaining doctrines as interpreted by the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB). If work teams and union represen 
tatives get more deeply involved in sharing information, con 
sulting, or perhaps even effectively deciding issues that lie 
outside the issues of wages, hours, and working conditions, 
the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects 
of collective bargaining becomes increasingly blurred and 
less relevant.
One further potential outgrowth of these participation ef 
forts is development of some form of "works council" ar 
rangement at the plant level. In a sense, a form of this 
already exists in the joint labor-management steering com 
mittees that oversee many of the QWL participation pro 
cesses.
196 Conclusions and Implications
Linkages to National Labor 
and Economic Policies
Should worker participation, along with the other changes 
in industrial relations set in motion by these projects, be 
viewed as part of a larger national strategy for reforming 
labor policy and enhancing human capital investment and 
development? We believe a strong case can be made for 
treating these processes, forms of work organization, and 
the labor management relationships which support them as 
the micro foundation for a new industrial and human 
resources development policy. It may be desirable for public 
policy debates over trade or tax policies targeted on par 
ticular industries to consider the state of labor-management 
relations (and joint efforts to improve them) in those in 
dustries.
These are questions that the labor movement and others 
concerned about the future of the U.S. industrial relations 
system must grapple with in the years ahead. Perhaps the 
analysis here will stimulate the dialogue needed to move this 
debate closer to center stage. While the material presented in 
this book was aimed primarily at the representatives of the 
labor movement who need to come to grips with the role of 
worker participation processes, ultimately the choice over 
the future of these processes is not labor's alone. Instead, the 
future of worker participation will be shaped by the strategic 
choices made by leaders of unions, firms, and the govern 
ment, and in no small part by the workers themselves, as 
they all attempt to adapt the U.S. industrial relations system 
to a highly competitive world environment.
POSTSCRIPT
Selected Reactions from Union Leaders
Since this study was conducted in cooperation with representatives 
from the labor movement, we thought it would be instructive to include 
as a postscript to the study the reactions to our conclusions of two key 
union presidents. As the following statements of Glenn Watts and 
William Winpisinger attest, there continues to be a wide diversity of 
views of worker participation processes within the American labor move 
ment.
Comments of 
Glenn E. Watts
President 
Communications Workers of America
This study performs a very valuable function in supplying evidence 
about an area which has been largely governed by assumption and im 
pression. It happens that we in CWA have recently concluded our own 
joint study of our QWL process with AT&T; our conclusions are on 
most points similar to those of this book.
1. We found that in the ten cases we studied, QWL had been suc 
cessful on most major dimensions. Survey results showed im 
proved job satisfaction, better relations to supervisors, and 
(unlike the MIT study) a feeling of increased influence and par 
ticipation among the team members. To a lesser extent, these im 
provements spilled over to the non-members. Of particular in 
terest to us, furthermore, is that attitudes to the union were very 
positive, especially among those who saw the union leadership as 
strongly committed to the process.
2. At the same time, we found that many QWL teams run into a 
"plateau"—the same term used by the MIT researchers—after a 
year or two. We do not, however, attribute this loss of momen 
tum to direct negative actions by management. In our case it
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seems to result from the fact that QWL often remains isolated 
within the organization as a whole: there is a lack of widespread 
support for its basic values, and higher-level policies often con 
tradict what the teams are trying to achieve. So their scope of ac 
tivity remains limited, and their view of the future is often 
pessimistic.
3. We also found a few areas where commitment from higher levels 
of management and the union was strong enough that teams 
were encouraged to deal with matters of work-related policy. In 
these locations teams had gotten past the "plateau" and were 
proceeding with great confidence and enthusiasm to tackle dif 
ficult issues.
These findings support the MIT researchers' emphasis on the impor 
tance of extending QWL beyond immediate "environmental" issues. I 
would certainly visualize QWL teams redesigning jobs; and this would, 
as Kochan, Katz and Mower point out, lead teams into areas which are 
covered by the collective bargaining agreement. But I do not believe that 
there need be any blurring of the distinction between collective bargain 
ing and QWL. Our position is very simple: QWL groups cannot bargain 
or alter the contract. They can, however, make recommendations; if 
their recommendations involve contractual changes, they must then pass 
through the normal collective bargaining process before being im 
plemented. This approach, I believe, provides both security and flexibili 
ty in dealing with advanced developments of the QWL process.
My final comment is about a topic which the MIT study does not 
stress. I believe that for QWL to be effective in the long run, it must 
become not just a worker "program," but a part of values and relation 
ships at all levels. That applies not only to management but also to the 
union: we need to consider whether our own structures and internal rela 
tions support participative values. We in CWA have recently taken our 
commitment to QWL a step further by starting the process within our 
own staff. We expect that it will lead to the same improvements we are 
seeking in our effort with AT&T—better working relations and greater 
organizational effectiveness—so that we can provide that best possible 
service to our members in this time of rapid change.
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Comments of 
William W. Winpisinger
President
International Association of Machinists 
and Aerospace Workers
The concept of "quality of work life" is not new to the American 
labor movement. From its very beginnings, American labor has been 
dedicated to improving the quality of workers' lives. In this effort, joint 
labor-management committees have played a role but always within the 
context of collective bargaining.
To their mutual advantage, unions and management have participated 
as equal partners in national and industry councils, firm and plant coun 
cils, apprenticeship and training committees, safety and health commit 
tees and local community programs of all kinds, bringing mutual 
benefits to all concerned. These efforts have augmented the basic collec 
tive bargaining relationship's ability to grapple with the continually 
changing problems of the work place. Workers, through the democratic 
process of collective bargaining, welcome the opportunity to play a 
creative role in helping to resolve problems of the work place. They know 
these problems intimately and can play a major role in resolving them.
To the extent that such committees contribute to worker dignity 
through pride in their skills and work, to their safety and security on the 
job, they greatly enhance the traditional work of the union.
In the past few years, however, there has been a spurt of national in 
terest in more formalized Quality of Work Life programs. Corporate 
America and an army of so-called labor relations consultants have in 
creasingly sought to involve American workers and their unions in 
QWLs. These QWLs are supposed to increase productivity and improve 
product quality. At the same time, they are touted as a means of pro 
moting better worker-employer relations and improving workers' job 
satisfaction by ostensibly giving them a say in work schedules, produc 
tion processes and the like.
Now, in theory, QWL is a concept which any responsible union 
representative would support, i.e., to maintain and improve both pro 
ductivity and the quality of the goods or services associated with the 
company, and thereby, increase the "pie" to be divided through collec 
tive bargaining. Only a quality product will stand the test of the market 
place, insure the company's success and, therefore, secure our members'
200
jobs. Further, if in the process, management utilizes a resource that it has 
long chosen to overlook—the average worker's ability to help solve shop 
floor problems—and, thereby, gives the worker more control over the 
work place, so much the better.
It is, however, how QWLs are actually being used which arouses our 
concern and suspicion. Many anti-union "consultants" and others are 
promoting QWL schemes, in organized as well as unorganized work 
places, to manipulate workers through the illusion of being consulted. 
Through manipulation and rigged committees, workers find themselves 
subjected to speedups, unsafe working conditions, or divisive peer-group 
pressures. When improvements made through workers' effort and in 
genuity exist solely at the discretion of the employer, they may be taken 
away arbitrarily or used to deprive the workers of their jobs.
Programs not based on the collective bargaining relationship under 
mine the basic element of true democratic participation in the determina 
tion of working conditions. They are frequently used as an anti-union 
device to obstruct the right of workers to support, join and organize 
unions of their choice. A recent newsletter from the notorious union- 
buster Charles Hughes extolling the "virtues" of Quality Control 
Circles, does little to allay these fears.
Specifically, QWL programs have the potential for being disruptive 
and unfair in a number of ways.
First, QWL has often been used by management to divide the worker 
and his duly elected bargaining representative. Responsible trade 
unionism has and will continue to recognize management's legitimate 
concern over quality and productivity. Where there are real problems, we 
will work with management through the already existing structure of in- 
plant union representatives, i.e., local lodge officers, shop stewards, etc. 
Why do we need some new organization when one already exists to 
handle these matters of mutual concern?
Second, QWLs can be used as an instrument to put the entire respon 
sibility for "increased productivity" and "poor quality" on the back of 
the workers. With regard to quality, we know from experience that 
employers generally turn a deaf ear to union and workers' criticism of 
management mistakes while continually trying to extract every possible 
minute of working time. Think how many times management has 
pressured workers to push work out regardless of defects so some super 
visor can meet his department's quota. Union members are proud of the 
quality of their work and are justifiably critical of management pressure 
to push work out regardless of defects.
201
Further, no one denies the need for maintaining the high levels of pro 
ductivity of the American worker. What is forgotten, however, is that 
the worker is not the sole instrument of productivity increases. Because 
productivity is most often defined as output per employee-hour, we tend 
to forget the other determinants of productivity—technology, manage 
ment skills, capital investment, energy use and capacity utilization. In 
deed, most experts predict that the greatest improvements in productivity 
will come from the new technologies, e.g., robotics, CAD-CAM, FMS, 
etc.
This is not to say that workers do not play an important role in the 
productivity equation. They do. Their ability to work "smarter," 
however, is directly proportionate to the training and skills they acquire, 
primarily on the job. American industry has always been reluctant to 
train their employees, unless the associated expense was subsidized by the 
government. The shortsightedness of this approach is best illustrated by 
today's critical shortage of skilled workers.
Third, QWL programs, especially Quality Control Circles, often result 
in significant cost savings for the companies that undertake these pro 
grams. These savings result from, among other items, reduced scrap, 
reduced rework, reduced absenteeism, increased productivity, etc. Does 
the company get it all or is the gain shared with the employees?
Further, the union must be concerned with what the company is going 
to do with its share of the savings. Are the savings being reinvested in the 
operation to improve it further and enhance its profitability and viabili 
ty? Are these savings potentially going to be returned to the workers via 
better income and improved benefits? Are the workers who invest their 
time and energy in the Quality Circle being adequately and properly 
rewarded for their participation? Or are these savings being invested 
elsewhere in the corporation in operations which may even be paralleled 
to those generating the savings? In other words, are the savings generated 
by QWL truly benefiting the company and harming workers?
Last, it is interesting to note that in Japan, where the current QCC 
concept first originated, job security is almost always guaranteed in the 
major industries in which QCCs function. It is both unreasonable and 
unfair to ask workers to engage in problem-solving to improve the opera 
tions of the company unless their own jobs are protected. When 
American management decides to import another Japanese idea, i.e., 
lifetime employment, perhaps we will reexamine our position on this sub 
ject.
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In conclusion, management in America often points to QWL, QCC 
and related programs in Japan and various European nations to 
demonstrate how productivity can be improved by labor-management 
cooperation. They fail to note, however, that in such countries both 
management and government recognize and accept the need for unions 
in a just society. Corporate America can hardly expect us to cooperate in 
these efforts while they simultaneously fund and support a so-called 
union-free environment movement dedicated to our destruction.
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